It finally happened

Ukraine has taken its next step towards democracy.

Instances of succession and surrender of power in pursuance of the popular will are unusual for the former USSR. That is why Ukrainian elections are of that importance. What matters the most is not the figure that gets the power but the mode of its transfer. Democratic procedures, in this case, are all important. The main task for the state today is to preserve these democratic institutions and procedures to be able to change power regularly at all levels in future.

Yuliya Tymoshenko has not officially recognised the election results. Being aware what a shock she must have received, we hope that she will find the strength to accept defeat and continue her political career.

What are results of the vote?

-  For the first time in the history of independent Ukraine, the president failed to win at least half of the votes of those who came to the polls. This is both, a good and a bad sign. Bad because it is difficult to run a country which doesn’t support you. Good, because it is a safety valve against the usurpation of power by the presidential office. It means a strong opposition. It means the need for Yanukovych to consider the stand and the opinion of his opponents. It is an imperative for coming to terms.

-   High percentage of those who voted “against all.” The results of voting in Kyiv especially strike the eye – 8 percent of people used this form of protest. This protest is a clear sign of a need for changes, which hopefully will come during the forthcoming local and possible early parliamentary elections.

-   The elections reaffirmed the geographic split of the country.  Residents of the eastern and western regions voted mirror-like, with few exceptions. Many see it as a danger, many – as a safeguard against the usurpation of power by one political force across Ukraine. In any case this an indispensable feature of the modern Ukraine.

-   Presidential elections are only the beginning. Now, focus will be on the regional elections next May and probably on the early parliamentary elections that may be held in the fall. The struggle and, consequently, the process of the succession of power will go on. Exactly this infuses hopes for the future.

The main thing: Ukraine is to continue its difficult democratic transformation. Many reproach Ukraine for chaos, political fight, absence of reforms and so on. To say a word in its defence: Ukraine is learning by democracy almost by itself with much lesser support than the Central and Eastern European countries had, when they were preparing to become the EU members. Mistakes are inevitable. But the nation is moving on, with moans and groans.

Of course, EU support makes it easier. We hope that the Eastern Partnership will help, and sooner or later, the door to the prospects of membership will be opened. In the short run, the opening of borders with Ukraine would give an invaluable signal of support.

Democracy cannot be ultimately established in the country without reforms. The lack of reforms today presents the main hindrance on Ukraine’s road to progress and prosperity. Reforms in this country are a very hard task to do until all ownership issues are resolved, and there are still “tasty” morsels of property lying around to be “appropriated” by whoever is in power. Current priorities for reforms, therefore, include: compilation of land registers, cancellation of a ban on sale of farm land, establishment of order in the tax and regulatory sectors, and fighting against corruption above all. They should go simultaneously with reforms of the law-enforcement and judicial systems.

Sooner or later, the country must come to that. Step by step, Ukrainian people will pave the way into the future.

Ukraine is highly important for the post-Soviet space. If democracy survives in Ukraine, it will have a chance in the post-Soviet space. Beyond doubt, people in the capitals of those countries breathlessly watched the presidential race. Some with disdain, some with hope.

It is important that the number of those who pin hopes on that difficult struggle waged by Ukrainians goes up…

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Is there a chance to escape de-legitimisation of the election results?

Recent developments in the election process in Ukraine may lead to potential de-legitimisation of the election results, no matter who formally wins it.

The period between the two rounds of the presidential elections have seen a series of alarming events showing that both sides are getting ready for falsifications on the part of their opponents, and for post-election confrontation:

  • The situation with two chairmen and two seals of the Higher Administrative Court, being the highest judicial instance to approve the election results;
  • Dismissal and re-establishment of the acting Minister of Internal Affairs Yuriy Lutsenko;
  • The seizure of Ukrayina printing house that prints voting ballots, along with passports;
  • Information regarding the amassing of supporters of the candidates around Kiev;
  • A ruling of the County administrative court of Kyiv banning mass events in Kyiv’s Maidan square during the period from 1 February till 1 March 2010 (before the Court banned the vents for the period from 9 January till 5 February);
  • The amendment of the election legislation in the Verkhovna Rada on Wednesday, 3 February, just a few days before voting.

Those who closely monitor the elections know the background of those events, so I will not dwell upon each of them here. More details can be found in materials presented on the Ukrayiniska Pravda web site.

However, amendments to the Law “On Election of the President of Ukraine” adopted on Wednesday deserve particular attention. Amendment of the election legislation in the heat of the election race is alarming by itself. It becomes especially dangerous, if we take a look at what was amended, and how.

In short, 233 votes (against the required minimum number of 226 votes) of three parties – the Party of Regions (led by Viktor Yanukovych), the Communist Party of Ukraine and 29 votes of “Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defence” bloc (led by Viktor Yushchenko) – introduced amendments to the law “On Election of the President of Ukraine” concerning organisation of election commissions’ activity.

