1. Promise both Russia and the EU everything they might want to hear (usually integration into some Russian- or EU-led initiative);
2. Ask for something in exchange (market access, lower gas prices, financial assistance, opportunities for lucrative but opaque deals  etc).
3. Get what you asked and drag your feet on delivering on your promises.
4. If either the EU or Russia is upset for not getting what they were promised – threaten that you will intensify cooperation with the other external partner.

The truth is that this has mostly worked. (Not just for Ukraine, but also for Moldova under Voronin and at times Belarus’ Lukashenko or a whole series of Central Asian states, not to mention a plethora of historical case from Italian city-states in the Middle Ages, to Nasser’s Egypt and Tito’s Yugoslavia.) The EU has long been quite lenient with Ukraine not because it was impressed by Ukraine’s reforms performance, but because it had to be nice to such a geopolitically important country. Ukraine, at its turn, whenever felt the heat of potential pressure from Brussels, would start tickling Brussels nerves with positive noises about integration with Russia; and vice-versa, whenever Russian demands on Ukraine became too assertive, Kiev was thrown into accesses of declarative pro-Europeanness (and pro-Atlanticism).

This has been going on for most of the last two decades. But the problem with the game is that the more you play it the less credibility you have, the less likely your partners are to play by your rules and the more likely they are to toughen their demands and ask for concrete deliverables (by following the dogma of one of the heroes of Ilf and Petrov – ‘if you give me the money in the evening – you get the chairs in the morning; or if you give me the money in the morning – you the chairs in the evening’). So with each new round of the game your room for manoeuvre is smaller and smaller and the usual Ukrainian foreign policy recipe works less and less well. Both Russia and the EU are tired of the game, and much less interested in playing it.

This explains why the EU is now more than ever in a non-blinking mood over the signature of the EU-Ukraine association agreement, put on hold because of the imprisonment of former prime-minister Timoshenko (and three former ministers) and other questionable ways in which Ukrainian domestic politics has been evolving. In usual fashion, the Ukrainian prime-minister tried to hint that Ukraine might join the Russia-led Customs Union. But EU’s resolve which at better times would have melted at such a threat, remained solid.

One of the more interesting episodes of these games is taking place in Kiev. Usually, it is American or Russian diplomats using straight talk to make a point and have the full backing of powerful states behind. EU’s diplomatic modus operandi is usually different. The EU has long been known for the fact that most of its diplomats are soft-spoken and controversy-shy project managers happily disbursing EU assistance, but avoiding tough political issues. Not least because their backing from ‘home’ can be less straightforward since the EU itself is so affected by many different, if not conflicting, member states preferences. In any case the EU has usually been a nice diplomatic pet, much easier to ignore than US or Russia. But not anymore (as argued in a recent post on EU is showing its teeth). The last few months saw some sharp diplomatic exchanges between the Ukrainian MFA and the EU delegation in Kiev. First, the EU ambassador to Kiev said that Yanukovich is not delivering on his promises to fight corruption. This provoked a strong rebuke from the Ukrainian MFA which accused the EU ambassador of behaving like a ‘ukrainized’ political analyst. Then the EU diplomat said his job is to say what he thinks about the situation in Ukraine and that the Ukrainians should not count on his fake smiles and praise of a non-improving business climate and that he is now someone’s ‘puppet’.

What a few years ago was called ‘Ukraine fatigue‘ in the EU, a feeling of disappointment with the failure of pursuing long-promised reforms by Yushchenko and Timoshenko, has now turned into active irritation with Yanukovich’s administration. Not a very good mood to attend the forthcoming football championship for Ukraine. By the way, attending EU leaders might want to start thinking now how to behave then. One option is to stay home, like Angela Merkel and Barroso. The other is to go, but spoil the party and visit Timoshenko. And the third, is to go and enjoy it. The bet is on EU’s different political leaders going for all three options undermining what until now has been a semblance of EU unity.

But another important factor is how Putin and Yanukovich play their systems. Putin’s role in the Russian system is that of the ultimate arbiter between various elite groups. He is a moderator, not a player in the elite squabbles. He is not neutral, nor fair. During his presidency, his closest friends acquired vast assets, and there has been quite some redistribution of property. But Putin mainly tries to stay above the fray realising that this is an important power resource for him. This is how he makes himself indispensable to the multiple interests groups within the Russian elites. That is also why elites value him – he has the power and the skill to maintain some degree of balance between competing factions.

But Yanukovich seems to be different. He is less of a moderator and more of a player than Putin is. This is exemplified by the sudden appearance Yanukovich’s eldest son, Alexandr, on the list of the richest Ukrainians. His $100 million is not much by the standards of Ukrainian politics, but what caught the eye is that Alexandr was not known for being a successful businessman before and that he his bank had a 1800% growth in the last year, ie it multiplied its revenue by 18 times. There is also talk of the emergence of a ‘Yanukovich clan’ or ‘the family’ with a set of new names being promoted to positions of influence including the ministry of interior or the tax inspectorate. This is done at the expense of the other clans and oligarchs who supported Yanukovich and the Party of Regions for years and years. In other words, Yanukovich is not only bulldozing the opposition (with Timoshenko in jail and on hunger strike, as well as 3 other former ministers now jailed) but also pushing back against his older allies by building his own personal political and financial power base and promoting people who owe their rise exclusively to him personally. In some sense this might strengthen him, but it also can weaken if he chooses to become even more of player and potential competitor to his own networks of supporters, rather than the indispensable arbiter than Putin is.

