Archive for February, 2012

In December 2011 – January 2012, the author traveled to Ukraine. During the trip she met leaders and MPs representing Ukraine’s main political parties: “Batkivshchyna”, the “Front for Change”, “Our Ukraine” and the Party of Regions. The author also met heads and experts of the lead think-tanks dealing with Ukraine’s home and external policy: the Centre for Political and Legal Reforms, the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, the International Renaissance Foundation (Soros Foundation in Ukraine), the Laboratory of Legislative Initiatives, New Citizen, the “Nomos” Centre, Razumkov Centre and Yalta European Strategy (YES). All in all, the author met 15 political figures and experts.

 This article rests on the conclusions made on the basis of her conversations with interlocutors, as well as own observations and reflections. In this article the author wants to review the key results of the home and foreign policy of Viktor Yanukovych by the end of 2011 and identify the key trends of its future development – in the short and middle run. More specifically, the author will try to answer the following questions:

• What socio-political system does Viktor Yanukovych seek to build?
• What results has he achieved so far?
• What factors facilitate the achievement of his goals?
• What factors stand in the way of Viktor Yanukovych implementing his ideas?
• How is the foreign policy embedded into the system of governance of Viktor Yanukovych? What are its goals and tools?
• What are the prospects of Ukraine’s development in 2012 and beyond?

Home policy: can one build and hold on an authoritarian regime without money and popular love?

Almost all interlocutors said that President Yanukovych was building an authoritarian system of governance in Ukraine. One interlocutor even said that he sought to build a dynastic system of rule with the right to transfer power to his sons. Maybe it is an exaggeration to say that, but actions of the president evidently aim to build and keep personal power. This is witnessed by many decisions and processes in Ukraine after Viktor Yanukovych came to power. All those dealing with Ukrainian issues are aware of those processes and facts. The author will only remind them:

• Reinstatement of the Constitution of 1996 restoring the semi-presidential system of rule. In reality, even that Constitution is implemented with a strong bias in favour of the presidential rule.
• Subjugation of the judicial and legislative branches to the executive branch in the person of the President and his administration. As most interlocutors noted, having assumed huge powers, including not provided by the Constitution, the President is now «responsible for everything that goes on in the country».
• Non-political reprisals against the opposition. The trials of Yuliya Tymoshenko and other members of her government are demonstrative in this respect.
• Strengthening of the President’s grasp locally, achieved through local elections not fully meeting the European standards.
• Restriction of the freedom of speech. This primarily refers to television – the most popular source of information. Existence of so-called political talk shows called to demonstrate pluralism of opinions should not deceive, since there are so-called «stop-lists» in Ukraine – the lists of persons barred from the air. Speaking to the author, one executive of an opposition party confessed that he could not appear and speak on TV for six months, since his name was on the black list.

During his stay in power Viktor Yanukovych, indeed, managed to make progress in building an authoritarian state with strong presidential power. This was facilitated by a number of factors:

• Apathy of the bulk of the population and disappointment at politics and politicians. The disappointment refers to representatives of the government and the opposition alike. That apathy is mainly attributed to the people’s disbelief in their ability to demand and enforce changes.
• Fear of possible forcible actions of the authorities and persecutions on political grounds. Of course, it is a matter of the number of protesters – as a rule, no government would use force against hundreds of thousands, but while such figures are absent, people are afraid of the use of force and other persecutions.
• The grave economic situation in the country makes people think about everyday bread rather than the defense of their democratic freedoms and rights.
• Disunity and weakness of civil society institutes. Disunity of society in Ukraine, as well as in other post-Soviet states, is a grave heritage of the Soviet system aimed at atomisation of society in order not to let it rally and defend its rights. But since Ukraine has already had an example of society unification to defend its rights – the Orange Revolution – there remains hope for reunification of society.
• Lack of democracy within democratic opposition. The main drawback of the opposition in Ukraine lies not in its disunity and inability to unite but in its insufficient democracy. One may say that in essence it little differs from the authorities, as they are built on and exist in accordance with similar principles and templates and, unfortunately, do little to change it. As one interlocutor put it, “both the authorities and the opposition view power in Ukraine as shares of a closed joint-stock company: if you stay in power – you are a majority shareholder, in the opposition – a minority, but all of them are embedded into the system”.