The passed amendments cancelled the norm whereby an election commission meeting was deemed valid, if attended by not less than two-thirds of the commission members, in that way removing the notion of a quorum in the election commission activity. It is noteworthy that the Scientific Expert Department of the Verkhovna Rada recommended that bill to be rejected. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko signed the Law as soon as February 4.

The amendments open up vast opportunities for non-recognition and contestation of the results of the voting. If we trace the situation to its potential extremes, a chairman of an election commission carrying a seal may on his own approve election results at his polling station. And if another member (or a few members) of that election commission manage to somehow produce a duplicate of the seal (whiсh is not that impossible as it may seem at first sight), they may adopt entirely different results of voting at their station. Someone else, disagreeing with the former and the latter alike, may apply to court. And so on, and so forth. Situations that may arise in the result of the passed amendments are many.

To justify those amendments, the Party of Regions argues that in this way they tried to oppose possible plans of Yulia Tymoshenko to derail the election process by ordering her representatives in election commissions to walk out on the voting day, to make them fall short of the quorum.

But even if they were guided by such intentions, the harm of the adopted amendments in the legislation far exceeds all imaginable potential threats, since “the law conceals an even greater danger – distortion of the voting results and non-recognition of the president elect by society.”

Therefore, Ukraine came close to the red line of an advanced de-legitimisation of the election results. In that situation, we would even not be able to speak of falsifications, because it will be absolutely unclear what results to trust. And with the trust in exit polls undermined after the first round, the country may fall into a collapse of non-recognition of the president-elect not only by elections and court rulings but also in people’s consciousness.

It is too late to change the situation. One way or another, the country may approach a chaotic scenario with unpredictable consequences.

Therefore, the role of the international community, EU and international organisations in the field of human rights, in particular  goes up. Yesterday the  European Parliament members and the rapporteur of the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for Ukraine  Renate Wohlwend have already denounced those amendments. Today High Representative Baroness Ashton made a statement, where called “on all candidates to ensure that the will of the people can once more be expressed at the polls this Sunday”.

It is highly important therefore that the international community further takes a firm position based on strong commitment to non-violation and recognition of the results of free demonstration of the voters’ will and principles of legal and peaceful settlement of disputes of any kind.

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Calm before the storm…

So, the first round of the Ukrainian elections is over. As expected, two contenders reached the home straight – Viktor Yanukovych, with 35.32% of votes, and Yuliya Tymoshenko, with 25.05% of the 66.76% of those who came to the polls.

International organisations called the elections fair and free of mass violations. Meanwhile, the situation with the National Exit Poll remains unclear. By contrast to the other five exit polls and official Central Electoral Committee results, it reported only a 4% difference of votes between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych, while the rest guessed right the 10% gap. What was it – a mistake, a difference of methods, something else? Or maybe their data were true, while the official results were influenced by some unclear and unknown to us factors – we don’t know yet. But, as many think, we may see a long and “fascinating” judicial whirligig of non-admission of the election results, where all possible data will be studied.

But this will happen later. For the time being, let us concentrate on what we have in solid residue after the first round.

Some preliminary conclusions:

-          Deep disappointment of the people with the present Ukrainian politics, both of the current authorities and the so-called opposition. 33% of voters did not come to the polls at all. The two contenders who reached the second round together collected 60% of the active voters, which means only 40% of all voters in Ukraine. Consequently, those two leaders failed to win support of at least half of Ukraine’s voters. And go into the second round with a scanty store.

-          Decline of the ratings of the “orange” camp leaders – Yushchenko-Tymoshenko, and the frozen rating of the so-called opposition “blue” leader Yanukovych. The disastrously meagre 5% of support for Yushchenko relates to the huge 10% lag of Tymoshenko behind Yanukovych. At that, the “blue” camp leader just managed to retain his votes, mainly because in the economic crisis he was lucky enough to be in the opposition, and the economic decline was associated not with him but with his opponents.

-          The geographic division between West-Central and East-Southern voters did not pass away. Since the latest parliamentary elections of 2007, there have been only slight shifts in the distribution of votes between the “orange” and “blue” camps.

-          “New” or “alternative” faces in politics are in demand. The “orange” largely lost to them, not to the “blue” camp: the votes of Tihipko and Yatsenyuk are mainly those of the “orange” voters disappointed in the current “orange” leaders.

-          Meanwhile, the demand for new faces in politics was not fully met. There were several reasons for that:

  • those faces were not brand new at all (Yatsenyuk, despite his young age, is long present in the Ukrainian politics and used to try most of the top executive posts; Tihipko in 2004 headed Yanukovych’s election staff, also occupied high positions, so, he looks new just because he reappeared after a few years of oblivion);
  • absence of new ideas in the so-called “new” politicians. People did not just support those two candidates, rather, they did not want to vote for the main candidates;
  • and the main reason lies in the existing political system and the refusal to use the majority system at all levels of elections. The political “elevator of personalities” does not work in Ukraine, as a result, new ideas simply cannot sprout, and old ones (even absolutely correct ones, such as that of European integration) are discredited by the poor conduct of the current politicians.