The progress reports are mainly concerned with legislative adjustments, which correspond to Phase 1 of the Action Plan. Evaluating realities will come next years. In order to somehow quantify the conclusions I also decided to give a ‘plus’ to the country that is ahead with some reforms, and a ‘minus’ to the country that lags behind the other (a simplified version of what ESI did with the Schengen White List project). Giving just plusses and minuses is of course quite simplistic, but nonetheless a useful exercise for a ‘quick and dirty’ look at where Moldova and Ukraine stand in relation to each other. I also decided to give additional bonuses in the form of half or full plusses to some areas which are much more important than the others (like introduction of biometric passports – a full plus, or half-pluses to having a half-functioning migration service or having implementing protocols for readmission agreements with EU member states). Finally, the table does not mention all the areas or laws mentioned in the progress reports, but only those where (comparative) value judgements are made and progress is assessed. So here is the table on who does better in the visa-dialogue with the EU: Ukraine or Moldova?

Introduction of the progress reports

Block 1: Document security, including biometrics

Block 2: Irregular migration, including readmission

Block 3: Public Order and Security

Block 4: External Relations and Fundamental Rights

Moldova-Ukraine: 14 vs 9

Moldova gets 14.5 plusses (13 plusses + 1 bonus point for having switched to the issuance of biometric passports only and 0.5 for the implementing protocols of the readmission agreement with EU members states). Correspondingly Moldova gets 9 minuses for those areas where it lags behind Ukraine. The minuses for Moldova are related to: the legislative framework in border management and the creation of a Migration Service (now the Border Guards Service of Moldova and the Migration and Asylum Bureau of the Ministry of Interior should be merged, which would result in the creation of Border Police under the Ministry of Interior), the signature of readmission agreements with Russia and several half- or non-European states from Turkey to China, anti-corruption legislation, anti-drug efforts and cooperation with the corresponding EU agency (EMCDAA) and negotiations with Eurojust on a cooperation agreements.

Ukraine gets 9.5 plusses (9 points + a 0.5 bonus for the Migration Service. The bonus is not so much for the functioning of the service ‘which needs to be consolidated’ but more due to the fact that the corresponding counterpart in Moldova has not even been mentioned in the report). The areas where Ukraine clearly needs to do some catching up are in the signing of Implementing protocols for the Readmission Agreement with the EU and moving faster on the roll-out of biometric passports. Whereas Moldova switched to the issuance of biometric passports only in January 2011 (except in consulates), Ukraine is still stuck with its policy process. In September the Ukrainian parliament adopted a law opening the way for the issuance of biometric passports, but then president Yanukovich vetoed it in October and the Government started to work on a new bill. In other words on biometric passports Moldova is at least a couple of years ahead, since it takes time and money to equip all passport-issuance authorities (so-called UOVIRRs) as well as all the border crossing points with the necessary equipment to produce and read biometric passports. It also seems that Moldova is more advanced on several fronts when it comes to legislative harmonisation with the EU on migration and asylum policy, combating trafficking in human beings, and preventing money laundering. Moldova is also more advanced in the development of a migration profile. One word of caution relates to the setting up of an anti-corruption agency. Ukraine is supposed to set up one, whereas Moldova has had one for over a decade. Yet in the case of Moldova, the anti-corruption centre often became an instrument in the hands of the high-, mid- and even low-level officials not so much to combat corruption as to benefit from it through the extraction of rents and pressures on businesses.

Finally, adopting laws is good, but implementing them is much tougher and longer. This is where the real test for Moldova and Ukraine will come. The next EU progress reports should start looking into the murkier area of how laws are implemented, not just how fast they are adopted (and even at this stage I am not very impressed by the speed of legislative adjustments. If the two countries have such lacunae on adopting laws, how long will it take to implement them?) Judging from the current report I would say the next big test for Moldova is the setting up of the Border Police and for Ukraine to move much faster to issuing biometric passports only (instead parallel issuance of both types of passports).

PS. Once Russia and EU publish their ‘common steps’ towards visa liberalisation in December, it will be interesting to look into who’s faster in fulfilling the necessary conditions in a three-way race between Russia, Ukraine and Moldova.

Certainly, it is not youth movements, but authoritarian regimes and ‘ripe contexts’ that are the causes of revolutions. This sounds self-evident, but both revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries seem to often miss it (though it is impossible to know whether a revolutionary situation is ‘ripe’ before it actually happens). I still remember the avalanches of venom deployed against youth movements as ‘fifth columns of foreign powers’, not just in Russian, Azeri or Serbian media, but also in plenty of (leftish) European newspapers (the Guardian seemed to excell at that). Many of them implied that youth movements, not authoritarian mismanagement were the causes of revolutions. But it is also indicative how Kefaya failed to lead to anything meaningful in Egypt in 2005, whereas the 2011 protests toppled Mubarak without any Kefaya-like organisation.