Many see the policy of Viktor Yanukovych as a mockery of the policy of Vladimir Putin building a hierarchy of power in Russia. Indeed, building his system of power, Viktor Yanukovych in many aspects followed the path covered by Vladimir Putin. Only the terms of building differ: while it took Vladimir Putin more than 10 years, Viktor Yanukovych almost managed it within less than two years. When one has predesigned and tested templates, one can indeed build faster. However, there is a strong probability that the hastily built system will collapse as rapidly as it was built. Besides, there is a number of natural factors and processes that may not let Viktor Yanukovych accomplish building authoritarianism and keep what he has already built. They include:

• Insufficient legitimacy of power, embedded in the unconstitutional method of amending the Constitution in September, 2010. Than, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine assumed powers not provided by the Constitution, abolished the Constitution of 2004 and replaced it with the Constitution of 1996. As one interlocutor put it, “at present, all in Ukraine seem to live with such situation, but this remains that way until the time comes”.
• Absence of popular love and respect for the authorities. It is enough to take a look at the results of public opinion polls of the end of 2011 to make sure that during his office, Viktor Yanukovych lost two-thirds of his most devoted voters – residents of the Eastern regions of Ukraine. People’s disappointment at Viktor Yanukovych deprives him of one of the main properties of an authoritarian leader or a contender for that role – popular love. According to one interlocutor, Leonid Kuchma lost popular support in ten years, Viktor Yushchenko – in five, while Viktor Yanukovych needed just two years.
• Lack of consensus between the government and elites. This factor greatly differentiates Viktor Yanukovych from Vladimir Putin. The latter’s rule largely rested on the existing «contract» between the government and elites: the government let the elite line pockets, and the latter in return did not protest against the government or even helped it. That contract was partly broken only at the end of 2011, when part of that elite managed to lead into streets of different Russian cities tens of thousands of people to rally against the government. In Ukraine, such contract has never been made – the Ukrainian intellectual elite from the very beginning did not conceal its negative attitude to Viktor Yanukovych, and as his rule goes on, the number of those dissatisfied grows.
• Lack of the government’s resources to build an authoritarian system. This may be the main factor that differentiates the capabilities of Viktor Yanukovych from those of Vladimir Putin. Apart from the non-public contract with the elites, Vladimir Putin also made kind of a «social contract» with broad strata of the population: people claimed no rights and freedoms, and instead, they got tolerable economic and social standards at the expense of the funds obtained from gas and oil sales. Nothing of that kind can happen in Ukraine, since it has no such resources.
• Vanity of the authorities’ hopes for support from the power structures. In the absence of funds and popular love, Viktor Yanukovych may be left with the hope of keeping society under his influence using power structures. Some interlocutors noted that the authorities will not stop at the use of power against population. Though, support for such actions by the power structures is doubtful due to two main reasons: unpopularity of Viktor Yanukovych among their officers and long-standing underfunding of those structures.
• Low professionalism of decision-makers in the country. Most of interlocutors mentioned that factor. Incompetence, lack of knowledge about the developments in the country and abroad, illiterate prediction and the generally narrow thinking were named as specific features of the people ruling today’s Ukraine. The inability to predict the consequences of their actions was noted by interlocutors as one of the factors in the case of Yuliya Tymoshenko.
• Possible divergence of interests of Viktor Yanukovych and the financial-industrial groups that led him to power. In parallel with authoritarianism, Viktor Yanukovych is building his own financial-industrial group, including at the expense of the existing ones. Here, his personal interests may differ from those of the oligarchs who led him to power. This contradiction conceals an internal conflict that, according to some interlocutors, is already in place but remains unnoticed by the broad public.
• Corruption as a core factor of public life. One expert keenly noted the difference of the corruption under President Yushchenko from the corruption under President Yanukovych: «while previously (under Viktor Yushchenko), officials were stealing but knew that that was bad and therefore tried to conceal that, the officials who came with Viktor Yanukovych do not even understand that this is bad, and so, steal in the public». Corruption and officials’ embezzlement of the budget under Viktor Yanukovych reached the scale that, according to another interlocutor, «frightens even the government», since they became uncontrolled and arouse strong protests and irritation of the people, weakening the standing of Viktor Yanukovych himself.
• Gradual evolution of people’s apathy into social protests. All the period of office of Viktor Yanukovych was accompanied with protests of different social groups – from people entitled to benefits and pensioners to Internet users. The bulk of society is real apathic but well informed and unity is found within different social strata and groups. So far, those groups are disunited and lack one leader to unite them. However, only a catalyser may be needed to make it happen.
• Profanation of reforms. As one expert rightfully said, it is absolutely unclear where the reforms come from, how they are developed and what their goal is. Another expert noted that «besides that, reforms are implemented chaotically, they were hastily compiled from uncoordinated elements of reforms proposed previously, that collected dust in different ministries and agencies». Quite naturally, people feel that, and the main thing, see from their own lives that those reforms do not improve but worsen their life.