-          The elections were irrational. Symbols and feelings fought, rather than ideas and pragmatic interests. Nobody paid attention to electoral programmes. The lack of ideas at the elections was showily demonstrated by the refusal of all main contenders to hold TV debates.

What do we come with to the second round? Who will decide its result, and what factors will influence voters’ choice?

The choice of February 7 will indeed be a difficult one.

The task is easier for those who voted for one of the two contenders in the first round. They are likely to support their candidates in the second round as well. But it is not they who will decide the future presidency of the country.

It will be decided by the undecided, or “free” votes. For them, it will be more difficult to make their choice. Such people are many:

-          first of all, nearly 40% of those who already voted for other than those two candidates, or voted against all;

-          additionally, some 33% of those who did not vote in the first round at all, waiting for its results to make their choice in the second round.

In absolute figures, we speak of about 21 million people (proceeding from the total number of voters – 36,576,763 persons, if all of them opt to come to the polls).

Today Tymoshenko and Yanukovych are competing exactly for their votes. Both realise that they can offer those people nothing brand new or what they desire, because those people prefer to think, rather than to feel. Neither Tymoshenko, nor Yanukovych, all the more so, has ever had much success with such people.

But exactly those people will decide the fate of the country’s presidency. Neither mathematics nor political science can predict the distribution of their votes, because those “free” voters, no matter how deeply philosophical they may be, will have to choose not rationally but emotionally, with a tint of “ethical-aesthetic” considerations. Without any illusions whatsoever…

Most probably, neither Tihipko nor Yatsenyuk will call upon their voters to vote for any of the remaining candidates. First, because they may risk losing their newly-gained electoral capital. After all, people voted for them because they are neither Tymoshenko nor Yanukovych. Second, they realise that those elections are nothing but history for them, and they should target local elections and probably early elections of the parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) as soon as 2010. And third, even if they call upon their voters to vote for one of the finalists, their supporters may not hurry to fulfil their will. Yushchenko already said that he saw no big difference between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych, that they were both anti-Ukrainian, so, he will vote against all.

Hence, “free” voters will have to make their own choice, and it will be a painful one.

It will be painful also because those thinking voters “free” in their spirit will have to choose among two alien for them candidates. As I put it earlier, both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych are “candidates for stability” for whom freedom and maintenance of political pluralism in the country are not a priority, which the undecided voters well realise.

So, in the second round, they may follow one of the following patterns of choice:

-          “a choice between two evils” – «they are both bad candidates, but “this” one at least does not do (or, on the contrary, does) what “that” will (or will not);

-          protest voting for one of the candidates – “I may dislike this candidate, but I will still vote for her or him, for that one not to win;

-          protest voting against both candidates – the third line of the voting ballot “against all” – “I cannot but come to the polls because I consider this my public duty. But let one of them win not by my hand”;

-          non-appearance at the polling station and dissociation from the knowingly bad choice.

How to vote, everybody will probably decide closer to the day of voting. Before that, it will be difficult to name the winner.

Both Yanukovych and especially the first-round runner-up Tymoshenko will now hurl themselves into the race for the “free” voters. But in reality, they cannot do much. In the past years, voters have thoroughly studied both.

Everyone can more or less imagine what Ukraine may look like with each of those candidates…

Exactly with that knowledge and imagery will people come to the polls on the 7th of February…

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History is closing a circle

Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko won the first round of the Ukrainian presidential elections on 17 January, as predicted.

According to the Central Election Committee, 66.72% of the voters took part in the elections. As of today, 15.46 (CET) results are:

Viktor Yanukovych – 35.36%
Yulia Tymoshenko – 25%

Sergij Tigipko – 13.01%
Arsenij Yatsenyuk – 6.97%
Viktor Yushchenko – 5.51%

Results of the National exit poll are as follows (as of 17 January 2009, 22.00 (CET)):

Viktor Yanukovych – 31.3%
Yulia Tymoshenko – 27.1%

Sergij Tigipko – 13.4%
Arsenij Yatsenyuk – 7.8%
Viktor Yushchenko – 6.0%

It’s too soon to make final conclusions. One may only say that history is closing a circle: Ukraine has taken the first step to elect the man it ejected five years ago.

No matter which of the two wins the 7 February run-off, we will see another Ukraine.

Will it still be a country based on democratic principles?

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European integration of Ukraine after the elections

According to the Ukrainian constitution, foreign policy is the President’s prerogative. The attitude of the candidates to the further integration of Ukraine with the EU is therefore of core importance. It is the key question for the country’s future because European integration means much more than just foreign policy: It also means the prospects for the internal transformation of the country.