I spent most of the last week in Morocco looking into how the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt affected the political dynamics there. The current wave of protests in Morocco are led by the ‘20 February movement‘ (or here), which stages big manifestations once a month (the first big demonstration was on 20 February), and smaller protests, sit-ins and flashmobs in between. Speaking to some activists from the movement (in their early twenties) I was pretty suprised that they never heard of Kefaya, let alone Otpor or their field manual Gene Shapr’s ‘From Dictatorship to Democracy‘. The current movements seem to be a different breed than the movements in 2000-2005.

From telegraph to sms to Facebook

One difference is how the media, the public and the protesters themselves talk of the way protests are organised. Remember – one of the first things the Bolsheviks did in 1917 was to seize the post and telegraph as the key means of communications. The failed 1991 Putsch in Russia and the 1993 stand-off between Eltsin and the Parliament saw big clashes at Ostankino, where the main Russian TV channels are. Controlling the TV was crucial for mobilising or keeping the public at home.

In 2003-2004 all the attention was on the hugely ‘innovative’ fact that protesters coordinated their actions or called for protests through sms (rather than more old-school leaflets, newspapers, radio or TV). Sms ‘democratised’, accelerated and simplified communication. Through sms protesters could circumvent TV and radio when they wanted to broaden their appeal and speed up coordination. It takes a few seconds to sms a dozen persons, and much longer to call them landline-to-landline. But sms is old-school now, as well. It is used of course, but does not excite the imagination of the media or the regimes. It is Facebook and Twitter that are the focus of attention (though the Russian FSB just said the already old-school Gmail, Hotmail and Skype are a threat to Russia becuase they cannot be ‘monitored’).

From ‘youth movements’ to ‘rainbow movements’

But the 2011 protesters are different not because just Facebook and Twitter replaced sms. They are different in a deeper sense. The current protest movements are not stricto sensu youth movements, but a blend of young urban middle-class facebookers, mild and not so mild conservative islamists, and (sometimes radical) leftists. Compared to the 2000-2005 wave of youth movements the current protest movements can be equally romantic, but they are less organised, with no chain of command, no training, and ultimately more fluid. This is sometimes a weakness (only the Muslim Bortherhood seemed organised enough to provide the public good of  crowd management during the protests in Egypt). But it is also partly a strength since they are also more inclusive and more open to people that are not urban middle-class kids and their social base is ultimately larger. This also makes them more dangerous to the regimes. Mubarak could outdo Kefaya, but not the fuzzier and less organised coalition without a name that took to the streets this year.

Seen from Ukraine, Moldova or most of the new EU member states one of the most irritating aspects of the European neighbourhood policy is that it dumps together the Southern and the Eastern neighbours of the EU. The Eastern neighbours tend to be rather arrogant about the Mediterannean neighbours of the EU. The argument goes that you cannot approach ‘European’ neighbours of the EU and ‘neighbours of Europe’ like Morocco or Syria through the same policy lenses; the East is culturally European and some would like to join the EU (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), whereas the South is civilisationally different and has no aspirations of EU membership etc.

Overall, I agree with the argument for differentiation. I do believe EU’s neighbourhood policy can only be effective if it approaches each of its neighbours individually, and that there can be no similar policy prescriptions to Moldova, Tunisia, Georgia, Egypt and Ukraine. This being sad, however, the debates on East vs South debates in the ENP miss two big points.

First, the negative effects of having a single policy framework, called ENP, for Morocco and Ukraine are overblown. Insufficient reforms, not differentiation is the real issue. In real life there is little Ukraine or Georgia did not get, because Morocco or Lebanon are also part of the ENP. (In a similar vein think of Croatia that is part of the same policy Stabilisation and Association framework as Albania, but is far ahead in terms of EU accession). I cannot remember a single issue where the EU would say: ‘Hang on, we cannot give this to Ukraine because Lebanon is also part of the ENP.’ And there have been dozens of times when the EU or its member states said: ‘Hang on, we cannot give this to the Eastern partner X or Y because they are not implementing the necessary reforms’ or ‘because we do not want further enlargement’ or because ‘this would create problems with Russia’. None of these reasons had anything to do with the Southern neighbours. To put it in other words, Ukraine did not get an offer of EU membership or a visa free regime with the EU not because Morocco is also part of the ENP but for entirely different reasons – Ukraine’s political mess and non-reformism, coupled with EU’s enlargement fatigue and the series of institutional crises in the EU.

