79.6 percent was the official count of votes supporting Lukashenka. By contrast, independent polls saw him score merely 51.1 percent. According to them, 20.5 percent is the share of Belarusian citizens that would cast their vote for him today.

And here are some more figures:

189 percent is the rate, at which the Belarusian rouble devalued this year.

113.6 is the current figure for base inflation. Food prices have risen by 127.4 percent, those of services by 72.4 percent.

45 percent is the current refinancing rate, the highest in the world. This rate compares to 10.5 at the beginning of the year.

70 percent of GDP is the estimated size of Belarus’ external debt by the end of 2011. And it is not supposed to exceed 55 percent of GDP under the country’s national security strategy.

$177 is the difference between wages in December 2010 and October 2011, as average incomes dropped from $530 to $353.

Tens of thousands of Belarusians have migrated to Russia and Ukraine for work; the worst-case scenario expects 1 million people to leave for work.

11 price rises have driven up the costs of gasoline in 2011, provoking several mass protests by automobilists.

$270 per one thousand cubic meters has been the price Belarus paid this year for Russian gas. In 2012, the price will drop to $165.50, while Ukraine is ready to pay $416.

100 percent is the ownership by Gazprom of Belarusian pipeline operator Beltransgaz. Having just purchased the remaining 50 percent for $2.5 billion, Russia now for the first time owns a pipeline outside its territory. Gazprom promised a threefold wage growth to its new employees.

$7.3 billion is the total of Russian subsidies to Belarus, as per Moscow’s calculations, in 2011 and 2012. Besides reductions in gas prices and the purchase of Beltransgaz, Sberbank has provided a $1 billion loan to potash giant Belaruskali.

A single currency is to be introduced in 2012, according to the hopes of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.

…a year has never been that long for the Belarusians.

The Eurasian Union is presented as a purely economic integration project to unite the markets of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, to begin with.

But there is nothing as political as an economic integration project with Russia. As Putin once put it: wars for land are pointless today, as you can just buy it.

The Union can look to its predecessors. The pilot version – the Union State of Belarus and Russia – got stuck somewhere between oblivion and non-existence. There is also the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Eurasian Economic Community, Eurasian Economic Community of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia and – last but not least – the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.

The Kremlin’s neo-imperial ambitions start and end with the immediate neighbourhood and have a strongly nostalgic flavour. The Eurasian Union looks like a set of crutches for three authoritarian regimes with different (and to some extent incompatible) economies to cling together for survival.

Russia’s main export is gas and oil. Its import is everything else. The most significant part of the Belarusian budget is exports of processed Russian oil. Russia is an important market for Belarusian products, but no Russian oil means no state budget. But considering popular protests around Belarus and Russia, economic stability is more than ever a necessity in these countries.

Twenty years have gone by and Belarus’ choice between the EU and the EU (the Eurasian Union) is not political but purely geographical as it still borders on three EU member states and Russia.

Brussels expects Belarus to embrace democracy before any integration can go ahead. The regime in Minsk has ignored Brussels’ unilateral offer to liberalise visas. Politically, the offer from Moscow looks unbeatable as it contains no uncomfortable conditions on structural reforms, liberalisation and respect of democratic values.

But the latest-model union means for Belarus an even tighter hug by the Russian bear. The common market excludes access to Russian gas and oil. And the formula for gas prices is always open to re-calculation and re-negotiation, depending heavily on the good political will of Moscow.

So the Eurasian Union, another integration project with Russia: It’s like a bad dream, not even a nightmare, because it’s all too familiar.

It’s not my metaphor but I find it is apt when it comes to questions about the general dissatisfaction and the lack of nationwide strikes or protests. So long as people can make ends meet economically, they won’t take to streets. Moreover, how can you demand anything when there are no instruments for you to influence those who make decisions? The only decisive argument here is mass demonstrations.

The silent protests in Belarus this summer were easier: Whether you prefer controlled or market economy, the current president or the opposition, you can clap together. No rally with loudspeakers could have united all those people as they have different problems and see different ways to solve them. And even this form of protest was successfully stifled with the method “arrest everyone in the vicinity.”