 The candidates’ stand on Ukraine-EU integration is a major indicator of where they want to take the country in the coming years. It may seem like a categorical statement, but given the tough present-day conditions in Ukraine, any deviations, substitutions or alternatives from the EU reform agenda mean that the candidate is not serious about taking the country forward.

 The election programmes of the main candidates describe their ideas on Ukraine-EU integration as follows:

Candidate Provisions of the election programme regarding Ukraine’s membership in the EU
Viktor Yushchenko “Ukraine’s membership in the EU is my goal”

 

Yuliya Tymoshenko “And when we build Europe in Ukraine, Ukraine will become a member of the European Union”

 

Viktor Yanukovych “Ukraine’s strategic choice – full membership in the European Union taking account of the specificities of its geopolitical location, with the utmost preservation of its historic, national and cultural originality”

 

Arseniy Yatsenyuk “We must form a single space of Greater Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific. After all, Europe is not confined to borders of the European Union”

 

Volodymyr Lytvyn “Achievement of an agreement of co-operation, free movement of people, goods, services and capitals with the EU …Implementation of the idea of a single economic space with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan”

 

Anatoliy Grytsenko “For five years, we will join no military-political alliances”

 

As we can see, Ukraine’s accession to the EU is set as the unconditional goal of Ukrainian foreign policy only in the programme of Viktor Yuschenko. The other candidates either overlook the subject (Lytvyn and Grytsenko), invent unrealistic alternatives (Yatsenyuk), or put conditions on the country’s integration (Tymoshenko and Yanukovych).

The conditions are so vague and can be interpreted so broadly that they would allow (in case of a win) either of the two latter candidates to direct foreign and domestic policy in any way they think fit. Their policies may end up matching their personal interests, but not the interests of the country. As a result, there is no guarantee that Ukraine will presume its European course, if one of the two main candidates wins the presidency.   

 What are the interests of the international actors?

 One new aspect of these elections is the sharp decline in the US factor. It is difficult to define the US approach to the forthcoming elections, if, indeed, there is one. And this is no wonder, given the drop in US interest in eastern European affairs as a whole.

 As a result, the EU and Russia have come to the forefront as international players in the 17 January poll.

 Russia has fundamentally changed its approach to the Ukrainian elections. Trying to avoid the mistakes of 2004, Russia is not openly supporting any of the candidates. Instead it has announced a sort of “tender” for the kind of Ukrainian president who will best protect Russian interests. These interests have remained quite stable, but Russia has defined them in more detail and taken a tougher line on them in the past two years. They include:

 -          Guarantee of military-political loyalty of Ukraine, including military neutrality and commitment of non-accession to NATO. Growing opposition of Russia to EU enlargement  has become another trend of the passing year;

-          Guarantee of the economic interests of Russian business in Ukraine;

-          The Black Sea Fleet must stay on Ukrainian soil after the agreed term of its redeployment from the Crimea in 2017;

-          Access to the Ukrainian gas transportation system on the basis of ownership or rental;

-          Guarantee of stable status for the Russian language;

-          Guarantee of the rights of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Ukraine (ROC revenues in Ukraine make up nearly half of the total ROC budget).

 The European Union has generally not changed its approach to the Ukrainian elections: Its main demand is that the elections are democratic and free and that a legitimate president wins. Over the years, the EU has consistently put forward demands for the country as a whole, rather than  for its president. The EU wants Ukraine and its future leadership to:

 -          Stabilise the political system and implement the required constitutional reform;

-          Enhance the effectiveness and transparency of state machinery, in order to implement far-reaching reforms throughout the country;

-          Defeat corruption;

-          Improve the investment climate.

 Russia and the EU have two fundamentally different objectives. The former wants to drag Ukraine into the past. The latter wants to push it into the future.

 It’s up to Ukrainians to choose…

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Elections without a choice, or déjà vu effect

Today, we will speak about the spirits dominating Ukrainian society. Who are people choosing as “their” candidates? Do they trust those whom they are going to vote for? Do they see any alternative, or may one say that the forthcoming elections will be an election without a choice? If so, why? And the main question – is there light at the end of the tunnel?

 In September – October, Ukraine’s sociological services carried out a measurement of the presidential race.

  Table 1 «Whom would you vote for, if elections were held in the near future?»

Candidates

 

“Socis”

20 September – 1 October 2009

(% of all respondents)

 

R&B Group

12-22 October 2009

(% of all respondents)

Razumkov Centre

19-26 October 2009

(% from those who will go to the polls)

KIIS

6-23 October 2009

(% of all respondents)

TNS Ukraine

October 2009

(% of all respondents)

Viktor Yanukovych 28.7 31.4 28.9 26.9 23.17
Yulia Tymoshenko 19 18.4 20.3 16.7 17.92
Viktor Yushchenko 2.8 3.5 4.9 2.9 3
Arseniy Yatseniuk 8.2 8.9 8.2 6.2 6.5
Volodymyr Lytvyn 2.9 2.3 3.3 1.4 1.75
Anatoliy Grytsenko - - 0.5 0.6 1.25
Against all - 9.6 8.2 12.1 9.67
Undecided - 9 13.6 14.8 19
Will not go to the polls - 6.8 - 8.9 8.5

 If Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko go into the second round, votes would be divided as follows:

  Table 2 «Whom would you vote for if Yu.Tymoshenko and V.Yanukovych go into the second round of elections?»

