The contrast between the transition at the Kremlin and China’s upcoming – and strictly choreographed – power transfer could hardly be starker. This autumn, all nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including the country’s president, Hu Jintao, and premier, Wen Jiabao, will step down, and at least 14 members of the 24-member Politburo will retire, making way for a new generation of leaders.

So, although China has the more authoritarian system, it is moving forward. The same cannot be said for Putin’s Russia.

Unlike China, a one-party state, where real power is insulated from direct voting by layers of Communist Party structures, Russia has a multi-party political system, with regular elections at most levels of government. To be sure, not all parties or candidates are allowed to run, and elections can be manipulated. Still, there is more room in Russia than in China for opposition voices to express themselves.

Indeed, Russian civil society and protest movements are more assertive and politicized, while protests in China are crushed without remorse. The Russian media, particularly newspapers and radio, have more freedom as well, and openly disparage Putin, whereas Chinese journalists can take on issues like corruption, but may not criticize the Party. Likewise, the Internet is not censored in Russia as it is in China.

Given that China is significantly more authoritarian than Russia, it seems counter-intuitive that China’s political system manages to produce some rotation of leaders, however imperfect and even tense, whereas Russia does not. In this way, China takes advantage of one of democracy’s key benefits – leadership turnover – without the risk of popular accountability.

Read the continuation of this commentary on Project Syndicate

The report has been endorsed by several foreign policy personalities in Europe. Here are some of the endorsements:

“This report is an important analysis of where Russia stands today and what opportunities this brings for the EU. It will open a much-needed and interesting debate.”

Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy; former Secretary General of NATO

“This report is extremely insightful both for its great analysis as well as policy recommendations proposed which touch upon both foreign, economic and energy policies. The report is indeed a real working agenda for the European Union.”
Massimo D’Alema, President, Italianieuropei Foundation; President, Foundation for European Progressive Studies; former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

Sergei Guriev, Rector of the New Economic School, Moscow

“A well-researched and panoramic survey of the Russian regime’s stagnant, self-destructive and malignant approach at home and abroad. It is essential reading for anyone interested in Russia, and impatient for a more robust EU policy to its eastern neighbours.”

Edward Lucas, International Editor, The Economist

“This is a very timely study on a changed Russia facing stagnation and many unresolved problems under the renewed leadership of Vladimir Putin. It is time for the EU to develop a coherent strategy to engage a “post-crisis Russia” likely to act more soberly and pragmatically. The proposed options for a “pro-active EU policy on Russia” provide an excellent starting point for European policy-makers.”

Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff, Coordinator of German-Russian Inter-societal Cooperation of the German Federal Foreign Office, MP and Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group

“The EU can and should have good relations with Russia; this ECFR report indicates what the priorities should be. Wishful thinking needs to be abandoned, yet respect for universal values strengthened, as Europe re-engages Russia into closer cooperation.”
Adam D. Rotfeld, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-Chairman of Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters

“A very timely and much-needed document.”

Vaira Vike-Freiberga, former President of Latvia

China and the break-up of USSR

A colleague of mine and I asked the Chinese how do they see the break-up of USSR. Here is the answer we got:

‘We had a big debate about whether this is good or bad for China. Some ideological people were saying this is bad because it undermines the attractiveness of Communism. But the pragmatists were saying this is good for China. And it is true, after the break-up of USSR we have very good relations with Russia. Better than ever before.’

The untold part of the answer is of course the fact these ‘better than ever’ relations are build on a very different balance of power and a Russia that is much weaker than USSR. As I wrote previously, Chinese views on the post-Soviet space do not differ much from those in Europe or the US. They differ in style (China is more deferential to Russia), but not in substance.

It is also apparent that the stronger China got, the better its relationship with Russia became. Another Chinese also suggested that China-Russia energy relations have been ‘unlocked’ by the economic crisis, since Russia’s need for cash opened the way for the USD 25bn loan-for-oil deal with Rosneft. A Chinese professor put it in the following terms: ‘How can you have a good sleep when you sleep with a bigger man?’ That referred to USSR, but not to Russia.

