This presents different challenges for everyone. The Russian government fears that a nationalist-democratic consolidation on an anti-Putinist platform would make a much more formidable adversary than the ‘official’ opposition allowed in parliament. Russian democrats also have their own dilemmas as their flirtation with nationalism is on the verge of evolving into a marriage of convenience, a combination that could produce either their elixir of life or a toxic poison.

From imperialist to defensive nationalism

Nationalism is like software that can run on different platforms – from Windows to Android. As nationalism normally has little to say about economic or social policies, it can easily merge easier with other left- or right-wing ideologies, increasing exponentially the number of mutations to which it can be subject.

In post-Soviet Russia virtually all political forces – from Putin to the Communists – have flirted with nationalism. Despite various ideological platforms, the unifying feature of Russian nationalists for most of the 20th century, in its right-wing imperial and left-wing communist forms, was a drive for expansion and a ‘bigger Russia’. As Russia grew bigger, other ethnic groups were welcome, but they were also expected to acquiesce to the ‘elder brother’ in the short term, and assimilate in the long-term.

One of Vladimir Putin’s recent pre-election articles dedicated to the ‘national question’ largely subscribes to this view, even though he laments the ‘inadequate, aggressive, defiant and disrespectful’ behaviour of some migrants. But such imperialist nationalism was based on a strong confidence in Russia’s state capacity, power of territorial expansion and cultural attraction. However, the growing realisation of Russia’s structural problems – from demographic crisis to bad governance under Putin, topped by the economic crisis – has led to some structural shifts in Russian nationalism.

An increasingly obvious trend in the last few years is for the ‘old’ expansionist nationalism to rapidly lose ground to a new breed of isolationist, introvert and defensive nationalism that is primarily anti-immigrant and often anti-imperial. Such nationalism is more concerned with maintaining Russia’s ‘Russianness’ than with territorial expansion. The key source of this defensive nationalism is the toxic mix of high immigration into Russia coupled with a demographic crisis. With over 12 million migrants, Russia is the second biggest recipient of inward migration in the world after the US, though as a share of migrants per total population Russia only ranks 55th in the world.

From the nationalists’ perspective Russia’s demographic crisis is two-fold. One aspect is the decline of Russia’s population, with the treat of further decline due to the higher numbers of old than young. But from the nationalists’ perspective, graver still is the fact that the fall in numbers of ethnic Russians due to emigration, high mortality and low birth rates is faster than the overall demographic decline, the pace of which has indeed slowed, partly due to immigration (primarily from  Central Asia and the south Caucasus) and higher population growth among some Russian minorities, particularly in the north Caucasus. So the fear is not only about Russia’s decreasing population, but even more so about the fact that Russia is becoming less ethnically Russian.

The instinctive response to fears of relative demographic decline of ethnic Russians is a growing ‘fortress Russia’ syndrome. At its core, Russia’s defensive nationalism rests on a much-diminished belief in Russia’s power to expand and assimilate its periphery, particularly the culturally distant Muslim populations of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The nationalist schism is clearly visible at nationalist marches parts of the crowd shout ‘there is no Russia without Caucasus’ whereas other parts shout ‘Stop feeding the Caucasus’ and ‘Migrants today, Occupiers tomorrow’.

The democratic-nationalist mix

Now Russian nationalism seems to give birth to a new permutation – a merger of the defensive type of nationalism with elements of democratic and liberal thought. Some in Russia hope that this kind of mix will appeal to many young, urban, middle-class Russians who often see themselves as liberals, hold democratic views, despise Putin’s regime, and are western-leaning (though not uncritically so) while on the other hand being increasingly anti-immigration.

The new liberal-nationalist fusion gradually trickles down into the political process, as some democrats start to move towards the adoption of nationalist views, while at the same time some nationalists seem to have moved towards the centre ground. Vladimir Milov, a prominent Russian liberal, decided to take the bull by the horns by initiating a liberal-nationalist fusion that aims to reclaim nationalism from Russia’s extremist groups.

The liberal-nationalist mix has not yet crystallised in a series of coherent views and leaders, let alone organisations. But it is starting to take some shape. A good example is Alexei Navalny, the emerging star of the Russian opposition. He is a hugely popular anti-corruption campaigner, the most popular blogger in Russia and widely seen as the anti-Putinists’ best hope. His success is built on three pillars: anti-corruption campaigning, pro-democracy activism, and a pinch of moderate nationalism. He goes about these activities by a very savvy mix of internet activism (blogging, crowd-sourcing, etc.) and offline actions (minority shareholders activism, court actions, monitoring of public tenders, writing formal complaints to public institutions forcing them to respond, etc.). Now Moscow is buzzing with talk of Navalny as Russia’s future president.

Navalny himself is a democrat. He also has a strong record of taking part in democratic groups and movements in the last decade. He is also in favour of the separation of powers, transparency and other worthy causes. His declared belief is that ‘the purpose of the state is to ensure comfortable and dignified conditions for its citizens, and defend their individual and collective rights. A nation-state means that Russia should follow the European path, ie build our own nice, cosy, but strong and solid, little European house.’ Yet he also attends the ‘Russian March’, a notorious annual gathering of nationalists. Asked whether he supports the nationalist slogan ‘Russia for Russians’, he responded that he supports the slogan ‘Russia for Russian citizens’ – a slightly more inclusive slogan, demonstrating a tolerance of Russia’s ethnic minorities who are citizens, yet one which is still distinctly nationalist.