Candidates “Socis”

20 September – 1 October 2009

(% of all respondents)

 

R&B Group

12-22 October 2009

(% of all respondents)

 

Razumkov Centre

19-26 October 2009

(% from those who will go to the polls)

KIIS

6-23 October 2009

(% of all respondents)

 

TNS Ukraine

October 2009

(% of all respondents)

 

Viktor Yanukovych 40.3 41.9 40.5 36.3 29.17
Yulia Tymoshenko 32.6 29.8 33.3 27.1 26.33
Against both - 15.1 17.7 21.4 19.67
Undecided - 6.5 8.6 7.9 16.67
Will not go to the polls - 6.7 - 7.3 8.17

 If Viktor Yanukovych and Arneniy Yatseniuk go into the second round, votes would be divided as follows:

 

Table 3 «Whom would you vote for if А.Yatseniuk and V.Yanukovych go into the second round of elections?»

Candidates Razumkov Centre

19-26 October 2009

(% of all respondents)

KIIS

6-23 October 2009

(% of all respondents)

 

Viktor Yanukovych 35 36.9
Arseniy Yatseniuk 27.1 22.1
Against both 20.8 24.5
Undecided 10.9 9
Will not go to the polls 6.3 7.5

 According to the Law on Elections of the President of Ukraine (Art. 71 point 4) the voting bulletin will contain an option “Do not support any of the candidates for the position of the President of Ukraine”. How likely people would use this option? In October 2009 Razumkov Centre held public opinion polls about trust in bodies of power and leaders who now personify the establishment and the opposition, that is, in fact – trust in the people running for the president.

 Table 4 «Do you support the activity of….?»

Institution Fully support Support some actions Do not support Difficult to say
President

(Viktor Yushchenko)

4.2 21.9 71.6 2.3
Verkhovna Rada (Parliament)

(Volodymyr Lytvyn is the speaker)

2.2 35.9 58.6 3.2
Government

(Yulia Tymoshenko is the head of the government)

5.6 31.3 58.8 4.2

 Table 5 «Do you support the activity of….?»

Personality Fully support Support some actions Do not support Don’t know such a politician Difficult to say
Viktor Yanukovych 17.1 25.3 54.2 0.4 3
Yulia Tymoshenko 14.3 23.7 58.8 0.5 2.8
Viktor Yushchenko 4.8 14.2 77.5 0.6 2.8
Arseniy Yatseniuk 8.2 29.2 51.9 1.5 9.1
Volodymyr Lytvyn 6.4 37.3 48.9 0.9 6.6
Anatoliy Grytsenko 3.4 17 53.7 16.9 9.1

 Comparing the ratings of presidential candidates and ratings of trust (or, rather, mistrust), one comes to the conclusion that the high level of mistrust is not transformed into a strong protest feeling against candidates. On one hand, this testifies to the strong feeling of civic duty of Ukrainians who are ready to elect their president in spite of all. But at the same time, it also illustrates the paradox and, to be frank, the tragedy of the situation: not trusting existing politicians, people nevertheless are going to vote for them. Why?

 Here are a few suggestions:

 - The tough and continuous information campaign of the key candidates insisting that the choice leaves no alternative – “Vote for me. No one is better. Others are even worse.”

 -  The imaginary lack of alternative at the elections finds its proof in the weakness of so-called “alternative” candidates. The main ones – Yatseniuk and Grytsenko – not only failed to win new supporters but continue to rapidly lose support among seemingly firm adherents.

 -  Intention to vote for “the lesser evil”. When none of the candidates meets people’s expectations they choose to vote for the candidate whom they dislike less.

 -   The high level of mistrust is related not only to politicians but also to people’s own powers, in their ability to oppose today’s politics and politicians. A society disappointed in the Orange Revolution can hardly come together to manage the new situation.

 -  The low level of morality in the political sphere affects the entire society. Erosion of moral targets in society is a danger in itself. And in association with the elections, this has the effect of people having passed the “threshold of sensitivity” – no matter what terrible things are told about “their” candidate or his party (even if based on firm evidence), people are no longer touched by it and, with few exceptions, are not going to change their vote.

