In light of the Tagliavini report, it is perhaps worth discussing in greater details EU’s performance in Georgia’s conflicts as well. We all know that both Georgia and Russia (with South Ossetia) are responsible for escalating the game around the conflicts zones and ruthlessly rushing into a downward spiral of militarisation of the conflicts zones, particularly after Kosovo’s declaration of independence and Georgia’s perceived moves towards NATO in the first half of 2008. But EU failures are also worth discussing. The report only refers to them en passant:”over the years there was a gradual increase in European involvement in Georgia, which may be called forthcoming in terms of economic aid, politically friendly on the bilateral side, cooperative but cautious on contentious political issues and … mostly distanced [from] sensitive security issues. A good case in point was the European reluctance to take over the Border Monitoring Mission on the Caucasus range facing Russia, after Russia had vetoed the hitherto OSCE engagement in 2004.”
Behind this carefully calibrated phrase lies the story of EU’s failure to engage in conflict-resolution. In late 2004 Russia vetoed the extension of the mandate of the 150-strong OSCE border monitoring mission in Georgia. Tbilisi invited the EU to take over the international monitoring of the Georgia-Russian border. Back in 2005 France (which later lead the peacekeeping effort in 2008) lead the ‘Nyet’ camp with the diplomatic support of Spain, Italy, Greece and partly Germany against EU involvement in the messy Caucasian affairs. As a result of that, instead of the requested 150 monitors, the EU only sent 3 persons as part of a so-called EU Special Representative’s Border Support Team. The team was later extended to 12 persons. This clearly was the most important EU failure to deploy conflict-prevention mechanisms in Georgia and engage in conflict-settlement.
School in Kemerti, north of Tskhinvali, rebuild by the OSCE with EU money (04.2008).
Throughout 2007-2008 the EU also tried to beef-up the team with two police and two border-liaison officers who were supposed to develop some kind of institutionalised dialogue with Abkhazia and South Ossetia on police and border-management related issues. Internal foot-dragging by some EU member states worried that this would irritate Russia (with Greece apparently taking the lead), and then the August 2008 war disrupted the process of extending the EU border support team.
In parallel to that, the EU spent over EUR 30 million before 2008 on post-conflict reconstruction around the conflict zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but failed to have a political and security strategy vis-a-vis these conflicts. Now, for example many, if not most, of the schools built in South Ossetia on EU money lie in ruins. This is what happens when throwing money at conflict zones is not backed up by political strategies. (At a much larger scale the dilemma is the same in Afghanistan and Iraq where building infrastructure or providing electricity is of little use if you do not ensure security).
Railway station in Tskhinvali rebuilt with EU money. Even before the war there were no rail tracks so the station was useless.
It is perhaps difficult to speculate now, but I am almost sure that if there was a strong international presence on the ground (read an EU monitoring mission) before the war, the chances chances of war would have been drastically reduced. And this is not benefit of hindsight. This is what many people (including in the EU institutions) said for years in the run up to the war.
In the end, the EU paid twice. Having failed to deploy 150 monitors in Georgia in 2005 in order not to irritate Russia, the EU ended up deploying close to 300 monitors in 2008 and paying close to EUR 1 billion to the international fund for post-conflict rehabilitation of Georgia. The war of 2008 became one of the worst crisis in EU-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War.
The lessons is the same any book or EU document on conflict prevention tell you – preventing is cheaper and better than managing the consequences of a conflict. The European security strategy also says that the EU “should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.” The more concrete lessons though are the following:
- “Not irritating Russia” is not a policy. Security crises in the neighbourhood such as Georgia end up worsening EU relations with both Russia and its neighbours. The EU has to do what it takes to contribute to stability in the neighbourhood, hence creating the basis for good relations with Russia and the Eastern partnership states as well. Ignoring conflicts makes matters worse for everyone. Conflicts need to be managed and prevented, and “avoiding irritation” is a poor excuse for inaction.
- It is late to pursue conflict prevention on Georgia, but it is not late to do that in Nagorno-Karabkh, Transnistria and Crimea. In the last two there is little danger of war, and EU’s preferred strategies of conflict-prevention through socio-economic instruments are just the right thing to do.