Is Russia a BRIC?

We also asked the Chinese whether they consider Russia is a BRIC country. Not in a technical sense as the source of letter R in this acronym, but whether they consider Russia a rising power – economically and politically. Instead of a reply, we heard a joke:

‘A BRIC summit is discussing how and when to unseat the US dollar as a global reserve currency. After days of deliberations the leaders of BRIC countries decide to go and ask God about the prospects of their currencies to become global reserve currencies. The first to go is Dilma Rousseff, president of Brazil – she asks God when will the real become a reserve currency. A few minutes later she returns crying. Her RIC colleagues ask her ‘what happenned?’ ‘God said I will not live to see that’ she explained.

Manmohan Singh goes to ask God when will the Indian rupee become a global reserve currency. Just like Dilma Rousseff he returns crying after a few minutes. God told him that the Rupee won’t become a reserve currency in his lifetime.

Hu Jintao goes through the same experience.

Then Medvedev goes to God. A few minutes later Medvedev returns completely calm. The others ask him what happened, and Medvedev replies: ‘I asked God when will the Rouble become a global reserve currency… and God started to cry. I asked him what happened, and he told me this will not happen in his lifetime…’

(I heard a similar joke about corruption in Romania). The joke is half funny, but captures how many Chinese see Russia.

Putin or Medvedev?

Just like the US and EU almost unashamedly prefer Medvedev to Putin, the Chinese equally unashamedly seem to prefer Putin to Medvedev. We asked why. One answer was that ‘Medvedev is pro-Western, and Putin is pro-Russian’. Another Chinese regretted the times when Russia was on the frontlines of opposition to the US. As one Chinese intellectual explained: ‘It is difficult for China alone to be against the US. With other powers – we can do it. Before, when Putin was president, Russia was much more active in the UN Security Council. But after the reset US-Russia reset we have to be smarter on how to promote out views in the UN. We do not want to face US pressures on our own.’

Many of them, though, highlight that before ‘Libya’ they didn’t matter much whether it is Putin or Medvedev, but that Russia’s failure to veto the resolution over Libya and the clash between Medvedev and Putin over the issue lead them to believe Putin is ‘closer’.

- Why? – I asked.

-Because ‘Medvedev did not veto UNSC resolution 1973.’

- But China didn’t block it either? Medvedev did what China did, so why do you say Putin is closer?

- Yes that’s true, but it was better before…

It sounds almost counter-intuitive that China, which has a careful, quiet, and markedly non-aggressive diplomatic style misses Putin’s Munich-speech style rants. But then those speeches allowed China to get the best of two worlds – cooperate with the US, while also enjoying from the sidelines Russia spearheading opposition to the US.

On Ukraine

There might be an increasing sense that Ukraine, Moldova, and perhaps Belarus will “of course” join the EU. Though with two caveats:  1) in the long run (defined as 20-30 years), and 2) “this should happen at our own pace, not due to geopolitical considerations”. The language is still more positive than I ever heard in Germany.

Much has been made about the fact that FDP’s election manifesto mentions an EU accession perspective for Ukraine. The Ukrainian foreign minister Poroshenko even says the new German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle (and FDP leader) gave him such a manifesto with the word “Ukraine” underlined and Westerwelle’s signature next to it. I tended not to overdo the importance of this point in the manfesto. But my FDP interlocutor stressed that the Ukraine point in the manifesto was thought through, discussed and “voted twice in an electoral year by the party convention, and this is not a backdoor policy paper, but a key document”.

Russia-China

This blog recently raised some aspects of the Russian-Chinese partnership (Russia’s Chinese neighbourhood and Russia’s vs China’s rise). In Berlin three persons raised this as well. One asked whether “it is in our interests to give Siberia to China? We are interested in a strong Russia integrated into European structures.” Another argued that “Russian foreign policy is a disaster. Russia’s problems with China can only be solved through cooperation with the West”. And another argued that Russia needs greater cooperation with the EU on Central Asia, otherwise Moscow cannot handle the situation on its own. This might be true or not. But as far as I am concerned I have not seen any pleas for EU or Western help in the Russian foreign policy debate (The answer I got to this was: “They still do not know it, but we know better”). So the point that Russia might be increasingly vulnerable vis-a-vis China is perhaps right, but there is a certain dose of paternalistic and mentoring attitude vis-a-vis Russia in it as well (which the Russians hate, and the Europeans often cannot get rid of).