Foreign policy: imitation, as the end and means of foreign policy?

The foreign policy of President Yanukovych reflects his home policy, focusing on his desire to stay the only national leader. The main goal in the foreign policy is, therefore, to bar alternative outside influence on the country.

Imitation of integration – probably at best describes the main task of his foreign policy.  Integration with both – the EU and Russia – so that to be integrated nowhere in the end result; rapprochement with both of them as much as necessary to keep them off real influence on developments within the country. The influence of one actor is to be offset by the counter-influence of another one. The logic behind it is simple: growth of influence of either actor can harm economic interests of the financial-industrial groups and is politically dangerous, since it may pose a threat to the president’s personal power.

All the past year Viktor Yanukovych, using all the state machinery, practiced this approach: alternatively pitted the EU and the USA against Russia, trying to openly play on contradictions in their attitude to Ukraine and bargain some dividends for himself and his milieu. However, by the end of 2011 he had lost his game and was left with nothing: no Agreement of Association with the EU, no new acceptable gas contract with Russia, no IMF credits, no normal relations with the USA.

The relations with the outside world and the attitude of the outside world to Viktor Yanukovych are important in two more respects: growing international isolation from the Western world, and a threat of fall of Vladimir Putin’s regime under the pressure of mass protests on the eve of presidential elections in Russia on March 4, 2012. Both those factor contribute to weakening of Viktor Yanukovych’s rule. Isolation threatens with and has largely become a reality of the absence of foreign Western loans and financial aid. The fall or even weakening of Putin’s rule threatens Mr. Yanukovych with the loss of a possible umbrella of power Viktor Yanukovych might need in case of weakening of his own regime.

Conclusions: parliamentary elections of October 2012 as a prelude to fundamental changes at the presidential elections 2015?

By and large, analysing the mix of factors that help or prevent Viktor Yanukovych from building a fully-pledged authoritarian system of governance in Ukraine, it seems that the factors standing at the road of authoritarianism prevail, and Viktor Yanukovych will manage neither to ultimately build an authoritarian society nor to keep what has been built. The trend of public processes in the country and beyond is not in the President’s favour.

The power of Viktor Yanukovych sooner rather than later may be sandwiched under pressure from two sides: by internal protests of Ukrainians, unsatisfied with socio-economic conditions of living on one side and external pressure on the other side.  Without an air cushion of financial assets or resources, it may be very difficult for Viktor Yanukovych to relieve that pressure by his own efforts. He may either have to make concessions to domestic protests of the opposition, or to ask for assistance to suppress protests. Anyway, this may mean loss of power. The remained question is when this can happen.

All interlocutors agreed that the parliamentary elections of October 2012 will be a landmark for Ukraine’s home and foreign policy. Most interlocutors also suggested that the authorities would manage to secure a majority in future Parliament, some predict even a constitutional majority. However, the same majority has no doubt that the parliamentary elections of October 2012 may be a prelude to fundamental changes in the country’s ruling power in the year of the presidential elections in 2015.