The economy in Belarus is going badly; the next wave of inflation is coming. People are anxious, lose their trust in the government and the measures it takes, try to predict the price rises. Nor is it easy politically, as there are new laws to prevent silent actions and financial help from abroad, the powers of the law enforcement officers are being broadened. But Belarusians have the will to survive anything.

The classical (Lenin’s) definition of the revolutionary situation is when the “tops” can’t govern the way they used to and “bottoms” do not want to live the same way anymore. Only desperate people create revolutions. Only when it rains, it pours. And now it’s still difficult to forecast: If and when it’s going to rain.

The October Revolution in Russia in 1917 was hailed by intellectuals as a socialist and a social coup. Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi and Cuba’s Fidel were also promising revolutionaries at one time.

But any great idea can fail in its implementation. If there are x ways to get from starting point a to point b, the choices need to be examined and debated, but this is impossible in autocratic regimes. There are no roads in the authoritarian jungle. The socialist revolution and the road to Communism were followed by almost a century of passionate struggle against individualism. The fist of Soviet autocracy crushed free spirits. It is the same story with Cuba and Libya.

Where are these countries going? Against the flow? Going their own, unique way, not giving a damn about America or EU? But who do they listen to? An inner circle of wise counsellors? Righto – the masses are already inert and can be easily ignored.

Authority is inherently so dangerous and prone to corruption that no system can stay healthy without division of power, elections and rotation of leaders. The problem is that any change is a challenge for autocrats. For them, a one-man protest could have a butterfly effect and bring everything crashing down.

But let us come back to Europe.

Belarusian leader Lukashenka won the first presidential elections in the country when it became independent and broke away from Soviet rule. He wanted to end corruption and to improve the economy. Seventeen years later his regime is heading into a cul-de-sac. “Cul” means “arse” in French and “sac” is “bag” – they literally describe the situation.

Inflation in Belarus in the first seven months of 2011 was between five and 103 times higher than elsewhere in post-Soviet countries. In 2011 consumer prices have gone up by 41%. A shortage of foreign currency prompted mass sales of Belarusian products to Poland and to Russia in order to get hold of Polish zlotys and Russian roubles. There are shortages in the shops. Now people go to queue up in the morning to get meat. Meanwhile, the upward leap in prices saw Belarusians stockpile sugar, cereal an sunflower oil. They say, it’s temporary that there’s not enough meat sold in Belarus. Well, was economic stability temporary as well?

And what does this panic show? It reveals the lack of trust and lack of empathy of ordinary people toward the leadership. People need an alternative and they cannot find one. It’s natural – an autocratic regime presupposes no alternative. As we say in Minsk, there’s no grass where the tanks drive. But discontent and distrust do not automatically bring autumn to the patriarchs. There’s panic about failing economy in Belarus, but no mass protests, no walkouts.

EU is now thinking to revive the conditional dialogue with the regime to help the country out. That would be the right thing to do for your neighbour, even if stabilising the country means stabilising the regime. When negotiating, one can trade help for necessary changes.

The colossi are heavy and not easy to move. But they are bound to fall in the end. Sometimes after 42 years, sometimes more quickly.

Isn’t it ironic? The name of my blog has changed its meaning several times since I started it. The spring of 2009 brought the thaw, the winter of 2010/2011 looked like an Ice Age and summer 2011 has it all: economic breakdown, complete loss of direction on behalf of the authorities and creative protests. My personal Oscar goes to the sense of humour skyrocketing these months in Belarus.

And it is ironic indeed. Now that the opposition is in jail or morally devastated, Belarusians all over the country are organising themselves with the help of social media (and use of the Internet is fairly widely spread) for silent protests. During three consecutive Wednesdays Belarusians gathered on the central squares of 20 cities, without chanting any slogans, and simply clapped their hands.

Each time more people came (several thousands only in Minsk) and even more were brutally detained or arrested. The next demo is on 29 June. On 3 July – on our Day of Independence – there is another one. Police have already announced that clapping hands will be considered a violation of public order.

Meanwhile, the EU has introduced its first ever economic sanctions against the regime. They needn’t have bothered. They regime already did that to themselves: problems with availability of foreign currency, imports and foreign debt are drastic.

