On Ukraine

There might be an increasing sense that Ukraine, Moldova, and perhaps Belarus will “of course” join the EU. Though with two caveats:  1) in the long run (defined as 20-30 years), and 2) “this should happen at our own pace, not due to geopolitical considerations”. The language is still more positive than I ever heard in Germany.

Much has been made about the fact that FDP’s election manifesto mentions an EU accession perspective for Ukraine. The Ukrainian foreign minister Poroshenko even says the new German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle (and FDP leader) gave him such a manifesto with the word “Ukraine” underlined and Westerwelle’s signature next to it. I tended not to overdo the importance of this point in the manfesto. But my FDP interlocutor stressed that the Ukraine point in the manifesto was thought through, discussed and “voted twice in an electoral year by the party convention, and this is not a backdoor policy paper, but a key document”.

Russia-China

This blog recently raised some aspects of the Russian-Chinese partnership (Russia’s Chinese neighbourhood and Russia’s vs China’s rise). In Berlin three persons raised this as well. One asked whether “it is in our interests to give Siberia to China? We are interested in a strong Russia integrated into European structures.” Another argued that “Russian foreign policy is a disaster. Russia’s problems with China can only be solved through cooperation with the West”. And another argued that Russia needs greater cooperation with the EU on Central Asia, otherwise Moscow cannot handle the situation on its own. This might be true or not. But as far as I am concerned I have not seen any pleas for EU or Western help in the Russian foreign policy debate (The answer I got to this was: “They still do not know it, but we know better”). So the point that Russia might be increasingly vulnerable vis-a-vis China is perhaps right, but there is a certain dose of paternalistic and mentoring attitude vis-a-vis Russia in it as well (which the Russians hate, and the Europeans often cannot get rid of).

Some people (predominantly in Eastern Europe) speak of the “Finlandisation of Germany”. This is not entirely right. Finland’s careful policies vis-a-vis URSS were based on a feeling (or fear) of Russian strength hence the need to accomodate the URSS. German approaches to Russia seem to result from an opposite assesment, namely that Russia is too weak. Hence the need to engage, prop-up and sometimes accomodate it in order to strengthen it.

And finally on Russia-China. No matter how sour Russian-Chinese relations might turn, I hardly imagine a Russian leader ever delivering a “Munich speech” on China… this probably tells something about Russian vulnerabilities.

A new Ostpolitik

Germany has had quite a number of “new ostpolitiks” over the decades. The most recent one came during the 2007 German EU presidency (see Gernot Erler’s the new EU Ostpolitik). Now there is talk of another “new ostpolitik” with the following nuances:

• Westerwelle’s first foreign visit was to Poland (rather than Paris as before)
• The coalition CDU-FDP agreement FDP-CDU talks of “In our bilateral realtions with Russia, we will respect the legitimate intersts of our neighbours.” And again this was stressed in conversations as well.
• Then I also heard of the need for Germany to invest more into the “EU-Russia partnership, not bilateral German-Russian relations” and the desire to “stronger embed German policies in the East into the EU.”

Of course, Germany wants to include Russia into the Eastern partnership projects (I do not see why Russian NGOs should not take part in the EaP civil society forum for a start and then expand this to other technical areas of cooperation). Though it is also true that Russian-EU bussiness, political and societal links are much more intense then the links between the EU and the Eastern partnership states, so I would not be afraid that Russia is being left behind.

(update) On public opinion and governmental policy

Germany’s policy on Russia highlights a certain paradox. German public opinion is among the most negative towards Russia, while governmental policies and business relations are among the most positive. This BBC opinion poll (page 8 ) shows that only 12% of Germans (compared to 18% in France and the US, 25% in UK) view Russia’s influence in world affairs in a positive light,  while 70% (vs 66% in France, 55% in the UK, and 64% in the UK) view Russia negatively. But Germany’s Russia policy is mainly decided at political and business elite levels (and its salience is relatively low). So discourses are rarely enough to fundamentaly shift policies.

Hence, one should not expect revolutionary changes in German foreign policy. How far such discoursive nuances will change policies remains to be seen. Until then, the foreign policy bits of the CDU-FDP coalition agreement reproduced below are an interesting read, at least.

Essential passages of the CDU-FDP coalition agreement

KAS.de

About EU and the neighbour-states (p.114)

The EU is strong as the member states are equal and worthy partners regardless of their size and economic potential. The interests of the small and medium EU member states will remain a trade mark of the German European policies.

The deepening and enlargement of the European Union will lead to a closer political coordination and an intensified exchange between our societies.