- On Georgia: the EU monitoring mission will have to stay engaged for the long term. International peacekeepers have been deployed in Cyprus for 35 years leaving room for wounds to heel and bonna fidae negotiations to be conducted.
#1 by al on October 4, 2009 - 2:05 pm
Mr Popescu: I hope you are aware that there exists a sort of new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Germany and Russia (and by extension, the EU and Russia)? This has been in place since the summer of last year. It explains the current EU policy in that area.
#2 by Karen Madoian on October 4, 2009 - 5:16 pm
Unfortunately, Tagliavini report has been released in accordance with the recent EU policy line of “not irritating Russia”. It is nothing but simple retelling of the Georgian-Russian conflict story. No one questions a fact that Georgian armed forces launched massive attack on Tskhinvali on 08.08.08. However, the report does not objectively reveal all preceding events which influenced a decision making in Tbilisi. The commission is not classifying Russia’s invasion in Georgia proper as a direct aggression against sovereign state. According to the report, action of Russian troops (occupation of Gori, Zugdidi, Poti, as well as air strikes on military objects in Tbilisi) are described by logic of preventive measures. Finally, my question is whether the report proposes any valuable recommendations for the future EU involvement in the conflict settlement process. Moreover, I wonder if the EU itself is ready for more active role in the South Caucasus. One may argue this what ENP is for. But I beleive that mentioned instrument will be less effective if Brussels continues with its inaction in the conflict settlement area. By now, at least in the case of Georgia, the EU missed its chance in 2005 when it could have been instrumental replacing the OSCE Monitoring Mission.
#3 by Kazimierz on October 4, 2009 - 5:21 pm
Georgia is the last little nutty Empire.
It is an empire because it wants to keep other peoples, in particular Abkhazians and Ossetians, within Georgia. Soviet Union let other people go peacefully. It didn’t talk about territorial integrity of Soviet Union.
It is little because its population is less than 5 million.
It is nutty because its GDP per capita is about 25 percent of Russian GDP per capita. But it wants to keep other peoples within this ridiculously small and poor empire. Nicu, by the way, it was Emperor Sakashvilli who started the war
#4 by Marcel on October 4, 2009 - 9:31 pm
Aid? Let those Georgian warmongers pay for their own problems. We have massive deficits in Western Europe, the time has come for all development aid to be halted indefinately. That money belongs to us, the taxpayers of Western Europe.
Why is Saakashvili not yet arrested and tried for war crimes?
#5 by al on October 4, 2009 - 10:25 pm
You misspelled “Putin”.
#6 by Iberi on October 5, 2009 - 5:03 am
Lets explode the myths by Mr. Putin and ignorant US and Russian media about so called South Ossetia Lets explode the myths by Mr. Putin and ignorant US and Russian media about so called South Ossetia
SO CALLED “SOUTH OSSETIA” = HISTORIC SHIDA CARTLI region of CENTRAL Georgia
First, lets explode the myth disseminated by Mr. Putin and media that back in the mid-18th century, in 1745-1747, Ossetia was the first to become part of the Russian Empire. At that time, it was a united entity; North and South Ossetia were one state.
Let me assure you – Tskhinvali (capital city of so called South Ossetia) was annexed to Imperial Russia with the rest of eastern Georgia (Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti) in 1801.
The so-called South Osetia IS NOT A NATIVE LAND OF OSSETIANS and It HAS NEVER BEEN PART OF “United Ossetia”.
Georgians always lived there and RULED the region even 2000 years before the Ossetians arrival in the 14th-17th centuries as well as after newcomers settled to central Georgia. The so called South Ossetia, which is one and a half times the area of Luxembourg broke away from Georgia in the 19911992 war.
Georgia remembers Soviet invasion and occupation in 1921 and the reason stated by Bolshevik Russia – Protection of local Communists (inqluding Ossetian Comunists). Today, Russians are protecting ethnic Osetian “Russian Citizens” in historic region of the central Georgia. We also remember early 1990′s when invaded two Georgian provinces and was bombing Georgia from sky and black see, enforced 450.000 people (80% of total population – mostly ethnic Georgian refugees) to leave their homes. In addition, at inactivity of the Russian peacemakers in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region were killed more than 2000 civilians of the Georgian nationality in 1994-2007.