-  Effect of the paradigm of the ««friend» against «foe»». Ukrainian political scientist  Dmytro Vydrin aptly formulated it: “Society has turned into people who thoughtlessly, uncritically and blindly love their idols, deify them, are ready to forgive any flaws and shout ‘Yes’ to them under any circumstances. At the same time, they similarly thoughtlessly, uncritically and blindly hate opponents of their idols and shout ‘Down with them,’ without even listening to their arguments and position.”

 The present situation of “elections without a choice” has deeper roots. The root of the evil is that the established political system pursues preservation and self-reproduction, not letting in new blood. Why did this happen? Here are again a few suggestions:

 -  The introduction of the proportional election system with closed lists in 2005 is a factor. This kills competition within a party (one needs to be not more professional but more loyal and devoted to the leader who decides one’s presence in the list) and makes party members dependent on the party leader. A lot has been said about this in Ukraine, but the system has not been changed, the lists have not been opened.

 -  The majority election system was cancelled at the regional level. This brought about even greater “cementing” of the existing parties and spread of their influence at all levels. The main problem is that this bars an alternative way of nomination and entry of people into power.

 - Corruption in the system of formation of political forces and the prevalence of the principle of loyalty over that of professionalism play a major role. Payment for entry on party lists has become the talk of the whole country. Parties are made up of people devoted to the leader (with few exceptions). Their professional qualities (or absence thereof) recede into the background. On the other hand, self-respecting professionals refuse to join the political process, are unwilling to “play by the rules of the game.” By and large, the nation is on the losing side, since people who could bring morality into politics cannot break through.

 - The geographic and, to some extent, psychological divisions of Ukraine are another factor. Such divisions, on the one hand, are good for the country since they curb the authoritarian ambitions of leaders, but on the other hand, they prevent the consolidation of society. They prevent the appearance of a leader who could unite society on the basis of values shared by the entire nation. 

 This is why, the current leaders fight each other for power but they know they cannot survive without each other. They march forward for power together to extend their dream to rule again, what raises a terrible sense of déjà vu in people of Ukraine. The people have had enough of this and know the end in advance but are compelled to watch it unfold.

 But do they have to acquiesce, really? After all, it is sufficient to look at the situation soberly and to rationally assess the candidates striving for election. Apply to them analysis, rather than creed, questions, rather than requests, head up, not shoulders down: “the greatest threat for the authorities is posed, strangely, by the usual ‘homo sapient,’ that is, thinking human”.

 If all the people in Ukraine think at least for a moment, the ghosts of the past would not prevent them from building their future now …

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The next post will be about the external factors at the forthcoming elections.

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Funny times, brother

‘Funny’ times came, brother,

a new future gives us a day,

but why is there so little sun in the sky?

Why am I writing sad songs?

‘Funny’ times came, brother,

we’re approaching the destination,

but why am I looking for another road?

why I don’t want to walk alongside them anymore?

‘Funny’ times came, brother,

a sign of glory shines on our chest.

They tenderly closed our eyes,

put honey on our lips,

threw away our soul.

The soul woke up and asks itself:

Why am I alone?

No one to ask: gold instead of father,

blind wall instead of mother.

It’s become so quiet all around,

all the voices have gone somewhere.

‘Funny’ times came, so few of us left.

Damn these times, brother.

Yet we have things to do,

open our eyes and keep walking,

set teeth on edge and love our mother tenderly.

Who else if not us, brothers?

‘Funny’ times came, brother, by Vyacheslav Vakarchuk, Okean Elzy, 2006
(translation from Ukrainian)

On October 19, 2009, the 2010 presidential election campaign officially started in Ukraine. One should probably be happy and hope for renewal. But there is sorrow and fear instead. For some reason, this song written by Vakarchuk back in 2006 comes to mind – maybe because then, in 2006, he as a man of arts and talent asked himself questions that most Ukrainians ask now – do we want to walk alongside them anymore, what are we expecting from them, is there any alternative to them?

I continue my articles devoted to the forthcoming elections in Ukraine with the elaboration of the first thesis: elections will focus on one main dilemma:

Freedom vs. security

I will try to find answers to the following questions:
What is understood under the notions of “freedom” and “stability;”
who of the main contenders is a “candidate for freedom,” and who is a “candidate for stability;”
what are the role and expectations of the international community, and why is the slogan of “stabilisation at any price” unacceptable;
is there a chance for the “candidate for freedom?”

Contenders

Among numerous contenders let’s focus upon those who represent a significant electoral segment and have at least a slight ideology and programme. So, we will consider:

Acting President and leader of the Our Ukraine party, Viktor Yushchenko;
acting Prime Minister and leader of the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, Yuliya Tymoshenko;
the leader of the opposition Party of the Regions and the main rival of Viktor Yushchenko in the presidential elections of 2004-2005, Viktor Yanukovych;
the Chairman of the Parliament’s National Security and Defence Committee, former Defence Minister Anatoliy Grytsenko;
the Former speaker of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine and former Foreign Minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk.