We know about the high importance of friendly, trustworthy and future-orientated relations with our neighbours.
About EU-enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy (p.117)

We advocate an enlargement policy according to sound judgement. There should not be a lowering of the criteria or even an automatism of accession e.g. through naming an accession date before the finalisation of the negotiations. The accession talks should be open-ended. The strict fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria is the crucial condition for an accession as well as the ability of the candidates and the capacity of the EU.

We support an expansion of the European Neighbourhood Policy. We aim at a sustainable democratic, economic, social, constitutional and ecological development in our environment. These countries should experience peace and prosperity. On the basis of shared values, we want to ontensify our cooperation with the countries of the Eastern Partnership.

About NATO and Russia (p.119f.)

The NATO will remain our strongest anchor of our common security. It connects Europe and America and is the foundation for the collective defence and displays a unique political and military instrument to keep and restore peace. NATO is a means to accomplish political aims and encompasses the offer to cooperate in the field of security policy, disarmament, trust building and peaceful conflict resolution. Due to this strategic concept, the alliance will adapt to the challanges of today.

We want that the alliance will embrace the strategic partnership with Russia, as stated in the 1997 NATO-Russia-agreement. The NATO-Russia council should be used as a forum for issues concerning collective security policy. Our aim is a euro-transatlantic security architecture which – on the basis of the approved institutions, including OSCE and the European Council – encompasses a close relation to Russia. The German government wants the alliance to keep its door principally open and fosters the expansion of the partnerships.

We regard Russia as an important partner when dealing with regional and global challenges. These challenges include the conflicts in Afghanistan and the Middle East just as the E3+3 talks about the Iranian nuclear programme, the challenge of international terrorism, climate change or global epidemics. Additionally, we will support Russia to consequently keep up the modernisation of the country and erase existing deficits concerning human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Furthermore, we want to foster the civil dialogue, expand economic relations and create energy security without one-sided dependencies. In our bilateral realtions to Russia, we will respect the eligible intersts of our neighbours.

As promissed, more impressions from my recent trip to Sukhumi. In Abkhazia, the economic imperative of rebuilding the region and attracting investments (predominantly Russian) clashes with its political project of staying more or less independent. Abkhazia might face the following paradox: until August 2008 Abkhazia was de facto independent but unrecognised; now it is recognised (by Russia and Nicaragua only), but not de facto independent anymore. The closure of the UNOMIG mission (anounced today) will also leave Abkhazia more internationally isolated than ever before.

Compared to my previous visit there in March 2006, now Sukhumi was livelier. There are more renovated buildings, more expensive cars, more people on the promenade by the sea, and the cafés are fuller. This is both a sign of some economic progress, but also the fact that summer is always livelier than the rest of the year (because of the tourists).

In the hotel I stayed (Ritsa) – very central and right by the sea – there were three wi-fi networks in the range of my laptop. The local GSM operator “Aquaphone” boasts with its 3G network. On one of the formerly abandoned piers in Sukhumi – a café was opened that serves sushi (and where the local authorities took Solana and Lavrov on their recent visits to Abkhazia). I even saw a yellow Hummer (!) (I also saw another one in Tbilisi –apparently that is trendy). A recent spat between the Georgian government and Benetton is also telling. Benetton Turkey wanted to open a shop in Sukhumi, but the Georgian government protested since such an investment was not coordinated with the Georgian government whose sovereignty over Abkhazia is recognised by all but two UN member states. Benetton Tbilisi even closed down its shop for two days in protest against the actions of its Turkish sister company. Still, I saw in Sukhumi one improvised (in Russian one would say “kustarnyi”) Zara, one improvised Mango and 3 improvised Ikea mini-shops (these are not official representations, but just local shuttle-businessmen buying stuff in Russia or Turkey and importing it into Abkhazia).

There still are plenty of destroyed buildings (in the centre of Sukhumi, and especially in the “Novyi raion”– not far from Gumista river where the frontline between Georgian and Abkhaz troops was in 1992-1993). Many Abkhaz speak of a local construction boom. It is true that some buildings are being rebuilt or renovated, but I would not call that a construction boom in the way “constructions booms” happened in Moscow, Tbilisi, Kiev or Baku. And certainly economical development in Sukhumi is nowehere near the economic development Tbilisi has seen in recent years. Despite the fact that Abkhazia is a paradise for fruits and vegetables (and tourists), almost all the fruits on the market are imported (from Turkey I guess), and the cherries cost 8-10 USD (250-300 roubles).

But overall the economic mood is very optimistic. From an Abkhaz perspective, the security problem is solved by Russia guaranteeing and defending Abkhazia’s mostly unrecognised border with Georgia. This should boost investor confidence and lead to higher economic growth.