It is still unclear whether Navalny is a strong believer in a nationalist agenda or whether his professed nationalism is primarily a calculated strategy. Either way, the combination of democratic rhetoric with an anti-corruption agenda and nationalist undertones gives him a strong base from which to bridge a range of societal groups in Russia beyond most other potential leaders in Russia today.

Refreshing or toxic?

It is too early to tell whether the nationalist-democratic cocktail will prove a toxic liquid or the ticket to the future for the so far marginalised Russian democrats. Either way, the nationalist-liberal rapprochement sparks tensions within both camps. Some expansionist nationalists are fuming that the liberals are trying to turn the nationalists into ‘cannon fodder for a liberal revanche’. Whereas the liberals, as Andreas Umland points out, fear that nationalists could subvert pro-democracy movements.

Putin apologists seize on this. Some of them attack the popular Navalny by drawing parallels between him and Kerensky, the Russian burgeois revolutionary leader who came to power after overthrowing the Tsar in February 1917, only to be forced out by a ruthless communist coup led by Vladimir Lenin eight months later. The parallel is supposed to suggest that nastier forces will steal whatever democratic advances Russia might make once Putin is out.

But it is also possible that Russian democrats could expand their influence and ultimately help co-opt the potentially strong force of Russian nationalism, channeling it into a more democratic and pluralist direction. Either way, Russian liberals are now engaged not only in a contest with Putin’s system, but also in a tense, but irresistible tango with Russian nationalism.

Open Democracy, 3 February 2012

By the standards of Western democracies, falling just short of the 50% mark after three years of global economic crisis and 12 years in power would be a stellar victory. But in Putin’s Russia this is a serious setback for two main reasons. First of all, the elections were neither free, nor fair. Evidence of ballot stuffing is already swirling around the internet, and the election campaign was heavily biased in favour of United Russia. Federal TV channels and local authorities worked hard to persuade and pressurise people to vote for United Russia. Under normal campaign circumstances and with no ballot stuffing Putin’s party would perhaps have got somewhere closer to 30-35% of the vote. The authorities know that. This is hardly a rock-solid foundation for the supposedly Teflon President Putin who wants to be a fatherly leader of the nation for a life-time. His lifetime.

Secondly, all authoritarian regimes thrive on the political apathy of the governed. Ruling a politically apathetic population is cheaper, as elites need fewer resources for either coercion or co-optation, while having more time to enjoy on the benefits of power. Throughout the last decade, from the average voters’ perspective the question was why bother voting when life standards were rising, Putin was cool and the election results were always going to be another Olympic-size victory for United Russia.

But instead of apathy, in the run up to these elections the Russian intelligentsia was at boiling point. Political activism (mainly online) among the young and urban middle classes was at its highest. Among the glamorous ‘crème de la crème’ of Russian society – pop singers, ballerinas and TV stars – supporting Putin (and especially United Russia) became markedly uncool. In the absence of access to TV or wider platforms for discussion, Russia’s oversized blogosphere hotly debated whether to boycott the elections (the argument of the ‘Nah-Nah’ campaigners – one could translate this as ‘fuc-fuc’, a short form of ‘f..k off’), or go out and vote for any party except United Russia. True, this was a bit of a storm in a teacup. But nonetheless the spilt water also leaves traces outside the cup, consolidating the trend of rising anti-government feeling among the growing middle-class (even including the half of it that is employed by the state). This trend is not so much fuelled by a hope of change, but by the desire to punch United Russia in the nose. That too suggests a change in attitudes.

A parallel side-story is how the elections affect President Medvedev, who led United Russia’s electoral list. For friends, Medvedev is now the president who lost the presidency. For his intra-Kremlin adversaries, he is the president who lost the elections. After Putin announced his return to the presidency in September, Medvedev lost most of the small band of hopeful followers who believed in his talk of modernisation. Now his adversaries will frame the results as due to a failure of Medvedev’s leadership, rather than a vote against Putin’s system and the fear of ‘Brezhnevisation’.

Medvedev could try to re-establish himself as a stronger player by once again sacking some powerful people. This was virtually the only daring thing he did as a president, when he sacked a powerful finance minister, several long-serving governors of Russian regions and the mayor of Moscow. This response may signal that he is not a spent political force, but it could also fuel further splits among the ruling elites, accelerating the erosion of Putin’s system.

However, beyond the headlines about possible decline there is room for a note of caution. Putin thrives on crises. His presidency was forged in the 1999 crisis: a time of terrorist attacks in Russia, war in Chechnya and struggles with rival oligarchs. Even if United Russia has fewer MPs, the other 3 parliamentary parties are willing collaborators, provided they get a slightly higher share of rent-seeking opportunities. Such an arrangement would not be novel. In United Russia’s first term in the Duma, from 1999 to 2003, it even had fewer members of parliament than now. Yet this did not prevent Putin from making some of his sharpest ever political manoeuvres – centralising power by kicking regional governors out from the upper chamber of the Parliament, asserting full control of the media that matters, throwing Khodorkovsky in jail and two other formerly powerful oligarchs Berezovsky and Gusinsky out of the country. In other words, even if Putin’s beginning of the end has started, it is not around the corner yet.