Russia has a history of causing problems in the “near abroad” , around the “whole perimeter” and then coming to “fix” the problem. Place name (toponym) “South Ossetia” for the first time has been used by Russian military, and then civil authorities in the beginning of XIX century. This term had collective character and meant historic-geographical areas of former Georgian Kingdom of Kartli where mainly lived the Ossetian population migrated from the North Caucasus.
Generally speaking, Georgians and Ossetians have been living in peace with each other except for the episodes in 19181920 and 1991-2008. Both ethnicities have had a high level of interaction and a high rate of intermarriages. The Osetians are originally descendants of the Alans. They became Christians during the early Middle Ages, under Georgian and Byzantine influences. Under Mongol rule, they were pushed out of their homeland south in present-day Republic of Alania (north Caucasus) under Russian rule from 1767. Another part of Osetians migrated towards and over the Caucasus mountains, to Georgia in the central region of Georgia – Tskhinvali, Shida Kartli Under rule of the eastern Georgian Royal Dynasty (abolished by Russians in 1801). Little part of Osetians also moved to in Western Georgian Kingdom Imereti, and principality of Racha ruled by another branch of Bagrationi Dynasty.
Transformation of the term “South Ossetia” in a designation of administrative-territorial formation with certain administrative borders begins since 1922. Following the Soviet occupation of Georgia (1921) Osetia was ARTIFICIALLY created by Bolsheviks in Georgia and areas with not only Osetian villages, but with mainly Georgian population (eastern Racha & Imeretia and mostly central Kartli) also have been included. In addition, old Georgian town Tskhinvali become a capital city of artificial Osetia (please note: by 1910 ONLY 10% Osetians lived in Tskhinvali). Subsequently, the town became largely Ossetian due to intense urbanization and Soviet Korenizatsiya (“nativization”) policy which induced an inflow of the Ossetians into Tskhinvali. Today, there is an obvious manifold instrumentalization of the local minorities by Russia for the purpose of destroying the Georgian state.
like this, so called “South Ossetia” was created for the Ossetian minority in central region of Georgia (30 miles from Tbilisi Capital) as a reward for Ossetians political loyalty to Bolshevik Russia and armed rebelions against government of Democratic Republic of Georgia in 1918-1921.
By the early 18th century, Tskhinvali was a small Georgian “royal town” populated chiefly by monastic serfs of the Georgian orthodox church and serfs of local Georgian aristocrats (such as Prince Matchabeli family, etc.) Tskhinvali was first chronicled by Georgian sources in 1398 as a village in Kartli (central Georgia) though a later account credits the 3rd century AD Georgian king Asphagur of Iberia (eastern Georgia) with its foundation as a fortress. The city contains several monuments of medieval Georgian architecture, with the Kavti Church of St. George being the oldest one dating back to the 8th-10th centuries, as well as Soviet time buildings and the old Jewish Quarter (Jewish lived peacefully in Georgia more than 24 centuries).
Located on a trade route which linked North Caucasus to Tbilisi and Gori, Tskhinvali gradually developed into a commercial town with a mixed Jewish, Georgian, Armenian and Ossetian population. In the 1910s, its censused population was 5,033 with 42.3% Jews, 33% Georgians, 13.4% Armenians and ONLY 11% Ossetians.
Having created, (ARTIFICIALLY – in 1922) & funded and fully backed the South Ossetian separatist movement since the Soviet crack-up, in late July the Kremlin ordered its own puppet regime of Kokoiti to provoke the Georgians. In the week prior to the Russian invasion, South Ossetians, aided by Russian peacekeepers, had shelled and raided Georgian villages beyond South Ossetia. President, Mikheil Saakashvili, took the bait and walked into Moscows trap—he ordered Georgian forces to go in and clean out the areas where the “South Ossetian” militias were operating.
The lessons of the past have demonstrated that shortsightedness, adventurism and extremism in politics invariably lead to a tragedy that makes hundreds and thousands of innocent people suffer.
Georgian public opinion very often is diverse, on this particular situation everyone, including the people, church, opposition and the authorities, are united and have one opinion: Georgia has been and should remain a unified state.
#7 by ZviadKavteli on October 5, 2009 - 8:07 am
@Marcel
Because Saakashvili has not committed war crimes.