Some people (predominantly in Eastern Europe) speak of the “Finlandisation of Germany”. This is not entirely right. Finland’s careful policies vis-a-vis URSS were based on a feeling (or fear) of Russian strength hence the need to accomodate the URSS. German approaches to Russia seem to result from an opposite assesment, namely that Russia is too weak. Hence the need to engage, prop-up and sometimes accomodate it in order to strengthen it.

And finally on Russia-China. No matter how sour Russian-Chinese relations might turn, I hardly imagine a Russian leader ever delivering a “Munich speech” on China… this probably tells something about Russian vulnerabilities.

A new Ostpolitik

Germany has had quite a number of “new ostpolitiks” over the decades. The most recent one came during the 2007 German EU presidency (see Gernot Erler’s the new EU Ostpolitik). Now there is talk of another “new ostpolitik” with the following nuances:

• Westerwelle’s first foreign visit was to Poland (rather than Paris as before)
• The coalition CDU-FDP agreement FDP-CDU talks of “In our bilateral realtions with Russia, we will respect the legitimate intersts of our neighbours.” And again this was stressed in conversations as well.
• Then I also heard of the need for Germany to invest more into the “EU-Russia partnership, not bilateral German-Russian relations” and the desire to “stronger embed German policies in the East into the EU.”

Of course, Germany wants to include Russia into the Eastern partnership projects (I do not see why Russian NGOs should not take part in the EaP civil society forum for a start and then expand this to other technical areas of cooperation). Though it is also true that Russian-EU bussiness, political and societal links are much more intense then the links between the EU and the Eastern partnership states, so I would not be afraid that Russia is being left behind.

(update) On public opinion and governmental policy

Germany’s policy on Russia highlights a certain paradox. German public opinion is among the most negative towards Russia, while governmental policies and business relations are among the most positive. This BBC opinion poll (page 8 ) shows that only 12% of Germans (compared to 18% in France and the US, 25% in UK) view Russia’s influence in world affairs in a positive light,  while 70% (vs 66% in France, 55% in the UK, and 64% in the UK) view Russia negatively. But Germany’s Russia policy is mainly decided at political and business elite levels (and its salience is relatively low). So discourses are rarely enough to fundamentaly shift policies.

Hence, one should not expect revolutionary changes in German foreign policy. How far such discoursive nuances will change policies remains to be seen. Until then, the foreign policy bits of the CDU-FDP coalition agreement reproduced below are an interesting read, at least.

Essential passages of the CDU-FDP coalition agreement

KAS.de

About EU and the neighbour-states (p.114)

The EU is strong as the member states are equal and worthy partners regardless of their size and economic potential. The interests of the small and medium EU member states will remain a trade mark of the German European policies.

The deepening and enlargement of the European Union will lead to a closer political coordination and an intensified exchange between our societies.

We know about the high importance of friendly, trustworthy and future-orientated relations with our neighbours.
About EU-enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy (p.117)

We advocate an enlargement policy according to sound judgement. There should not be a lowering of the criteria or even an automatism of accession e.g. through naming an accession date before the finalisation of the negotiations. The accession talks should be open-ended. The strict fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria is the crucial condition for an accession as well as the ability of the candidates and the capacity of the EU.

We support an expansion of the European Neighbourhood Policy. We aim at a sustainable democratic, economic, social, constitutional and ecological development in our environment. These countries should experience peace and prosperity. On the basis of shared values, we want to ontensify our cooperation with the countries of the Eastern Partnership.

About NATO and Russia (p.119f.)

The NATO will remain our strongest anchor of our common security. It connects Europe and America and is the foundation for the collective defence and displays a unique political and military instrument to keep and restore peace. NATO is a means to accomplish political aims and encompasses the offer to cooperate in the field of security policy, disarmament, trust building and peaceful conflict resolution. Due to this strategic concept, the alliance will adapt to the challanges of today.