The report has been endorsed by several foreign policy personalities in Europe. Here are some of the endorsements:

“This report is an important analysis of where Russia stands today and what opportunities this brings for the EU. It will open a much-needed and interesting debate.”

Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy; former Secretary General of NATO

“This report is extremely insightful both for its great analysis as well as policy recommendations proposed which touch upon both foreign, economic and energy policies. The report is indeed a real working agenda for the European Union.”
Massimo D’Alema, President, Italianieuropei Foundation; President, Foundation for European Progressive Studies; former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

Sergei Guriev, Rector of the New Economic School, Moscow

“A well-researched and panoramic survey of the Russian regime’s stagnant, self-destructive and malignant approach at home and abroad. It is essential reading for anyone interested in Russia, and impatient for a more robust EU policy to its eastern neighbours.”

Edward Lucas, International Editor, The Economist

“This is a very timely study on a changed Russia facing stagnation and many unresolved problems under the renewed leadership of Vladimir Putin. It is time for the EU to develop a coherent strategy to engage a “post-crisis Russia” likely to act more soberly and pragmatically. The proposed options for a “pro-active EU policy on Russia” provide an excellent starting point for European policy-makers.”

Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff, Coordinator of German-Russian Inter-societal Cooperation of the German Federal Foreign Office, MP and Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group

“The EU can and should have good relations with Russia; this ECFR report indicates what the priorities should be. Wishful thinking needs to be abandoned, yet respect for universal values strengthened, as Europe re-engages Russia into closer cooperation.”
Adam D. Rotfeld, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-Chairman of Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters

“A very timely and much-needed document.”

Vaira Vike-Freiberga, former President of Latvia

EU member states differ widely not just in the application of visa procedures, but also on how fast the EU should move towards a visa-free regime withRussia. Russia and the EU apparently agreed on a set of common steps to undertake towards the visa free regime and should make the agreement public at their next summit in December. The ‘common steps’ are presumably supposed to be quite similar to the EU action plans on visa free travel offered to Moldova and Ukraine.

From an EU perspective there are two possible approaches to the issue of liberalising visas for Russia. One approach is to set the bar high (as the EU did in the Western Balkans), and demand not just improvement of border-management and security of documents, including biometric passports, but also wider and deeper reforms of the law-enforcement agencies, fight against corruption and improvements in the human rights record. Some officials in several EU member states, including Germany, suggest that the EU should link the EU offer of a visa-free regime to Russia to some political or security issues where the EU wants to see some progress. In such a case the EU would treat the offer of a visa-free regime to Russia as the highest possible prize for which Russia should sweat a lot. Under such an approach fighting corruption would minimize the dangers that the Russian passports might be acquired/bought by potential third country illegal migrants as a one-way ticket to the EU; and improving the human rights record and fighting torture would dry up the legitimate reasons for Russian to claim asylum status in the EU (data in Part 1). Finally, the EU then has to inspect and monitor Russian compliance with EU demands.

The problem is that such a strongly conditional approach has worked on Serbia, might work on Moldova, but is unlikely to work on Russia. The Russian elites have few problems in getting EU visas, and holders of diplomatic passports travel visa-free already (to Schengen, but not to the UK). They will not change the way Russia is governed and their positions in power for the sake of the average Russian’s possibility to travel visa-free to the EU. The EU is also unlikely to descend with fact-finding missions to see how the border is controlled between Russia and Kazakhstan or Mongolia, the way they checked Serbian-Bosnian border, or would check the Moldovan-Ukrainian borders. The EU member states are also not united enough in their application of visa policies to be able to leverage their joint influence over Russia. This offers ordinary the Russian state and ordinary Russians simply engage in ‘visa shopping’ rather than comply with EU conditions. The divergent visa policies of EU states described in Part 1 are proof of that.

An alternative approach is to liberalise the visa system as soon as possible in the hope that this will have a gradual transformational effect on Russian society. Proponents of such an approach argue that the visa-free regime with Russia should be treated as a tool of helping Russia to modernise. By opening borders, the argument goes, the EU will contribute to the modernisation of Russian society through greater and easier business, educational and cultural contacts with the EU for the Russian middle class. But of course there is little enthusiasm in the EU in being seen as offering such a present to Putin’s third presidency.

It is not that different member states adopt one of the two approaches (though they often lean towards one of them), but also different players within the same member state are quite divided: diplomats and the business community tend to favour a more liberal approach (see this position paper by the German Committee for Eastern Economic Relations or a study from the European Tour Operators Association), whereas law-enforcement agencies in the same states prefer a tougher approach.