Actually the real problem with differentiation lies not in the Eastern vs Southern dimension, but among the Eastern neighbours themselves (and this includes Russia). Very often if the EU is in theory ready to give something to country X, but then there is huge pressure to give it to countries Y and Z as well, and the EU ends up not giving anything to anybody, in order not to create precedents. I have personally heard the leader of an EU member state who is generally sceptical of enlargement saying that ‘If it was only for Moldova, the EU would give Moldova an EU accession perspective tomorrow [Moldova is too small to matter and easy to swallow -n.a.], but there is Ukraine… and we cannot give this to Ukraine, nor can we treat the two differently’. There are also plenty of cases where insufficient differentiation among the Eastern neighbours is much more of an issue than insufficient differentiation between the Southern and Eastern neighbours.

Second, the arrogance of the Eastern neighbours is also less justified than a few years ago. Most of the Eastern neighbours have already consolidated or are rapidly consolidating centralised political regimes, coupled with oligarchic and pretty corrupt economic systems. In real life Morocco is often more reformist (though not more democratic) and Lebanon is more pluralist than many of EU’s eastern neighbours. And this was even before decision-makers in the EU started to stake their hopes on successful consolidation of political pluralism in Tunisia.

The zeal with which the argument for delinking the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods is perhaps understandable, but largely misses the point. Real differentiation is achieved through reforms, not branding.

Coming up with coherent EU responses to today’s ‘revolutions’ is more difficult. The problem for the EU is not so much the lack of visibility, but the lack of a clear-cut position with which to be visible. Back in 2003-2005, EU’s sympathies were clear (though not always as explicitly articulated at revolutionaries wanted it), but now the EU is struck by the scale of events and is mainly stuck on the fence. As Daniel Korski asks: “Should the EU back the protests, support what has been a friendly regime or sit uncomfortably on the fence?”

The fence-sitting moment (for many it is a ‘fence-sitting eternity’) is something which comes up at every single revolutionary situation the EU is supposed to have a view on. It is always uncomfortable, but sometimes it is easier to choose sides than other. Responding to Belarus’ suppression of post-election protests last December was relatively ‘easy’. It might not be effective, but there was no room for fence-sitting, and the EU was practically pre-determined to reimpose sanctions on Lukashenko and his cronies. Of course this was tried before and hasn’t worked. But what else can the EU do? After years of sanctions since the late 90s, the EU tried to engage with Lukashenko for the last few years, but engagement was pushed aside by the repression of post-electoral protests. To a certain extent, the new set of sanctions are not introduced to change Lukashenko, but for EU’s peace of mind and modicum of self-respect. So the EU policy on Belarus came full circle – sanctions, then engagement and now sanctions again. Nothing worked in the end. (Though engagement seemed to bring some moderate progress, which proved unsustainable however.)

But Albania, Tunisia and Egypt are much more complicated when it comes to having coherent reactions and choosing on which side of the fence to put the EU. The reasons are many-fold. To begin with, the EU is relatively disappointed  with the value and sustainability of coloured revolutions. Mostly because of Ukraine’s Orange failure (see the blog post on ‘Ukraine fatigue’), but Lebanon (which just saw Hariri Jr ousted and a Hezbollah-backed prime-minister brought in) has hardly been a success story. Georgia has been a decent success in terms of reforms, but the 2008 war have tarnished its reputation and fueled ‘Georgia fatigue’ in the EU and US. Either way the EU burned its fingers on having high hopes in successful revolutionary mid-term outcomes in the neighbourhood. Add to that an Obama administration that seems to have a preference for realist-type engagements. And a general and increasing lack of self-confidence in the West because of the ‘rise of the rest’. What you get out of this is a mix of extreme caution and counter-revolutionary instincts in both the EU and the US.

Then, if you go through the latest set of revolutions country by country, the choices are even tougher. Albania has an EU accession perspective and has just received the possibility of visa-free travel to the EU, supposedly for structural reforms in the law-enforcement sector. So the Albanian government is supposed to be a respectable, democratic partner of the EU. You cannot treat it like Kuchma’s Ukraine or Shevardnadze’ Georgia. But then 3 people were left dead in Albania during the latest riots, the government’s legitimacy is seriously questioned, the country seems to be in a process of self-destruction, and the crisis is not over yet, even if all the media attention is on Egypt now. But the EU still cannot jump off its fence, because a legitimate question is how on earth did Albania get a visa-free regime just 3 months ago if the governments is so bad?

Tunisia, an authoritarian, but reformist state in the Southern neighbourhood also presented the EU with a set of hard choices. Tunisia was one of those cases where the EU was confused when it came to taking attitudes towards their reformism/democracy performance.  Still, Tunisia benefited from a lot of EU support. In the World Bank’s Cost of Doing Business index Tunisia was ahead of Croatia and Montenegro (but in the Press Freedom it was behind Lybia and Uzbekistan). Anyway, Tunisia was small, geopolitically not-so-important and Islamists were not a first-order issue. So EU’s fence sitting for most of the revolution had relatively limited costs. But Egypt is of an entirely different magnitude.