Putin, on the other hand, committed war crimes in Georgia (ethnic cleansing) and Chechnya (genocide). But nobody demands an investigation into Putin’s crimes, because he is sitting on nukes, oil, gas and UN Security Council. In addition he controlls 140 million brainwashed Russians who would be happy to invade France, Germany or Italy if they could.
#8 by Yelena Zabortseva on October 5, 2009 - 8:47 am
Well, I doubt the described EU policy of “not irritating Russia” is so simple, as outlined.
#9 by Stefan on October 5, 2009 - 8:47 am
Kazimierz, you reminded me Sakharov, winner of the 1975 Nobel Prize in Peace.
It is not by chance that in 1989 after the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict Academician Sakharov in one of his last articles called Georgia a ‘mini-empire’ (Ogonёk 1989, 31). Later, describing the relationship between Abkhazia and Georgia, he wrote: «I tend to justify the Abkhazian position. I think we should regard with special attention the problems of small peoples: freedom and rights of big nations should not be exercised at the expense of small ones» (Znamja, 1991, No.10, p.69).
And C. Bechhofer, an English diplomat, characterized the government of the “democratic” Georgian state that had already occupied Abkhazia at that moment as follows: “The free and independent social-democratic State of Georgia will always remain in my memory as a classic imperialist body, that is characterized with territory-snatching outside and bureaucratic tyranny inside; its chauvinism is beyond all bounds”. C.E. Bechhofer. In Denikin’s Russia and the Caucasus. 1919-1920. London. 1921, p. 14.
#10 by Sanne Draijeer on October 5, 2009 - 8:49 am
Facts indicate that Mr. Saakashvili has apparently decided to continue the cause of Georgia’s first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia who, by proclaiming “Georgia for Georgians,” actually had his home set on fire. Today, Saakashvili seems to be propelling a de jure formalization of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence. Georgia will thus lose the quality of a mini-empire as defined by Dr. Andrei Sakharov, a democrat and liberal and a man whom no one would dare call a chauvinist or proponent of totalitarianism. If some people say that the age of empires is gone, it is then gone for all empires, large or small, and Mr. Saakashvili definitely has to take this into account and reconcile himself with this reality.
#11 by Stefan on October 5, 2009 - 9:01 am
PS. ”1989” – [The events of July 1989.]
By the way, Saakashvili has also apparently decided to continue the cause of Shevardnadze, not only Gamsakhurdia.
Shevardnadze, in his speeches on Georgian radio on 7-8 December 1992 the leader of Georgia openly called for the possible annihilation of the Abkhazians. He said: ”The fate of Georgia, her way to freedom and independence, is being decided in Abkhazia today. That is why I have called on every citizen of Georgia to make his contribution to this fight for freedom and independence. I repeat – I have taken this decision against my will and my own beliefs. I know this is not right, but there is no other way.” Then he said: ”This war should not be a long one. The world believes us, and we should not let it down. We are for peace, and we must end this war as soon as possible. By the 3rd millennium Georgia will be the happiest country in the world.”
Freedom and independence for their own people and dictatorship and open chauvinism towards other peoples – this is the double standard that underlies the Georgian policy in Abkhazia and S. Ossetia.
#12 by Mihal on October 5, 2009 - 10:22 am
21st of May, 1865 is the symbolic date of Russian Tsardom’s genocide on Abkhazian and Circassian peoples following hundreds years of wars and invasion. After that date, Russian Tsardom expelled the rest of the survivors to Ottoman State. A symbolic amount of collaborators were left in the Caucasus from those peoples but of course in ” secure” area for Russians. But today, those people unfortunately celebrate the anniversaries (in 2008, 450.) of their “voluntarily” unficiation with Russian Tsardom. They’re in love with their assassins. Osetians are the Serbians of the Caucasus who are in hunger for massacring innocent people like they’ve done in Prigorodny-Ingushetia. Who can trust in the lies of those marauders, bandits, depredators and masochists?
#13 by Robert Harneis on October 5, 2009 - 10:51 am
Nicu Popescu writes an article about the war in Georgia that fails to mention the prime mover in that conflict – the United States. He is not the first and he will not be the last.