Ultimately, the question is not whether to move towards a visa-free regime with Russia, but how quickly and under what conditions. Those who fear a relatively quick liberalisation of the visa regime have a point. An EU diplomat told me once that ‘Russia is so big – you can take a chance with visa free for Macedonia, but not with Russia’. An Estonian diplomat argued that ‘it is easy for Spaniards to push for visa free withRussia. They will get the rich oligarchs on the Spanish coast, and we will get the petty criminals from Pskov region’. With the current debate on immigration – most EU politicians have little to gain from a visa-free regime with Russia and a lot to loose in terms of public support in many EU countries.

Yet the current system does not work either. It penalises ordinary citizens, and its application is not uniform enough to give EU member states joint leverage over Russia. The conclusions is that in the short term what the EU needs is a middle way that reconciles the need to open up EU borders for legitimate travellers from Russia, while keeping a strong enough monitoring mechanism that would assuage reluctant EU member states. A European version of the Mexican system of ‘electronic visas‘ for Russians (and Ukrainians) could be such a solution that fits into the ‘smart borders‘ approach and could be applied to those who already had Schengen visas once. And in the mid-term, once the conditions of the ‘common steps’ are fulfilled, a fully fledged visa-free regime would follow.

Divergent visa practices

Not surprisingly, EU member states approaches to visa policies on Russia vary hugely. Some EU member states like Belgium, Germany or the Netherlands, and almost all the ministries of interior across the EU are in favour of a more restrictive approach to visas. Such policies are driven by several concerns.

First – are the risks of excessive immigration. Many also argue that the existing visa regime limits the flow of potential asylum seekers or petty criminals from Russia. In fact, Russia is the second most important source of asylum seekers in the EU after Afghanistan, and ahead of Iraq and Somalia. Furthermore, Europol’s annual Organised Crime Threat Assessment OCTA 2011 warned that visa liberalisation with Russia “may lead to widespread abuse” and this would “undoubtedly present new opportunities for organised crime groups involved in illegal immigration”.

In the view of others, a potentially useful side effect of the visa-regime is that EU or its member states can impose travel-restrictions. For example, Estonia blacklisted some activist of a thuggish pro-Kremlin youth group called Nashi believed to be behind the assault on the Estonian embassy in Moscow in 2008 (the former leader of Nashi is now an official; and still on the visa ban). With the US introducing visa bans against roughly 60 Russian officials involved in the death of lawyer Magnitsky and the European Parliament calling for a similar ban, a Russian expert argued that such “visa bans have the potential to moderate potential human rights abuses by various officials. They won’t stop stealing, but would think twice before doing really nasty abuses.”

Source: European Commission

On the other end of attitudes are a group of EU member states that are much more liberal. States like Spain, Italy, or Greece are keen to encourage tourists and are very liberal in the issuance of visa. They often ask for fewer supporting documents, have lower refusal rates and offer more long-term multi-entry visas. The most liberal of all is Finland. It issues almost as many visas in Russia as Germany, France and Italy put together. And the Finnish consulate in St Petersburg, dubbed by fellow EU member states the ‘Finnish visa factory’ is the biggest EU consulate in the world issuing over 700.000 visas annually, followed by the Spanish consulate in Moscow with around 438.000 visas issued in 2010. Equally striking is that 98.8% of Austrian visas issued in Moscow or 96% of Finnish visas issued in St Petersburg are multi-entry, whereas only 1.6% of Czech visas issued in Moscow are (all the data is from the European Commission).

The ‘liberals’ also argue that, under the current system most of those who potentially threaten EU security have the means to get the visas. Criminals or corrupt officials have the money to make reservations in posh hotels or buy property in the EU which are strong reasons to be granted a visa. However, the current visa policies close the door for ordinary Russian citizens, while hardly restricting the movements of the rich and often corrupt elite. As an important side-effect, EU visa policies also undermine EU soft power, while hardly being an obstacle for sophisticated Russian organised crime networks.

It is also worth noting that the state of political relations with Russia is not a good indicator for approaches to visa-policy. Most of the Central European EU member states are rather liberal in their approaches even if many of them have difficult political relations with Russia; whereas some of Russia’s closest partners in the EU, like Germany, can be quite difficult on visas.

Russia’s approach to visas – hardly liberal, or reciprocal

Russia’s approach to the issue of visas is a mixture of criticising the EU for a discriminatory policy, lobbying EU member states for a visa-free regime, and retaliating against specific EU member states with tougher visa requirements. One such instance came in autumn 2010 when Russia introduced tougher conditions for German citizens such as requesting proofs that they will return to Germany, bank statements, property deeds, or company registration certificates, mirroring German requests from Russian citizens.

Overall,Russia tries to apply the principle of reciprocity in its visa policies with the EU. Yet, looking into the details of it this is not always true. For sure the EU visa regime is highly restrictive, but Russia’s visa regime is equally cumbersome and on the margins can be even tougher. To begin with, Russia does not have the same wide-spread policy of granting long-term multi-entry visas like Austria, Finland or the UK (mostUKvisas are for 6 months and multi-entry) even for the citizens of these three countries. So Russia is happy to reproduce the worst EU visa practices, but prefers not to reciprocate on the better aspects of EU visa policies.