In the time of economic crisis it’s finally evident  – even for my granny  – that the country badly needs structural reforms.

Belarus’ economic model has run out of steam, the World Bank says. Devaluation of the national currency to 56 percent is a blessing for an export-oriented economy, Lukashenka says. He is embarrassed to see how Belarusians reacted, with panic buying, to rumours about possible shortages of sugar and sunflower oil … (the oil, yes, the oil, Annushka).

A quarter of Belarusians believe they are to blame for the economic crisis in the country, Lukashenko also says. Aha, the nation responds, now we know how many Belarusians really voted for the president in December.

You can’t choose a nation to govern, Lukashenka adds. But you can choose a president is my reply.

Russia? Its involvement in the whole story of the economic deterioration in Belarus is not so clear. After years of brotherly help, it sharply raises energy prices, denies indirect subsidies, demands back debts and remindes about the Belarusian enterprises it could buy.

In terms of political pressure, the Russian government has publicly deplored politicised trials and state Russian TV is closely following our protests. For his part, Russian President Medvedev didn’t even bother to come to the Brest fortress to commemorate 70th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic war.

This is what Belarusians are saying with their silence. That changes are taking place and more is to come. It’s scary. It’s unbelievable. It’s unexpected. But it’s real and it needs to be done.

Hey EU – all eyes on Belarus for 3 July.

The country has neither religious nor nationalist internal conflicts and no external enemies. The explosion comes shortly after presidential elections in December, which saw law enforcement bodies hailed for preventing what they called a coup d’etat prepared by the opposition and Western countries. So how was the blast in the very centre of the capital possible?

The bomb attack occurred in the Minsk metro during Monday’s evening rush hour. Thirteen people are dead, 200 were injured. It’s a huge tragedy for a peaceful country of 10 million people which has not taken part in any wars since it gained independence in 1991. A far more striking loss than the disappearances of several opposition politicians and a journalist in 1999 and 2000.

On 13 April – the official day of mourning – President Alyaksandr Lukashenka announced that the case has been solved and the bombing suspects have confessed.

The main suspects are two ordinary 25-year-old men, a lathe operator and an electrician. They also confessed to two earlier bombings – in September 2005 in Vitsyebsk and on Independence Day in Minsk on 3 July 2008 – basically, the only other bomb attacks of note during Lukashenka’s rule. Nobody was killed in the earlier blasts, which had remained unsolved.

There has been a lot of speculation on who might have wanted to ‘destabilise the country’ at a time when it is already struggling with a complicated economic problem.

Moscow? But Minsk has pinned its hope on a loan from Russia and it will be hard for the Kremlin to seek tough conditions in the aftermath of the tragedy. In fact, the latest news from Moscow is that talks on a $1 billion loan could be completed within a month. Also, that a second anti-crisis loan of $2 billion will be considered in the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community.

The opposition? After the presidential elections opposition leaders and their aides are either in prison or under house arrest, awaiting trial on charges of organising or participating in mass protests.

Islamist groups? Organised crime? Could it be an internal power struggle between apparatchiks? The fight against Lukashenka?

For sure, the explosion has caused discomfort for the government: the first reactions on Belarusian websites blamed Lukashenka himself. He visited the site just two and a half hours after the attack with his seven-year-old son (!) and urged police to catch the bombers as soon as possible.

In theory, he could benefit from distracting people from the economic crisis and use the event as a pretext to strangle what remains of the opposition. But in practice? It doesn’t make much sense. How can you distract someone from his daily routine? And destroy what is already almost nonexistent? And more trials will follow anyway.

For its part, the UN Security Council condemned the explosion as an “apparent” act of terrorism on face value. It apparently saw “a more than even chance that the government was behind this”.

Meanwhile, Lukashenka is indignant over the suggestions he may have been involved. He said that peace and security are the “brand” of Belarus and that the case has been solved very quickly. He added: “Am I an idiot to be the one to claim the crime is cleared?” The terrorists loved chemistry and hated people.

The President has linked the post-election protests, the current economic problems and the bombing as a joint-up conspiracy to undermine the stability in the country, saying that the opposition is acting in collusion with Western governments and could be responsible.