Sure the EU did not want to irritate Russia and quite right. What is the point of that? But their real fear was irritating the rampant and ruthless Bush administration who they knew was determined on a military solution to the “frozen conflicts” if neccessary.
In reality thanks to the coincidence of Sarkozy’s presidence,the EU have moved at exactly the right time to monitor the disputed frontiers. To have done so earlier would have been too soon and impractical bearing in mind the political and military US alliance in Georgia prior to the war. The Georgian fiasco has created some diplomatic space.
#14 by santini olivier on October 5, 2009 - 12:00 pm
Dear friends, Nicu Popescu did a good job. We may have different opinions but this post is about EU inability to bring bring justice, security and stability to its neighbours. There is only one reason why the EU has so little to offer: the lack of political will.
Nicu, thank you for this post. Your understanding of frozen conflicts is correct and I agree with the three conclusions you make. I hope that you’ll give us a more detailed vision of conflict prevention mecanisms involving the EU and/or OSCE in the post-soviet area (especially NK, Transn.) Also, I would like to exchange on Crimea, which is particular in terms of prevention/regulation/settlement.
And, what is your opinion on Modova’s gvmt recent initiative to invite the Europeans in Transnitria?
#15 by Ivan Kalburov on October 7, 2009 - 1:58 pm
Once again, the ECFR analysts are the only people who criticize ESDP and CFSP properly. Except them, there is no one to openly say that the BiH mission which is used as an example by the EU is actaully a FAILURE. No one to say that the EU’s missions around the world prove the union a small actor, if not CMO-impotent.
Prevention is a huge gap in ESDP. The policy on Georgia was not carried out competently. Good Job, Nicu !
#16 by Sergi Kapanadze on October 7, 2009 - 9:58 pm
Nicu, I agree with all your points, except the second observation, that it is late to prevent conflict in Georgia. In fact, I think that in the medium-long run, conflict prevention might be just as necessary as it was in 2008. Unlike pre-2008, when serious provocation was needed to offset the balance of power, now it could be destabilized with a single gunshot.
Unfortunately, tools at hand of the international community are more limited currently than they were before August 2008. Then we had UNOMIG and OSCE on the ground, even with very weak mandates, but still, with the monitoring capabilities. Currently we have no monitors inside and EUMM’s presence on one side of the ABL is not a preventive tool, but rather a deterring semi-argument.
To continue your point on acting-now-is-cheaper-then-reacting-later, I think that the EU might be in the process of making the same mistake as we speak. EU could start using satellite data to control the armament and troop deployment inside Akhazia and South Ossetia. But they are not doing so. I am sure it will eventually cost cheaper (financially and politically) to make this step now, then to face the unexpected crisis in several years.
We live in the 21st century, when digital technology is changing the world. Satellite imagery can indeed change the situation in Georgia, if regularly published. It is harder to plan provocations when there is the EU eyes fixed on you. Or at least I hope so…
#17 by Ivan Kalburov on October 8, 2009 - 12:33 am
Sergi, on the satellite point: it is highly unlikely that the EU would use the Satellite Center as you suggest. Indeed, it would be useful, but for this to happen we first need to have strong drive towards extending the mission and possibly adding a military component. That would not be bad, but I am afraid it is too late to send EU troops there.
The other option is to count on national surveillance data, which seems to be more viable option, but I can imagine the Russian reaction if the UK starts doing so. As for the other member states, I doubt they have the guts or capacity.
#18 by Karen Madoian on October 8, 2009 - 8:43 am
Coming back to Sergi’s satellite point: we cannot expect the EU involvement to such an extent as it is crystal clear that Brussels has no idea how to handle the South Caucasus security issue. What can it offer for replacing the UN and OSCE monitoring instruments in the conflict zones? I doubt that an answer is already on the table.
As for the Tagliavini report, this link might be interesting http://www.expertclub.ge/DesktopDefault.aspx?cnid=2291&alias=Expertclub&lang=en&tabid=2546
#19 by Nicu Popescu on October 12, 2009 - 5:55 pm
Dear friends, thanks a lot for your comments… I cannot deal with them now.. I have been traveling quite heavily last week and off again for another week. will try to deal with the comments when I return
sorry