In addition, Russia has other requirements which complicate the travelling of EU citizens to Russia– a foreigner visiting any place in Russia for longer than three days needs to register with the authorities. So the paradox is that a Russian citizen who obtained a Schengen visa can visit 25 countries from Estonia to Portugal and Iceland to Greece without any restrictions, yet an EU citizen visiting Russia has to register with the federal migration service every time for stays longer than 3 days or when visiting other towns for longer than 3 days. Hotels do such registrations automatically, but visiting friends or relatives in Russia is more difficult, since they have to go through these pretty bureaucratic procedures themselves. Though, the current system is something of an improvement. Just a few years ago foreigners had to go to the police to register which was time consuming and was best solved with a bribe.

Part 2 will follow soon…

China and the break-up of USSR

A colleague of mine and I asked the Chinese how do they see the break-up of USSR. Here is the answer we got:

‘We had a big debate about whether this is good or bad for China. Some ideological people were saying this is bad because it undermines the attractiveness of Communism. But the pragmatists were saying this is good for China. And it is true, after the break-up of USSR we have very good relations with Russia. Better than ever before.’

The untold part of the answer is of course the fact these ‘better than ever’ relations are build on a very different balance of power and a Russia that is much weaker than USSR. As I wrote previously, Chinese views on the post-Soviet space do not differ much from those in Europe or the US. They differ in style (China is more deferential to Russia), but not in substance.

It is also apparent that the stronger China got, the better its relationship with Russia became. Another Chinese also suggested that China-Russia energy relations have been ‘unlocked’ by the economic crisis, since Russia’s need for cash opened the way for the USD 25bn loan-for-oil deal with Rosneft. A Chinese professor put it in the following terms: ‘How can you have a good sleep when you sleep with a bigger man?’ That referred to USSR, but not to Russia.

Is Russia a BRIC?

We also asked the Chinese whether they consider Russia is a BRIC country. Not in a technical sense as the source of letter R in this acronym, but whether they consider Russia a rising power – economically and politically. Instead of a reply, we heard a joke:

‘A BRIC summit is discussing how and when to unseat the US dollar as a global reserve currency. After days of deliberations the leaders of BRIC countries decide to go and ask God about the prospects of their currencies to become global reserve currencies. The first to go is Dilma Rousseff, president of Brazil – she asks God when will the real become a reserve currency. A few minutes later she returns crying. Her RIC colleagues ask her ‘what happenned?’ ‘God said I will not live to see that’ she explained.

Manmohan Singh goes to ask God when will the Indian rupee become a global reserve currency. Just like Dilma Rousseff he returns crying after a few minutes. God told him that the Rupee won’t become a reserve currency in his lifetime.

Hu Jintao goes through the same experience.

Then Medvedev goes to God. A few minutes later Medvedev returns completely calm. The others ask him what happened, and Medvedev replies: ‘I asked God when will the Rouble become a global reserve currency… and God started to cry. I asked him what happened, and he told me this will not happen in his lifetime…’

(I heard a similar joke about corruption in Romania). The joke is half funny, but captures how many Chinese see Russia.

Putin or Medvedev?

Just like the US and EU almost unashamedly prefer Medvedev to Putin, the Chinese equally unashamedly seem to prefer Putin to Medvedev. We asked why. One answer was that ‘Medvedev is pro-Western, and Putin is pro-Russian’. Another Chinese regretted the times when Russia was on the frontlines of opposition to the US. As one Chinese intellectual explained: ‘It is difficult for China alone to be against the US. With other powers – we can do it. Before, when Putin was president, Russia was much more active in the UN Security Council. But after the reset US-Russia reset we have to be smarter on how to promote out views in the UN. We do not want to face US pressures on our own.’

Many of them, though, highlight that before ‘Libya’ they didn’t matter much whether it is Putin or Medvedev, but that Russia’s failure to veto the resolution over Libya and the clash between Medvedev and Putin over the issue lead them to believe Putin is ‘closer’.

- Why? – I asked.

-Because ‘Medvedev did not veto UNSC resolution 1973.’

- But China didn’t block it either? Medvedev did what China did, so why do you say Putin is closer?

- Yes that’s true, but it was better before…

It sounds almost counter-intuitive that China, which has a careful, quiet, and markedly non-aggressive diplomatic style misses Putin’s Munich-speech style rants. But then those speeches allowed China to get the best of two worlds – cooperate with the US, while also enjoying from the sidelines Russia spearheading opposition to the US.

Certainly, it is not youth movements, but authoritarian regimes and ‘ripe contexts’ that are the causes of revolutions. This sounds self-evident, but both revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries seem to often miss it (though it is impossible to know whether a revolutionary situation is ‘ripe’ before it actually happens). I still remember the avalanches of venom deployed against youth movements as ‘fifth columns of foreign powers’, not just in Russian, Azeri or Serbian media, but also in plenty of (leftish) European newspapers (the Guardian seemed to excell at that). Many of them implied that youth movements, not authoritarian mismanagement were the causes of revolutions. But it is also indicative how Kefaya failed to lead to anything meaningful in Egypt in 2005, whereas the 2011 protests toppled Mubarak without any Kefaya-like organisation.