Lukashenka promised to stabilise the economic situation in a matter of days, or a week. He asked people “not to be mad at him” and promised that the worst has already passed.

One of the Russian yellow newspapers published the names of the three suspects, all of whom are simple guys from Vitsyebsk who worked at the Vitsyebsk Tractor Parts Factory. An opposition activist who happened to serve in the army together with one of the suspects confirmed that the guy was a real fan of chemistry.

No formal charges have yet been brought against the men, but it’s pretty clear what awaits them: Belarus is the only country in Europe which still executes people. They could be trialed as quickly as they were arrested. The official discourse – that the country is in a state of war – is also alarming as for instance, the people spreading ‘slanderous accusations’ about the events could face criminal charges.

Unreal as it may seem, the situation in the country might soon stabilise: the government is likely to get the loans it needs and to privatise some of the biggest enterprises. Devaluation will be a tough but necessary step, foreign currency will flow back, those found guilty of the bombing will face capital punishment.

What will remain is a deep fissure in the fabric of society, recognised even by the President himself: between those who believe anything the authorities say or do and those who find it difficult to believe anything.

How many people believe that the hastily arrested are the terrorists? How many will trust the verdict?

How many will be happy with economic measures to curb the crisis? How many regret their vote in December?

The question is – can such a country be considered genuinely stable?

The two main weapons of the Belarusian authorities are fear, surprise and ruthless efficiency… Well, the three weapons are fear, surprise, ruthless efficiency and fanatical devotion to the social model of market economy… Anyhow, not the rule of law, but the law of their rules, which are not always logical.

The current economic and political self-portrait of Belarus is full of the brightest shades of the darkest colours. Since presidential elections in December 2010, the future of the country has been changing. On 12 April EU ministers will discuss potential economic sanctions against Belarusian authorities. No sweat: they already introduced economic sanctions against themselves.

The country faces a crisis in terms of hard currency: trading in foreign currency has been restricted and no flexibility in the exchange rate is allowed. It’s very difficult to buy dollars or euros, which makes foreign travel difficult, handicaps the private sector and could end-up bringing the biggest state factories to a standstill.

Belarusians have hurried to empty their bank accounts to buy foreign currency as well as anything that can be traded (gold) or might get a lot more expensive (sugar, buckwheat, sunflower oil).

Belarus lives beyond its means. Foreign debt skyrocketed from zero in 2006 to $10.6 billion dollars in March 2011. The government has ruled out a devaluation, which the IMF believes is a vital step.

It looks like Moscow is in control. It promised loans ($3 billion) but is in no hurry to pay them. First the Kremlin gave Minsk 10 days (!) to bring forward a plan for economic reforms. Now this document is being studied. Is Moscow expecting Belarus to give it carte blanche to buy the family silver (Belarusian chemical and machinery plants, oil refineries)? Russian businessmen have wanted this for a long time but could not get access.

Meanwhile, Russia is to raise its gas price for Belarus. It used to be $187 dollar per 1.000 cubic metres in 2010, $223 at the beginning of 2011 and will now be $244.7.

One sign that Belarusian authorities are once again putting their hope in the West is the release of a number of detainees from KGB detention centres considered by the EU to be political prisoners. Their charges have not been dropped but10 of them now face three instead of 15 years in jail. The official story is that this is the result of the investigations.

The two main sources of stability for Belarusian authorities have always been cheap Russian gas (for whatever reasons) and the trust of the wider public (for whatsoever reasons). The lack of the first asset shows the instability of the latter. And this at least is logical.

So why the sanctions? Since the evening of election day on 19 December Blearusian civil society has faced an unprecedented level of pressure.

Political activists, journalists, human rights defenders are being taken for questioning and arrested, their offices and flats are being searched. Three out of 10 presidential candidates are still in KGB detention centre, five ex-candidates and 37 people in total face harges of organising mass protests and could spend up to 15 years in prison.

Most of them haven’t met their lawyers since 29 December. All 37 have been recognised by Amnesty International as prisoners of conscience.

What could the EU do? Ban officials from entering EU countries; freeze their assets and property in EU countries; embargo products of Belarusian state companies.