Freedom vs. stability

Let me start by reminding that the latest Nations in Transit rating classifies Ukraine among “hybrid regimes,” i.e. those with an unclear future. Such a country can both move forward to democracy, and step back into authoritarianism.

As we know, political developments in a country are not predetermined. States become democratic not because of some specific conditions on the territory of a given country but because the people living in that country spare no effort to maintain and promote democracy continuously. Once established, democracy is not guaranteed – democratic processes are reversible. They are especially susceptible to regression into authoritarianism if this is the will of the current ruler. Ukraine may find itself in this situation after the elections, if the segment “candidates for stability” comes to power.

What do we understand as “freedom” and “stability” in present-day Ukraine? We mean “freedom” or “freedoms,” in their classic definition of the OSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975: “human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion …civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.”

“Stability” can be defined as stabilisation of the political system with the purpose of removal of the current collapse in decision-making, observed in today’s Ukraine. The current state of affairs is a result of the uncompleted constitutional reform that did not ultimately and clearly distribute the powers of different branches and separate officials of the same branch, and the personal rivalry of individual national leaders.

Stabilisation at any price?

Stabilisation in itself is not objectionable. It is the right thing to aim for, and a nation should accomplish constitutional transformations, preferably, to establish parliamentary rule.

Nevertheless, several factors raise fears:

The character of the persons abiding by the motto of “stability,” insisting on the appearance of “a powerful arm that can impose order;”
immaturity of the institutions of democracy in the country;
the high level of corruption and dependence of officials on the will of their superiors;
the vivid example of Russia which in the mid-2000s saw a “successful” course of stabilisation of the system that led that country to become a “consolidated authoritarian regime,” according to the Nations in Transit rating.

Exactly these factors let us assert that in the present Ukrainian conditions, “stabilisation” of the political system will lead not to a harmonious parliamentary democracy but to liquidation of political pluralism and potential subsequent authoritarianism. In the conditions of the current impoverishment of a great part of the population and the decline of morality and education, this may happen quite soon. The role of individuals in politics is still very important. In circumstances when institutions are weak, the future of the state in the main part depends on who becomes leader. Besides, democracy can hardly survive in poor societies – in such societies, the pendulum can turn from the “chaos of democracy” into authoritarian regimes.

Unfortunately, we should admit that “candidates for stability” outnumber “candidates for freedom.” In fact, there is only one “candidate for freedom” – the current President, Viktor Yushchenko. In his disastrous rule, the absence of attempts of oppression of political and other freedoms may be his best achievement. Under his leadership, Ukraine was recognised as “a free country” and free and democratic parliamentary elections were held.

By contrast, the “candidates for stability” are represented by a whole range of more or less gifted politicians. Unfortunately, in the given situation, their political talents can easily be used to play a trick on the country. Virtue can turn evil.

Proceeding from the political programmes of the candidates’ parties, their speeches and statements, their executive experience and their established image, the “candidates for stability” are represented by (in descending order of their “ambitions of stability”):

Yuliya Tymoshenko (on the Shuster.Live TV programme, Ukrayina TV channel, 25 September 2009:  “Who told you that people do not want dictatorship?”);
Viktor Yanukovych (at the Chernivtsi Machine-Building Plant LLC, October 2009: “People are already tired of this government. People want stability, calm and prosperity”);
Anatoliy Grytsenko ( interview to Dzerkalo Tyzhnya newspaper, 24 October 2009: “Are you sure that the country is ready to accept such authoritarian changes? …We have no other way out. The country and the economy need management …Promoters of liberal economy …would better hide from the people today.”).

Arseniy Yatsenyuk, positioned as a hopeful alternative in spring, has still not revealed his position on any of the questions critical for the country. This makes him hard to categorise. Most probably, he will maintain his indefinite status until the end of the campaign.

Therefore, the list of “candidates for stability” is long enough. Most probably, exactly they will compete for the presidential seat, unless something extraordinary happens. People may be put in a position of choosing the “lesser evil.”

Viktor Yushchenko, being the only “candidate for freedom,” has lost support over the past five years of his rule. And even those who choose freedom are not certain to vote for him, although he has still has the necessary means to turn the tide of events.

What does the international community expect?

What are the expectations of the international community? Unfortunately, they coincide with the stand of the majority of presidential candidates. The slogan of the need for “stability in Ukraine” is heard ever more frequently. Few think about the potential price of such stability. The position of the EU can be understood – having suffered from the gas crisis last winter, it naturally wants to avoid a repeat. Stabilisation of government is seen as one of its tools. But if stability is secured at the expense of freedom, the EU may then face an even greater problem – Ukraine’s reversal on the path of democratic transformation. Then, the Eastern Partnership, intended to promote European values in Ukraine, may no longer be relevant, as it will fall too short of the needs and wishes of the next president, who gives stability but takes freedom. It is highly important that the EU is not guided by the slogan of “stability at any price.” Its implementation would bring much worse consequences than the gas crisis. A clear signal of the indispensability of further democratic transformations should be given to all candidates.