I spent most of the last week in Morocco looking into how the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt affected the political dynamics there. The current wave of protests in Morocco are led by the ‘20 February movement‘ (or here), which stages big manifestations once a month (the first big demonstration was on 20 February), and smaller protests, sit-ins and flashmobs in between. Speaking to some activists from the movement (in their early twenties) I was pretty suprised that they never heard of Kefaya, let alone Otpor or their field manual Gene Shapr’s ‘From Dictatorship to Democracy‘. The current movements seem to be a different breed than the movements in 2000-2005.

From telegraph to sms to Facebook

One difference is how the media, the public and the protesters themselves talk of the way protests are organised. Remember – one of the first things the Bolsheviks did in 1917 was to seize the post and telegraph as the key means of communications. The failed 1991 Putsch in Russia and the 1993 stand-off between Eltsin and the Parliament saw big clashes at Ostankino, where the main Russian TV channels are. Controlling the TV was crucial for mobilising or keeping the public at home.

In 2003-2004 all the attention was on the hugely ‘innovative’ fact that protesters coordinated their actions or called for protests through sms (rather than more old-school leaflets, newspapers, radio or TV). Sms ‘democratised’, accelerated and simplified communication. Through sms protesters could circumvent TV and radio when they wanted to broaden their appeal and speed up coordination. It takes a few seconds to sms a dozen persons, and much longer to call them landline-to-landline. But sms is old-school now, as well. It is used of course, but does not excite the imagination of the media or the regimes. It is Facebook and Twitter that are the focus of attention (though the Russian FSB just said the already old-school Gmail, Hotmail and Skype are a threat to Russia becuase they cannot be ‘monitored’).

From ‘youth movements’ to ‘rainbow movements’

But the 2011 protesters are different not because just Facebook and Twitter replaced sms. They are different in a deeper sense. The current protest movements are not stricto sensu youth movements, but a blend of young urban middle-class facebookers, mild and not so mild conservative islamists, and (sometimes radical) leftists. Compared to the 2000-2005 wave of youth movements the current protest movements can be equally romantic, but they are less organised, with no chain of command, no training, and ultimately more fluid. This is sometimes a weakness (only the Muslim Bortherhood seemed organised enough to provide the public good of  crowd management during the protests in Egypt). But it is also partly a strength since they are also more inclusive and more open to people that are not urban middle-class kids and their social base is ultimately larger. This also makes them more dangerous to the regimes. Mubarak could outdo Kefaya, but not the fuzzier and less organised coalition without a name that took to the streets this year.

On Ukraine

There might be an increasing sense that Ukraine, Moldova, and perhaps Belarus will “of course” join the EU. Though with two caveats:  1) in the long run (defined as 20-30 years), and 2) “this should happen at our own pace, not due to geopolitical considerations”. The language is still more positive than I ever heard in Germany.

Much has been made about the fact that FDP’s election manifesto mentions an EU accession perspective for Ukraine. The Ukrainian foreign minister Poroshenko even says the new German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle (and FDP leader) gave him such a manifesto with the word “Ukraine” underlined and Westerwelle’s signature next to it. I tended not to overdo the importance of this point in the manfesto. But my FDP interlocutor stressed that the Ukraine point in the manifesto was thought through, discussed and “voted twice in an electoral year by the party convention, and this is not a backdoor policy paper, but a key document”.

Russia-China

This blog recently raised some aspects of the Russian-Chinese partnership (Russia’s Chinese neighbourhood and Russia’s vs China’s rise). In Berlin three persons raised this as well. One asked whether “it is in our interests to give Siberia to China? We are interested in a strong Russia integrated into European structures.” Another argued that “Russian foreign policy is a disaster. Russia’s problems with China can only be solved through cooperation with the West”. And another argued that Russia needs greater cooperation with the EU on Central Asia, otherwise Moscow cannot handle the situation on its own. This might be true or not. But as far as I am concerned I have not seen any pleas for EU or Western help in the Russian foreign policy debate (The answer I got to this was: “They still do not know it, but we know better”). So the point that Russia might be increasingly vulnerable vis-a-vis China is perhaps right, but there is a certain dose of paternalistic and mentoring attitude vis-a-vis Russia in it as well (which the Russians hate, and the Europeans often cannot get rid of).

Some people (predominantly in Eastern Europe) speak of the “Finlandisation of Germany”. This is not entirely right. Finland’s careful policies vis-a-vis URSS were based on a feeling (or fear) of Russian strength hence the need to accomodate the URSS. German approaches to Russia seem to result from an opposite assesment, namely that Russia is too weak. Hence the need to engage, prop-up and sometimes accomodate it in order to strengthen it.

And finally on Russia-China. No matter how sour Russian-Chinese relations might turn, I hardly imagine a Russian leader ever delivering a “Munich speech” on China… this probably tells something about Russian vulnerabilities.