What would it bring? Only the embargo option has an impact beyond the political. There are calculations that the Belarusian economy would collapse in a matter of months if Europe stops buying Belarusian oil products and potash fertilisers. On the other hand, any restrictions from the West would inevitably push Belarus eastwards – into Russia’s loving arms.

What do Belarusians want? Belarusians hope that imprisoned activists are released. They also hope for “positive sanctions” – more freedom to travel; enhanced and non-bureaucratic co-operation with NGOs and political parties; a long-term perspective for institution-building and social development. And they want no more Russia.

What’s it all about? Is the ultimate goal regime change? The democratisation of Belarus? If the latter, the EU should proceed with restricted political dialogue with the political elite and an extended dialogue with the population at large. I do hope they consider carefully the means, not just the end.

As the last month has shown, it’s very unlikely that the BY government has the potential to carry out structural democratic reforms and to open up. At the same time, the uninformed wider public in Belarus has no way to articulate its will, no public sphere in which to imagine a new path of development. We need external help to help ourselves.

If supermarkets have for decades only sold apples, why would you suddenly demand pineapples, which are anyway believed to  be “the worst form [of fruit?], except for all the others that have been tried?”

I know, the matter is a lot more complicated than I have pictured here. For informed Belarusians it’s been a very, VERY exhausting month. Every day has brought ups and downs and ups and then downs again. There is no signs the madness will end shortly, or that the EU  sanctions will really help.

The prisoner release on the eve of the EU foreign ministers’ meeting is the traditional Belarusian political tango: two steps backward and one step forward. Will the EU be deceived again?

If nothing else, Belarus is a wonderful stress test for EU foreign policy, and its influence on events in the Union’s most direct of neighbours.

Probably, you didn’t hear?

A short retrospective, as I feel the need to explain myself, the same as German and Polish FMs Westerwelle and Sikorski – the architects of the EU-Belarus “critical” political dialogue. I’ve been trying to show it’s not that bad. Well, now it is.

Two weeks ago the authorities dispersed an anti-Lukashenka demonstration with extreme violence. About 700 people were detained, and not just protesters. People who were simply leaving bars or cinemas in Minsk city centre were also among those put under arrest for 10 to 15 days or fined. It’s as if someone wanted to make sure that the number of those detained was impressive enough. The detention reports were identical: everybody, apparently, was arrested at 10.30pm local time at the Nezavisimosti square, where an unauthorised demonstration took place and where they shouted anti-state (!) slogans – inter alia – “Long live Belarus.”

In the two weeks that followed, the crackdown has continued but in a more targeted way. The homes of the relatives of those arrested were searched, as well as the flats and offices of human rights defenders, opposition activists and journalists.

There’s also a (growing?) list of 27 people who could be charged with organising mass riots (facing between 5 and 15 years’ jail) and participating in them (3-8 years).

The list features seven former presidential rivals of Alyaksandr Lukashenka – Ryhor Kastusyow, Alyaksey Mikhalevich, Uladzimir Nyaklyayew, Vital Rymashewski, Andrey Sannikaw, Mikalay Statkevich and Dzmitry Uss.

All of them, except for Kastusyow and Uss, are being held in the KGB detention centre, even though the charges were brought by the Minsk city police. The news is coming out from the lawyers of those charged. There is no official information as this stage. Rymashewski was suddenly released today on his own recognisance (3 January). More people are expected to be released on the condition that they will not leave Minsk during the investigation.

Among the 27 on the list and in the KGB cells are the presidential candidates’ aides, journalists and opposition activists, but not the dozen or so people who broke the windows of a government building on 19 December. The attack on the building was a signal for the police to brutally disperse the whole unarmed crowd. They dozen assailants can be clearly seen on videos posted on the internet. Where are these still-unknown heroes? The minister of interior, Kulyashow, has promised to identify each and every one who was involved.

Meanwhile, the president-elect decided not to wait for the inauguration and appointed a new government (same faces, different positions). On 31 December Belarusian authorities sent another signal to the Western front: they found no objective reason to prolong the mandate of the OSCE office in Minsk (“We don’t need no education”).

Every action has a reaction.