Egypt has a rather institutionalised, deep-rooted Islamist opposition network – the Muslim Brotherhood (which Tunisia never had). It is also an indispensable ally and cool-head in the whole Israel-Palestine set of issues. The choice in Egypt is much more difficult than choosing to support Yushchenko vs Kuchma, or ‘whoever’ against Lukashenko. Finding yourself on the wrong side of the fence in Egypt has huge implications for all kinds of issues – from Israel to how the EU is seen throughout the Muslim world and among European Muslims. The problem though is that there is no fence in Egypt to sit on. The revolutionary logic of such situations is that you can only be with or against the revolutionaries. Sitting on the fence equals opposing the street. And this is what the EU might increasingly become associated with, as it thinks is sits on the fence.

In a sense, the 90s was a simpler world in which Meciar, Tudjman or Milosevic were undemocratic and non-reformist; whereas Dzurinda, Mesic, and Djindjic were both reformist and democratic. The good and the bad guys were obvious; the black was clearly distinguishable from the white. And the EU’s approach to these governments was shaped by this unbreakable link between reformism and democracy.

But it seems that the Eastern neighbourhood is different. There is much more grey than black and white. Categorising the likes of Yuschenko, Timoshenko, Saakashvili, Putin and Medvedev is more difficult. The link between being reformist and being democratic is much more blurred. Some are reformist, but less democratic; some are more democratic, but less reformist; and some are neither reformist, nor democratic.

Think of the following examples. ‘Orange Ukraine’ in 2005-2010 was the most democratic post-Soviet state with a vibrant media, lively parliament and vociferous opposition. But it was hardly reformist. Few deep reforms were even tried, let alone successfully implemented. The successive governments either did not want or could not fight corruption and try to reform state institutions like the police or customs. The elites were too divided. This prevented political monopolisation, but also made it too difficult to push for reforms which were not backed by a large political consensus. What made Ukraine democratic, also made it non-reformist.

Georgia was the opposite of Ukraine. It has been the most reformist state in the post-Soviet state in the last 20 years. The state budget increased something like 20 times since Saakashvili came to power in 2004. The sources of increased revenues were the fight against corruption, radically improved tax collection, and significant inflows of foreign investments (due to the cutting of red tape, improvement of business climate, and persistent courting of foreign investors).  The police has been reformed and corruption drastically reduced. Georgian police is amazingly efficient and non-corrupt by post-Soviet standards (even though it can be quite politicised). Georgia is also in the top of the costs of doing business ranking of the World Bank. No other post-Soviet state (the Baltics aside) have managed to modernise from such a low base as successfully as Georgia did.

But Georgia’s achievements on the democratic front have been less clear-cut. Politics is monopolised,  the opposition is virtually absent from the parliament; it is often vilified and sometimes harassed (though parts, but not all, of the opposition have also had questionable dealings with foreign intelligence, exiled oligarchs and allegedly prepared coup d’etats).  The media is less free than a few years ago. There are fewer ‘independent’ or ‘opposition’ TV channels. Certainly, the November 2007 events (police clashes with protesters left 500 people wounded and the police smashed the Imedi TV station) have not re-occurred. The government kind of learned the lessons. In spring 2009 protesters blocked Tbilisi city centre for months in a row almost without any incident with the police. A visible improvement from 2007. But then the situation has not reverted to the pre-2007 status quo ante either. There has been no visible worsening of the democratic situation in Georgia,  but no visible improvement either. And there is also wide-spread talk of Saakashvili continuing as a prime-minister after his term expires in 2013 (under a revamped constitution that beefs up the PM’s powers).  So Georgia seems to be a clear cut case of a state that is reformist, but less pluralist than ‘Orange Ukraine’.

Whereas divided politics made Ukraine pluralist, but too divided to implement difficult reforms; Georgia’s single-party government with large popular support is strong enough to push for reforms, but there are fewer checks on it and less space for political pluralism. (The international ratings capture this. Georgia’s is 12th in the World Bank’s Cost of Doing Business ranking (proxy indicator for reformism), and Ukraine is 147th. But in the Ecomomist Democracy Index Georgia is 103rd when it comes to democracy, and Ukraine at 67th place (before Yanukovich I assume) scored better than Montenegro.)

In the end the EU is quite dissapointed with with both – Ukraine’s democratic non-reformism, as well as with Georgia’s semi-democratic reformism. The EU developed a ‘Georgia fatigue’ and a ‘Ukraine fatigue’, ie became disappointed and uninterested. The one country that so far managed to avoid such EU fatigue is MOldova. It even provokes visible levels of EU enthusiasm. It is because is managed to be as pluralist as Orange Ukraine, but also more reformist. International ratings capture this. Moldova is 90th place in the Costs of Doing Business, and 65th in the Democracy Index (on a par with Serbia). Less reformist, but more democratic than Georgia; more reformist and similarly democratic to Orange Ukraine. But maintaining this reputation and continuing to improve its ‘reformist’ credentials will still be very hard work.

This disconnect between democracy and reformism is not unusual. Think of ideas such as ‘enlightened authoritarianism’ or ‘the Singapore model’. They both imply reformism without democracy. Also think of the ‘reformist’ Morocco, and ‘pluralist’, ‘divided’, but often politically stuck, Lebanon.