A new Ostpolitik

Germany has had quite a number of “new ostpolitiks” over the decades. The most recent one came during the 2007 German EU presidency (see Gernot Erler’s the new EU Ostpolitik). Now there is talk of another “new ostpolitik” with the following nuances:

• Westerwelle’s first foreign visit was to Poland (rather than Paris as before)
• The coalition CDU-FDP agreement FDP-CDU talks of “In our bilateral realtions with Russia, we will respect the legitimate intersts of our neighbours.” And again this was stressed in conversations as well.
• Then I also heard of the need for Germany to invest more into the “EU-Russia partnership, not bilateral German-Russian relations” and the desire to “stronger embed German policies in the East into the EU.”

Of course, Germany wants to include Russia into the Eastern partnership projects (I do not see why Russian NGOs should not take part in the EaP civil society forum for a start and then expand this to other technical areas of cooperation). Though it is also true that Russian-EU bussiness, political and societal links are much more intense then the links between the EU and the Eastern partnership states, so I would not be afraid that Russia is being left behind.

(update) On public opinion and governmental policy

Germany’s policy on Russia highlights a certain paradox. German public opinion is among the most negative towards Russia, while governmental policies and business relations are among the most positive. This BBC opinion poll (page 8 ) shows that only 12% of Germans (compared to 18% in France and the US, 25% in UK) view Russia’s influence in world affairs in a positive light,  while 70% (vs 66% in France, 55% in the UK, and 64% in the UK) view Russia negatively. But Germany’s Russia policy is mainly decided at political and business elite levels (and its salience is relatively low). So discourses are rarely enough to fundamentaly shift policies.

Hence, one should not expect revolutionary changes in German foreign policy. How far such discoursive nuances will change policies remains to be seen. Until then, the foreign policy bits of the CDU-FDP coalition agreement reproduced below are an interesting read, at least.

Essential passages of the CDU-FDP coalition agreement

KAS.de

About EU and the neighbour-states (p.114)

The EU is strong as the member states are equal and worthy partners regardless of their size and economic potential. The interests of the small and medium EU member states will remain a trade mark of the German European policies.

The deepening and enlargement of the European Union will lead to a closer political coordination and an intensified exchange between our societies.

We know about the high importance of friendly, trustworthy and future-orientated relations with our neighbours.
About EU-enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy (p.117)

We advocate an enlargement policy according to sound judgement. There should not be a lowering of the criteria or even an automatism of accession e.g. through naming an accession date before the finalisation of the negotiations. The accession talks should be open-ended. The strict fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria is the crucial condition for an accession as well as the ability of the candidates and the capacity of the EU.

We support an expansion of the European Neighbourhood Policy. We aim at a sustainable democratic, economic, social, constitutional and ecological development in our environment. These countries should experience peace and prosperity. On the basis of shared values, we want to ontensify our cooperation with the countries of the Eastern Partnership.

About NATO and Russia (p.119f.)

The NATO will remain our strongest anchor of our common security. It connects Europe and America and is the foundation for the collective defence and displays a unique political and military instrument to keep and restore peace. NATO is a means to accomplish political aims and encompasses the offer to cooperate in the field of security policy, disarmament, trust building and peaceful conflict resolution. Due to this strategic concept, the alliance will adapt to the challanges of today.

We want that the alliance will embrace the strategic partnership with Russia, as stated in the 1997 NATO-Russia-agreement. The NATO-Russia council should be used as a forum for issues concerning collective security policy. Our aim is a euro-transatlantic security architecture which – on the basis of the approved institutions, including OSCE and the European Council – encompasses a close relation to Russia. The German government wants the alliance to keep its door principally open and fosters the expansion of the partnerships.

We regard Russia as an important partner when dealing with regional and global challenges. These challenges include the conflicts in Afghanistan and the Middle East just as the E3+3 talks about the Iranian nuclear programme, the challenge of international terrorism, climate change or global epidemics. Additionally, we will support Russia to consequently keep up the modernisation of the country and erase existing deficits concerning human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Furthermore, we want to foster the civil dialogue, expand economic relations and create energy security without one-sided dependencies. In our bilateral realtions to Russia, we will respect the eligible intersts of our neighbours.

The reply: “We understand that Russia has special interests in this space, and that Russia tries to preserve its influence, but only if this takes the form of a civilisational community, because these states are still independent states… Russia should treat these states as independent states from a legal point of view, and from the point of view of international norms.”

Lecturing Russia

Then another Chinese speaker started to ‘lecture’ Russia (page 3):

[in order to strengthen the cooperation between Russia and us the following things are necessary:] “First, is to elaborate new norms of international relations – move beyond spheres of influence thinking. Our countries should jointly create new norms of interstate relations that correspond to contemporary trends… more specifically mutual trust, benefits, equality, consultations, respect for the diversity of civilisations, a strife for joint development. The essence of these is mutual equality, respect, good neighbourly relations, pragmatic cooperation and peaceful co-existence, non-interference, common security and development. These new norms are qualitatively different not only from hegemonism and monopolism, but also from traditional spheres of influence thinking, which presupposes a desire to control and pursue relations based on inequality with small states. It also presupposes xenophobia… a controlled sphere of influence unavoidably provokes the dissatisfaction of the states of the region concerned and the resistance of other states. At the end of the day this damages the interests of the dominant state itself… And if such thinking is directed against strategic partners, neighbours, that are developing mutually beneficial cooperation in the region, then I think that this is entirely wrong. In reality when it comes to energy issues in Central Asia such a clash already happened…”

One might think this is Americans or Europeans lecturing (again) Russia again about the post-Soviet space.  I personally found striking just how similar is the Chinese discourse on its shared neighbourhood with Russia to the EU’s discourse. So here is Russia’s sphere of influence project squeezed between two neighbouring centres of power unwilling to accept a Russia sphere of influence neither East, nor West.