But Abkhazia’s economic optimism is clouded by a certain anxiety on Abkhazia’s political and demographic future. There is a deep sense of fear that Abkhazia will dissolve itself economically and politically in the “greater Russia” (see the newspaper article below). The fear is that Russia will take over most of the Abkhaz tourist infrastructure (attractive land by the sea and hotels); the construction works for the Sochi Olympics will draw on Abkhaz construction materials, such a gravel, destroying Abkhaz beaches and riverbeds; and the Russian soldiers serving in Abkhazia might stay on with their families changing the demographic balance in a way that is even less favourable to the ethnic Abkhaz (who anyway constitute slightly over a third of the population now). However this does not mean the Abkhaz will suddenly want to become part of Georgia again.

As an Abkhaz told me: “Abkhazia faces competing pressures: we need more Russian troops to have our security guaranteed, but we also fear having too many Russian troops for fear of losing control of Abkhazia”. The need to find a balance between integration with Russia and maintaining a certain distance from Russia runs through almost every single economic, social, political, demographic or environmental issue in the region. Such a balance is impossible perhaps.

PS: Andrew Wilson and I just published a new ECFR report on the Eastern neighbourhood: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood .

PPS: Russia vetoed the extension of the UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia). From what I know the Abkhaz definitely wanted the mission to stay (under a modified name), since this was virtually their only opening to the broader world.

I just spent a few days in Abkhazia and Tbilisi. I will write more about the trip in the following days. But it was interesting to see that the word “war” refers to different historical events. For the Georgians the phrase “after the war” means “after the August 2008 war”. For the Abkhaz (and I guess the 240.000 Georgian refugees from Abkhazia) the term “war” refers to a the war in 1992-93. For the Abkhaz “after the war” means  “after the 1992-1993 war”, while the August 2008 war is referred to as “the August events”. For Georgians the 1992-1993 war in Abkhazia is “the conflict in Abkhazia”. And for the Russians “the war” refers to the great patriotic war of 1941-1945 (which is symbolically different from the Second World War, as some Russian like to stress). So here it comes three nations that fought wars against each-other in the recent past – have entirely different meanings of the word “war”.

The pattern is not so different in the case of Moldova and Transnistria. For Transnistria “the war” is the 1992 armed conflict with Moldova. For Moldova, the 1992 clashes are just the “Transnistria conflict”.

“The war” is the event that shakes the core foundations of a state or nation, and the rest are just conflicts. “The war” is the one war that affects most of the population directly (that is why the 1992-93 is “the war” for the Abkhaz, but not for the most Georgians). So if one wants to understand which of the wars had the most decisive impact on the psyche of a nation, one has to look into what this nations calls “the war”.

The fact that the term “war” refers to recent events, also shows the degree to which “war” is a defining moment for contemporary politics in the South Caucasus, as opposed to most of Europe where “war” refers to historical events.

PS: I also wonder what is the by default meaning of the term “war” for Serbia?

Tskhinvali today. Photo taken from Nikozi, some 300 metres south-west of Tskhinvali.

The relative calm rests almost exclusively on the lack of any (current) interest for renewed hostilities from either Russia or Georgia. Russia has a military victory in its pocket, and an economic crisis on its hands. Georgia is deterred by Russia’s military presence. The EU Monitoring Mission might have some psychologically restraining effects on the conflict sides. But here is little else that would prevent renewed hostilities should any of the parties become interested in stirring them. And they might be. If not now, then in the future. If not by Russia and Georgia, then by South Ossetia.

Russia has huge problems in monitoring how Russian reconstruction funding is spent by the South Ossetian authorities, who refuse any kind of scrutiny. Already a couple of Russian appointed officials to South Ossetia have resigned after apparent pressure from the local government who refuses any degree of transparency. Former Russian appointed officials to South Ossetia such as former prime minister of the region Morozov and former secretary security council Barankevich have criticised Kokoity for corruption and embezzlement of Russian money. Russia seems to exercise pressure on the South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity who tries to keep under his control all the money that flow into the region. To diffuse Russian pressures, Kokoity might have an interest in growing security tensions on the ground. Changing Kokoity against the background of security tensions could be too risky.

Some EU member states seem to have their doubts about the need to have a prolonged EU peace-monitoring presence on the ground. But withdrawing the EU monitoring mission from Georgia would be folly. It might need to stay there, in this or that form, for long. Without it, both EU’s interests in the South Caucasus and EU-Russia relations could be severely tested again. As they were in August 2008.