But this disconnect between ‘reformism’ and ‘democracy’ still creates problems for how the EU thinks of its neighbours and how it designs policies that aim at rewarding ‘progress’. Most of the EU hopes to see its Eastern partners  being both democratic and reformist. But this might be a bit too much to expect. The EU should probably lower the expectations bar and accept that having either ‘reformism’ or ‘pluralism’ are already good achievements that deserve more support, not ‘fatigue’. At the end of the day most other EU neighbours are neither reformist, nor democratic. Both East and South.

PS: All this being said, I do not believe in the model of undemocratic reformism in the Eastern neighbourhood. I do not buy the argument that ‘authoritarian modernisation’ China-style is something that should or could be emulated in the EU’s neighbourhood. Too many authoritarian states extol the ‘Chinese modernisation’ argument domestically or internationally, explicitly or implicitly, to explain their non-democratic non-reformism. Perhaps ‘authoritarian modernisation’ is a model that has succeeded in a number of cases (Singapore, China, South Korea), but in 90% of the cases authoritarianism is used to crush decent and benefit from corruption, rather than modernise. Most of EU’s neighbours fall in those 90 percent of non-democratic non-reformists, and are likely to do so for the foreseeable future.

On Ukraine

There might be an increasing sense that Ukraine, Moldova, and perhaps Belarus will “of course” join the EU. Though with two caveats:  1) in the long run (defined as 20-30 years), and 2) “this should happen at our own pace, not due to geopolitical considerations”. The language is still more positive than I ever heard in Germany.

Much has been made about the fact that FDP’s election manifesto mentions an EU accession perspective for Ukraine. The Ukrainian foreign minister Poroshenko even says the new German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle (and FDP leader) gave him such a manifesto with the word “Ukraine” underlined and Westerwelle’s signature next to it. I tended not to overdo the importance of this point in the manfesto. But my FDP interlocutor stressed that the Ukraine point in the manifesto was thought through, discussed and “voted twice in an electoral year by the party convention, and this is not a backdoor policy paper, but a key document”.

Russia-China

This blog recently raised some aspects of the Russian-Chinese partnership (Russia’s Chinese neighbourhood and Russia’s vs China’s rise). In Berlin three persons raised this as well. One asked whether “it is in our interests to give Siberia to China? We are interested in a strong Russia integrated into European structures.” Another argued that “Russian foreign policy is a disaster. Russia’s problems with China can only be solved through cooperation with the West”. And another argued that Russia needs greater cooperation with the EU on Central Asia, otherwise Moscow cannot handle the situation on its own. This might be true or not. But as far as I am concerned I have not seen any pleas for EU or Western help in the Russian foreign policy debate (The answer I got to this was: “They still do not know it, but we know better”). So the point that Russia might be increasingly vulnerable vis-a-vis China is perhaps right, but there is a certain dose of paternalistic and mentoring attitude vis-a-vis Russia in it as well (which the Russians hate, and the Europeans often cannot get rid of).

Some people (predominantly in Eastern Europe) speak of the “Finlandisation of Germany”. This is not entirely right. Finland’s careful policies vis-a-vis URSS were based on a feeling (or fear) of Russian strength hence the need to accomodate the URSS. German approaches to Russia seem to result from an opposite assesment, namely that Russia is too weak. Hence the need to engage, prop-up and sometimes accomodate it in order to strengthen it.

And finally on Russia-China. No matter how sour Russian-Chinese relations might turn, I hardly imagine a Russian leader ever delivering a “Munich speech” on China… this probably tells something about Russian vulnerabilities.

A new Ostpolitik

Germany has had quite a number of “new ostpolitiks” over the decades. The most recent one came during the 2007 German EU presidency (see Gernot Erler’s the new EU Ostpolitik). Now there is talk of another “new ostpolitik” with the following nuances:

• Westerwelle’s first foreign visit was to Poland (rather than Paris as before)
• The coalition CDU-FDP agreement FDP-CDU talks of “In our bilateral realtions with Russia, we will respect the legitimate intersts of our neighbours.” And again this was stressed in conversations as well.
• Then I also heard of the need for Germany to invest more into the “EU-Russia partnership, not bilateral German-Russian relations” and the desire to “stronger embed German policies in the East into the EU.”

Of course, Germany wants to include Russia into the Eastern partnership projects (I do not see why Russian NGOs should not take part in the EaP civil society forum for a start and then expand this to other technical areas of cooperation). Though it is also true that Russian-EU bussiness, political and societal links are much more intense then the links between the EU and the Eastern partnership states, so I would not be afraid that Russia is being left behind.

(update) On public opinion and governmental policy

Germany’s policy on Russia highlights a certain paradox. German public opinion is among the most negative towards Russia, while governmental policies and business relations are among the most positive. This BBC opinion poll (page 8 ) shows that only 12% of Germans (compared to 18% in France and the US, 25% in UK) view Russia’s influence in world affairs in a positive light,  while 70% (vs 66% in France, 55% in the UK, and 64% in the UK) view Russia negatively. But Germany’s Russia policy is mainly decided at political and business elite levels (and its salience is relatively low). So discourses are rarely enough to fundamentaly shift policies.