Unfortunately, the USA will hardly be instrumental in the promotion of democracy in Ukraine this time aound. There is an impression that the USA, having lost interest in the democratisation of this region and the wider world, places no particular importance on the forthcoming presidential elections. Its presence will be greatly limited, compared to the previous elections.

Does freedom have a chance to win this election? It should have a chance – after all, hope springs eternal.

Maybe an examination of the results of the latest public opinion polls, which we will carry out in the next article, will help to answer this question.

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Introduction into 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine

In the recent weeks, Brussels housed several events dedicated to the forthcoming elections in Ukraine set for January 17, 2010. The interest in them is certain to grow with their approach. And this is good. The more attention is paid to Ukraine at this difficult point of its history, the stronger the hope is that the country will win this race.

With this article, I would like to begin a series of publications devoted to the future elections. Here I present only the theses, to be addressed in more detail in the following articles in my blog.

So, a few introductory remarks:

1. The forthcoming presidential elections in Ukraine will be decisive for the country’s future. The choice will be not among the candidates, it will be much wider and much more important:

Freedom vs. Stability

These two notions, never conflicting in developed societies, now run into a contradiction in Ukraine, as they do in transitional societies where continuous transformation deprives people of the possibility to look into the future with confidence or at least with hope.

Over the years the passed after the Orange Revolution, the country indeed saw erosion of the notion of democracy. Unfortunately, the high ideas of freedom and democracy were shattered by poor performance. But this does not mean devaluation of those ideas as such, as those who call for stability and a strong arm want Ukrainians to believe.

That is why people will face an uneasy choice – either devotion to the dim but free way of development, or “stabilisation” at the expense of the acquired freedom. The choice is tough, unnatural, but real. At that, one should be well aware that so called stability in a country as complex, varied and plural as Ukraine can be guaranteed only by forcible methods.

2. The country will witness “elections without a choice”. This meant not only the absence of new personalities but discredit on the actual and would-be top officials. In the result of ablation of all signs of morality from the conduct of the strong and mighty in Ukraine over the past five years, even the highest ideas pronounced from dishonest lips are distrusted.

Thus, distrust and disbelief are a key factor of the forthcoming elections.

3. Ukraine would not have appeared in the current political chaos, if in 2005 it had been given a clear signal of future EU membership. Not having said its weighty word in support for the European future for Ukraine, the EU partly bears responsibility for the present chaos and uncertainty of the country’s future. What is certain is that the country would have already implemented reforms and overcome many obstacles, and the most important – avoided the present swamp of chaos and disbelief, because people would have had the main thing – hope and “light at the end of the tunnel”.

That is why it is so important for the EU not to commit that mistake and to take the lead by offering weighty “incentives” to choose freedom.

4. The result of the future elections is uncertain. On one hand, this witness the democratic nature of the political system, on the other – is threatening. The Ukrainian policy is not a policy of compromise. The present political pluralism is maintained not at the expense of the high political culture of the actors and their ability to agree but rather due to impracticability of controlling the whole country, because of its natural geographic and value-based division.

This makes subsequent transformation of the political system inevitable. The figure of the president will be critical for the way and, the main thing, methods of that transformation.

5. In such complex situation, the role and position of the EU are highly important. In fact, the EU remains the only international actor seriously supporting democratic transformations in Ukraine and the whole region.

Russia, not truly supporting any of the candidates, seeks general destabilisation of Ukraine. On one hand, it needs this for “domestic consumption”, to present Ukraine as an example of the “chaos of democracy” for its own population. On the other, it is much easier to make business transactions with the split political establishment of the country that may be unable to keep its promises but is ready for covert arrangements and corruption.

The USA, with its new ideology of the foreign policy, seems to have lost interest in Ukraine and the whole region, admitting its right to a “specific way of development”, on a par with the other regions of the world.

That is why the conduct and results of the elections will largely depend on what the EU will say, to whom, and how.

6. Nevertheless, the choice will be made by Ukrainians, not imposed from outside. The effect of external factors of the Ukrainian politics has always been exaggerated. Foreign influence, no matter how strong it is, cannot decisively influence the choice of the almost 50-million strong nation.

7. Ukraine’s choice between freedom and stability will determine the subsequent choice of the other post-Soviet countries. According to the latest Nations in Transit report, the level of democracy in the region has deteriorated last year. Most post-Soviet countries are semi-authoritarian regimes. The stroke of the pendulum of their development will depend, among other things, on the choice of Ukraine in the forthcoming elections. If after the elections Ukraine continues its hard but indispensable drive for freedom, those countries will sooner or later follow it. But if Ukraine does not endure the burden of freedom, and the next president begins to turn the country from democracy – democracy will continue its decline in the whole region.

More details of these and other factors of the elections in Ukraine – in the next posts…

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