We want that the alliance will embrace the strategic partnership with Russia, as stated in the 1997 NATO-Russia-agreement. The NATO-Russia council should be used as a forum for issues concerning collective security policy. Our aim is a euro-transatlantic security architecture which – on the basis of the approved institutions, including OSCE and the European Council – encompasses a close relation to Russia. The German government wants the alliance to keep its door principally open and fosters the expansion of the partnerships.

We regard Russia as an important partner when dealing with regional and global challenges. These challenges include the conflicts in Afghanistan and the Middle East just as the E3+3 talks about the Iranian nuclear programme, the challenge of international terrorism, climate change or global epidemics. Additionally, we will support Russia to consequently keep up the modernisation of the country and erase existing deficits concerning human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Furthermore, we want to foster the civil dialogue, expand economic relations and create energy security without one-sided dependencies. In our bilateral realtions to Russia, we will respect the eligible intersts of our neighbours.

The reply: “We understand that Russia has special interests in this space, and that Russia tries to preserve its influence, but only if this takes the form of a civilisational community, because these states are still independent states… Russia should treat these states as independent states from a legal point of view, and from the point of view of international norms.”

Lecturing Russia

Then another Chinese speaker started to ‘lecture’ Russia (page 3):

[in order to strengthen the cooperation between Russia and us the following things are necessary:] “First, is to elaborate new norms of international relations – move beyond spheres of influence thinking. Our countries should jointly create new norms of interstate relations that correspond to contemporary trends… more specifically mutual trust, benefits, equality, consultations, respect for the diversity of civilisations, a strife for joint development. The essence of these is mutual equality, respect, good neighbourly relations, pragmatic cooperation and peaceful co-existence, non-interference, common security and development. These new norms are qualitatively different not only from hegemonism and monopolism, but also from traditional spheres of influence thinking, which presupposes a desire to control and pursue relations based on inequality with small states. It also presupposes xenophobia… a controlled sphere of influence unavoidably provokes the dissatisfaction of the states of the region concerned and the resistance of other states. At the end of the day this damages the interests of the dominant state itself… And if such thinking is directed against strategic partners, neighbours, that are developing mutually beneficial cooperation in the region, then I think that this is entirely wrong. In reality when it comes to energy issues in Central Asia such a clash already happened…”

One might think this is Americans or Europeans lecturing (again) Russia again about the post-Soviet space.  I personally found striking just how similar is the Chinese discourse on its shared neighbourhood with Russia to the EU’s discourse. So here is Russia’s sphere of influence project squeezed between two neighbouring centres of power unwilling to accept a Russia sphere of influence neither East, nor West.

The end of the post-Soviet space

Certainly, some still have the illusion of a Russian sphere of influence. A Harvard-based Russian scholar argues that: “Though currently in a much-diminished state, a Russian sphere of influence is not simply the ambition of Moscow’s current leadership, it is geopolitical reality. Through its position on the Eurasian landmass, Russia controls many of these countries’ links to the outside world, including critical pipelines, railroads and ports. Russia also remains the destination for most of the region’s labor migrants and is the origin of large volumes of remittances, amounting to as much as 25-30% of some receiving countries’ GDP.”

Not exactly and not anymore. China is already a fast-growing economic and political actor in the post-Soviet space. And not just in the states of Central Asia which are very keen to play between Russia and China and diversify their energy exports to China (Turkmenistan just finished building its first gas pipeline to China). One curious recent news is a Chinese offer of a $1 billion for Moldova which dwarfed Russia’s offer of $150 , IMF’s assistance of $590 millions and US’s $262 million under the Millennium Challenge Account. Today, the EU is a bigger trading partner than Russia for Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Certainly, Russia is a very influential actor in the post-Soviet space and this will remain so. But having influence and having a sphere of influence are two very different things. Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Ukraine-Moldova-Belarus are not the post-Soviet space of the 90s anymore. This is something, Russia, China, the EU and the US will have to learn to live with.