The end of the post-Soviet space

Certainly, some still have the illusion of a Russian sphere of influence. A Harvard-based Russian scholar argues that: “Though currently in a much-diminished state, a Russian sphere of influence is not simply the ambition of Moscow’s current leadership, it is geopolitical reality. Through its position on the Eurasian landmass, Russia controls many of these countries’ links to the outside world, including critical pipelines, railroads and ports. Russia also remains the destination for most of the region’s labor migrants and is the origin of large volumes of remittances, amounting to as much as 25-30% of some receiving countries’ GDP.”

Not exactly and not anymore. China is already a fast-growing economic and political actor in the post-Soviet space. And not just in the states of Central Asia which are very keen to play between Russia and China and diversify their energy exports to China (Turkmenistan just finished building its first gas pipeline to China). One curious recent news is a Chinese offer of a $1 billion for Moldova which dwarfed Russia’s offer of $150 , IMF’s assistance of $590 millions and US’s $262 million under the Millennium Challenge Account. Today, the EU is a bigger trading partner than Russia for Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Certainly, Russia is a very influential actor in the post-Soviet space and this will remain so. But having influence and having a sphere of influence are two very different things. Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Ukraine-Moldova-Belarus are not the post-Soviet space of the 90s anymore. This is something, Russia, China, the EU and the US will have to learn to live with.

Among the more interesting results are (see page 35 of this opinion poll):

• Georgia comes first in pro-EU sentiment  with 36% being in favour of integration with the EU. But it also comes first in pro-independence sentiment with 48% (not willing to join any integrationist blocks). Unsurprisingly only 3% want integration into a Russian-led Union.
• Moldova comes second in pro-EU sentiment with 33% in favour of joining the EU (with 26% in favour of joining a Russian-led union). Among the post-Soviet states, Moldova also has the lowest degree of support for its own ‘full independence’ (20%).
• In Belarus, interestingly enough 23% want integration with Russia, while 20% want integration into the EU (and 28% want full independence). It is almost suprising that almost as the number of Belarussians that want integration into the EU and integration with Russia is almost equal.
• In Ukraine – 20% want integration into the EU and 34% integration into a Russia-Ukraine-Belarus-Kazakhstan union (and 12% back into the USSR), while 23% want full ‘nezalezhnost’ (independence).
• In Russia 36% don’t want any integration with other states or groups oif states, while 20% want the restoration of USSR and 15% want a union with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazahstan. Thus Russia itself is split between a go-it-alone attitude and a desire to reintegrate some of its former periphery.
• Perhaps surprisingly, in Latvia (and EU member state) only 31% want integration into the EU (10% integration with Russia) and 35% want full independence. Thus pro-EU sentiment in Latvia is lower than in Georgia and Moldova.

UPDATE: As the comments below attest – this poll is neither uncontroversial, not uncotested. The reason I put it on this blog is because I think many in the EU are hubristic abouts EU’s soft power. Way too many think EU’s power of attraction and magnetism works almost automatically, and the EU will transform its neighbours almost by default, simply because the EU attractive, it provides the best way of organising international relations and its successes are uncontested. Unfortunately, this is not so. The EU will have to invest much more political will and resources into its foreign policy if it really wants to shape its neighbourhood and the world at large. The hubris of soft power is not a good recipe for an effective foreign policy. I believe the EU is the best model of organising international relations, but its soft power is not automatic and good models do not always win.

UPDATE 2: The numbers on the foreign policy orientation of Ukraine have raised some controversy. I was not analysing Ukraine’s public opinion, but one specific opinion poll. However, it is fair to supply more data on Ukraine. After some digging – here is more data on Ukraine’s public opinion on the foreign policy orientation of the country. The Razumkov centre supplies the following:

Question 1: Does Ukraine need to join the European Union?

• Yes – 43% in December 2008 (compared to 65% in 2002, 0r 54% in 2007).
• No – 35% in 2008 (compared to 14% in 2002 and 29 in 2007)

Question 2: which foreign policy direction should be a priority for Ukraine (Russia, EU, USA, CIS)?

• in favour of the EU – 27.5% (compared to 39% in 2005)
• in favour of Russia 51% (compared to 34 in 2005)

If you add the attitudes towards NATO it seems like Ukrainian public opinion is less enthusiastic about both NATO and EU than in was in 2002-2003-2005.

If you ask me, I would also consider the Razumkov Centre opinion polls more reliable than the Eurasia monitor.

on Moldova:  if the question is “are you in favour of joining the EU?” – 72% are in favour (IPP poll, March 2009)