Hence, one should not expect revolutionary changes in German foreign policy. How far such discoursive nuances will change policies remains to be seen. Until then, the foreign policy bits of the CDU-FDP coalition agreement reproduced below are an interesting read, at least.

Essential passages of the CDU-FDP coalition agreement

KAS.de

About EU and the neighbour-states (p.114)

The EU is strong as the member states are equal and worthy partners regardless of their size and economic potential. The interests of the small and medium EU member states will remain a trade mark of the German European policies.

The deepening and enlargement of the European Union will lead to a closer political coordination and an intensified exchange between our societies.

We know about the high importance of friendly, trustworthy and future-orientated relations with our neighbours.
About EU-enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy (p.117)

We advocate an enlargement policy according to sound judgement. There should not be a lowering of the criteria or even an automatism of accession e.g. through naming an accession date before the finalisation of the negotiations. The accession talks should be open-ended. The strict fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria is the crucial condition for an accession as well as the ability of the candidates and the capacity of the EU.

We support an expansion of the European Neighbourhood Policy. We aim at a sustainable democratic, economic, social, constitutional and ecological development in our environment. These countries should experience peace and prosperity. On the basis of shared values, we want to ontensify our cooperation with the countries of the Eastern Partnership.

About NATO and Russia (p.119f.)

The NATO will remain our strongest anchor of our common security. It connects Europe and America and is the foundation for the collective defence and displays a unique political and military instrument to keep and restore peace. NATO is a means to accomplish political aims and encompasses the offer to cooperate in the field of security policy, disarmament, trust building and peaceful conflict resolution. Due to this strategic concept, the alliance will adapt to the challanges of today.

We want that the alliance will embrace the strategic partnership with Russia, as stated in the 1997 NATO-Russia-agreement. The NATO-Russia council should be used as a forum for issues concerning collective security policy. Our aim is a euro-transatlantic security architecture which – on the basis of the approved institutions, including OSCE and the European Council – encompasses a close relation to Russia. The German government wants the alliance to keep its door principally open and fosters the expansion of the partnerships.

We regard Russia as an important partner when dealing with regional and global challenges. These challenges include the conflicts in Afghanistan and the Middle East just as the E3+3 talks about the Iranian nuclear programme, the challenge of international terrorism, climate change or global epidemics. Additionally, we will support Russia to consequently keep up the modernisation of the country and erase existing deficits concerning human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Furthermore, we want to foster the civil dialogue, expand economic relations and create energy security without one-sided dependencies. In our bilateral realtions to Russia, we will respect the eligible intersts of our neighbours.

Among the more interesting results are (see page 35 of this opinion poll):

• Georgia comes first in pro-EU sentiment  with 36% being in favour of integration with the EU. But it also comes first in pro-independence sentiment with 48% (not willing to join any integrationist blocks). Unsurprisingly only 3% want integration into a Russian-led Union.
• Moldova comes second in pro-EU sentiment with 33% in favour of joining the EU (with 26% in favour of joining a Russian-led union). Among the post-Soviet states, Moldova also has the lowest degree of support for its own ‘full independence’ (20%).
• In Belarus, interestingly enough 23% want integration with Russia, while 20% want integration into the EU (and 28% want full independence). It is almost suprising that almost as the number of Belarussians that want integration into the EU and integration with Russia is almost equal.
• In Ukraine – 20% want integration into the EU and 34% integration into a Russia-Ukraine-Belarus-Kazakhstan union (and 12% back into the USSR), while 23% want full ‘nezalezhnost’ (independence).
• In Russia 36% don’t want any integration with other states or groups oif states, while 20% want the restoration of USSR and 15% want a union with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazahstan. Thus Russia itself is split between a go-it-alone attitude and a desire to reintegrate some of its former periphery.
• Perhaps surprisingly, in Latvia (and EU member state) only 31% want integration into the EU (10% integration with Russia) and 35% want full independence. Thus pro-EU sentiment in Latvia is lower than in Georgia and Moldova.

UPDATE: As the comments below attest – this poll is neither uncontroversial, not uncotested. The reason I put it on this blog is because I think many in the EU are hubristic abouts EU’s soft power. Way too many think EU’s power of attraction and magnetism works almost automatically, and the EU will transform its neighbours almost by default, simply because the EU attractive, it provides the best way of organising international relations and its successes are uncontested. Unfortunately, this is not so. The EU will have to invest much more political will and resources into its foreign policy if it really wants to shape its neighbourhood and the world at large. The hubris of soft power is not a good recipe for an effective foreign policy. I believe the EU is the best model of organising international relations, but its soft power is not automatic and good models do not always win.