I can hardly believe the massive wave of solidarity this has provoked: Social networks put aside their holidays, people have been raising money to pay the fines, discussing how they could help. The Guardian-Angel programme published the list of people arrested for 10-15 days and suggested ways to help: choose a person to supply with toilet paper, drinking water, warm clothes and so on, come to pick him/her up with a car when they are released.

Blogs and forums have analysed pictures and videos from the demonstration, compared official reports and independent media. Newspapers got phone-calls with stories such as: “Who can I tell that my mum took a taxi from the restaurant and was snatched out of it when it stopped at the traffic lights? She is arrested as a demonstration participant”.

The comment of the president-elect – that Christmas in Belarus was celebrated this year in a unique, unprecedented atmosphere – is indeed true.

This country, situated between the EU and Russia, has contained had a dividing line. Now the nation is more polarised than ever, mostly along age lines, not geographically, but geopolitically and, above all, emotionally. In his New Year’s address Lukashenka spoke of “the absolute majority” and “the minority.”

What’s going on? How far is Moscow involved? Is it the intention of Minsk to stop all cooperation with the West and put up with the opposition? Just like that? All of a sudden? That’s what “the minority” can’t stop talking about and finds no answers.

But the question that bothers me the most: what were the police guys thinking when they beat and kicked their own countrymen – people who were armed only with slogans?

Nobody expected the Spanish inquisition: it was beyond logic that some 20 thousand would gather in the centre of Minsk after the closure of the polling stations to protest against rigged votes, that more than 600 would be detained or arrested, dozens would be beaten up. The presidential candidates were virtually abducted from the street or from the hospital.

The demonstration was violently dispersed after a group of youngsters attacked the building with the Central Election Commission and the parliament. There are no lists of those detained.

Journalists argue that the attack was a stage-managed government provocation in order trigger detentions. Probably, not. But some candidates were beaten and taken to the KGB detention centre before the attack on the government building.

Some official numbers:  More than 90% turnout, almost 80% supported Lukashenka and 14% was shared by the rest of the candidates.

Some more big numbers: 5 ex-candidates and several prominent opposition activists are still under arrest. They might be penalised for the organisation of mass riots (up to 15 years), but nothing is yet clear.

Meanwhile on Tuesday (21 December) searches and detentions went on.

Why would months of  “democracy” end up so abruptly? The protest potential and the cold wouldn’t keep Belarusians in the city centre too long. The demonstrations on the following evenings gather dozens people, no thousands. The police violence was excessive and rather pre-emptive than anything else.

The advantage of the authorities is their pro-active stand. Oposition leaders didn’t have any plan, they were undecided and disagreed whether to stay in the square or move to the Election Committee. And what to do there.

Even more so, the opposition knew that provocations were prepared but never took means of precaution to protect the action and the people who dared to join it.

President Lukashenka called a rather negative OSCE assessment a huge step forward. He pointed out that “too much of this stupid democracy is over” and he won’t let “tear the counrty into pieces“. He promised to publish within a week information on the operation of opposition parties and NGOs and the backstage data on their financial sources.

Journalists will also be made fully responsible for every word they write, he said. The election-time heyday of free and easy reporting is over.

Lukashenka remarked that it’s not manly for people to complain that they have been beaten up: “You want to be a president? You have to bear it!”

The president-elect now has compelling problems to tackle, such as foreign debt, the export deficit, urgent demand for economic modernisation.

The country needs money. EU ministers coming to Minsk before elections have talked about €3 billion for projects and reforms in future. Russia’s conditions for $4 billion dollars in indirect aid are unclear but the offer seems to have been snapped up by Minsk as both sides are very optimistic about the oil and gas deliveries.

Was one of the conditions sending a clear signal to the opposition via the use of police batons?

Russian Dmitry Medvedev voiced hope that as a result of the elections Belarus will continue to develop its state on the basis of democracy and friendship with its neighbours (!).

The EU seems perplexed and for a reason. It’s yet to be seen if this will influence relations between Brussels and Minsk. But so far the reaction from the neighbouring EU capitals was very moderate.

Me, I am pretty frustrated… Another election, another democratic flop… My hope is  that every exit is an entrance to somewhere else.