UPDATE 2: The numbers on the foreign policy orientation of Ukraine have raised some controversy. I was not analysing Ukraine’s public opinion, but one specific opinion poll. However, it is fair to supply more data on Ukraine. After some digging – here is more data on Ukraine’s public opinion on the foreign policy orientation of the country. The Razumkov centre supplies the following:

Question 1: Does Ukraine need to join the European Union?

• Yes – 43% in December 2008 (compared to 65% in 2002, 0r 54% in 2007).
• No – 35% in 2008 (compared to 14% in 2002 and 29 in 2007)

Question 2: which foreign policy direction should be a priority for Ukraine (Russia, EU, USA, CIS)?

• in favour of the EU – 27.5% (compared to 39% in 2005)
• in favour of Russia 51% (compared to 34 in 2005)

If you add the attitudes towards NATO it seems like Ukrainian public opinion is less enthusiastic about both NATO and EU than in was in 2002-2003-2005.

If you ask me, I would also consider the Razumkov Centre opinion polls more reliable than the Eurasia monitor.

on Moldova:  if the question is “are you in favour of joining the EU?” – 72% are in favour (IPP poll, March 2009)

Exporting border controls

A fortress has multiple lines of defence – a dungeon as the hard nucleus and defensive walls, but also external fortifications such as ditches or earthworks (see a formidable fortress, left). The EU has been developing a similarly multilayered system of border management and protection with elements of outside fortifications. With the Schengen area as the dungeon, non-Schengen EU member states such as Romania and Bulgaria (and the other new EU states until December 2007) already separated from the outside world by a strong visa wall, the EU has started to build outside fortifications.

The EU is as keen to engage in border management cooperation with its neighbours, as it is sceptical of facilitation of trade or visas. The EU has currently deployed four EU operations in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, and three of them are border assistance missions – the EU Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova (EUBAM), a EUBAM Rafah (Palestine) and a tiny EU Border Support Team to Georgia. Moreover, when in spring 2008 the EU Special Representative for South Caucasus put forward possible ways for the EU to step up its engagement in the conflict region of Abkhazia, these also focused on border management dialogue. In many ways the EU is exporting its preoccupation for illegal migration, trafficking and organised crime to its neighbours.

To make sure EU border missions are important for making its neighbourhood a better place. But the EU’s export of border controls has to be complemented with similar activism on trade and visa facilitation, which are its neighbour’s true priorities. There are many things a post-modern Europe can learn from medieval Europe. Building multi-line defences as a technical solution to border controls is one thing. But the EU has to learn more from the medieval concept of borders, as well. Not how to manage defences, but what borders are and how to manage borderlands.

Borderlines vs borderlands

The notion of “borders” has many meanings, hence the proliferation of related terms such as frontier, boundary, borderland, limes, rim etc. A border can be a fixed line of demarcation. A borderland or frontier are more difficult to define. They imply the existence of grey transitory area between one jurisdiction to another. As in medieval times borderlands can be ‘a relatively undeveloped, thinly populated, outlying zone or rimland, a marginal region into which an advanced civilization introduces colonists as permanent settlers’ (The Frontier in Medieval History). Or they can be some kind of cross-roads where multiple languages, currencies, religions and ethnic groups interact, mingle and prosper (think of Geneva, the Savoy Kingdom, Vojvodina or the Low Countries).

Conceptually borders and frontiers are antonyms. In the last century and a half modern borderlines have destroyed many borderlands. Passports, currencies and visas have relegated frontier regions to symbols of divisions, not cross-roads. The fixed borders of nation-states were set to delineate cultures, languages, currencies, and mobile telephony operators, not mingle them. In frontier regions people interacted, multiple currencies circulated, overlapping sovereignties were clashing, while locals spoke easily two-three languages. In many ways the “fixed, durable and inflexible requirements of borders clash with the unstable, transient and flexible requirements of people” (Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices)

The EU’s relationship to borders is double-edged. While the EU has been eliminating borders inside Europe, but its outside borders were becoming increasingly restrictive. Witness the example of two of EU’s Eastern neighbours: Moldova and Ukraine. Just a few years ago these countries had visa-free regimes with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. After Central Europe joined the EU, there is no single country to the West of Ukraine and Moldova where the citizens of these states can go without visas. They can travel easily only to the post-Soviet space. And there is no stronger anchor in the increasingly authoritarian post-soviet space than people’s inability to travel, study or do business in the EU. Thus EU’s visa policies are easily cancelling many of the expected political, economic or cultural effects of the European neighbourhood policy. EU’s soft power is in fact draining in the queues in front of the EU consulates in Kiev, Moscow or Tbilisi.

Reconceptualising the debate on EU’s borders might help. Today the intra-European debate on borders is either focused on enlargement (‘Should Turkey or Ukraine join the EU?’), or on border-management (‘how to make the defensive fortifications stronger?’). But the EU should equally re-think the way it sees its borders. Shifting from the notion of borders as demarcation lines, and symbols of exclusion, to the reality of frontiers – more open regions, where people and cultures mingle will make post-modern Europe learn a good lesson from medieval Europe. Border management need not be just about fences, but about management of openness and interaction.