As Moldova and Georgia are plunging into political crisis, increasing polarisation, and growing tensions between the government and opposition EU’s priorities in these countries suddenly look different than a few months ago. This is clearly captured by what the EU special representatives (EUSR) to these countries are doing. If EU special representatives for South Caucasus and Moldova were appointed (in 2003 and 2005 respectively) to deal primarily with secessionist conflicts, now they have to deal primarily with domestic political crises.
When Georgia plunged into crisis in November 2007, Peter Semneby, EUSR for South Caucasus, flew immediately to Tbilisi and sought to diffuse the crisis by mediating between government and opposition. As the opposition launched again a series to rallies to unseat president Saakashvili less than two months ago, Peter Semneby is trying again to diffuse the crisis through mediation.
EUSR Moldova, Kalman Mizsei is doing just the same. After Moldovan protesters attacked the parliament and the presidential palace on the 7 April 2009, and the government responded with a severe and brutal crackdown, Kalman Mizsei flew to Chisinau from the very first day of the crisis and tried hard to convince the government and opposition on the need for political dialogue.
Since then, both EU Special representatives are spending most of their time in Tbilisi and Chisinau as go-betweens the government and opposition. And the secessionist conflicts – are much more marginal to their agenda. Certainly, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria are not off the cards. But the domestic crises in Georgia and Moldova make their jobs even more daunting.
This is a sign of new times in the Eastern neighbourhood. Until recently the hope was to reintegrate Transnistria with Moldova, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Georgia; now EU’s might become more modest (at least on Georgia) – to keep the country on a path towards more democratization and reforms. And even these goals are far from certain in the medium term.
If a couple of years ago it was assumed that Georgia and Moldova were more or less “moving into the right direction” (implementing reforms described in the Action Plans with the EU) and the main source of instability were the secessionist conflicts, now the situation has changed. The sources of instability have multiplied considerably as they now stem from domestic politics, increasing centralisation, growing use of authoritarian practices, societal polarisation, economic crisis, unfair elections and Russian attempts to use some of these crises to promote a sphere of influence. The weak states of the neighbourhood are torn apart more than ever before in the last 20 years by domestic and external pressures. Russkii Zhurnal, a Russian magazine published by a Kremlin-connected NGO, even dedicated a special issue on the need to “manage” the de-sovereignisation of neighbourhood states in times of crisis. This is not a great conspiracy, but there is a debate in Russia on how to manage the de-sovereignisation of the post-Soviet states.
These trends have many policy implications for the EU. One, is that the job of EU special representatives is becoming much more complex. Their teams of experts on crisis-management, conflict mediation and peace-keeping, might need to be complemented with new advisers on democratization and constitutional reform (though discussions on conflict-settlement in Transnistria were already related to democracy-building and constitution-making anyway). It could also be useful to explore the idea of double-hatting (or merging) the post of EU Special representative to Moldova with the post of Head of Delegation of the European Commission to Moldova. As things stand now, the Council-based EUSR does not have the necessary financial “arguments” to apply conditionality on Moldova in a much more systematic way, while the European Commission is not involved enough in political issues in Moldova.
But a broader conceptual overhaul of the entire EU policy towards the region might be necessary. When the Eastern Partnership was initiated a year ago in a Swedish-Polish initiative, the policy was supposed to deal with long-term institution-building and reforms. But in the current context the Eastern partnership needs to be complemented with shorter-term measures that would allow the EU to manage political, economic, social and security crises in the neighbourhood.
EU praises itself for being an able soft power. But soft power is slow power. In the Eastern neighbourhood, all too often the potential effects of soft power (and the European neighbourhood policy) do not take root because EU policies are not shielded from the storm of crises ravaging throughout the neighbourhood. The challenge for the EU is to complement its focus on long-term institution building with shorter-term “crisis management” interventions. Events on the ground are forcing the EU to do just that.
#1 by Ion on May 18, 2009 - 8:47 pm
I liked more the initial title – you should have kept it a subtitle
but I understand you’ll get the right audience with the new one
#2 by andria on May 19, 2009 - 7:52 am
I am from Georgia, country feels like wounded human that needs an operation, but Russian surgeons are trying to widen the wounds,
it needs the European surgery to heel the wounds.
Situation in Caucasus is much more complicated than in Balkans in 90s, because there are much bigger and much more actors (USA, Russia, Turkey) with different opinions about future of small region.
I agree with Nicu Popescu that EU should step up and take a bigger role, its not just Semneby who should be dealing with Georgian matters. He isn’t Superhero and no one is expecting him to be. It needs much deeper and institutionalized approach with crisis in Caucasus and Transdnistria. Now those regions have become the new EU backyard since last enlargement, so it should be one of the priorities of CFS policy.
#3 by Wim Roffel on May 19, 2009 - 11:02 am
I think the EU’s Eastern neighborhood policy is a carbon copy of the EU’s failed Yugoslavia policy. Where in the case of Yugoslavia everyone else had to be saved from Serbia now it is Russia that everyone else has to be saved from. This is divide-and-rule policy at its ugliest.
Instead I believe that the EU should treat the former Soviet-Union as a closely connected region where ties can only be broken at considerable humanitarian and economic costs. Many of those countries have problematic regimes but that is no excuse.
#4 by nicu on May 19, 2009 - 12:06 pm
Ion, yes the title was “cool” but also less representative of the piece. I will have another post with that title
the idea is there.
Andria, much more people died in former Yougoslavia. I agree the political crises in the Caucasus are much worse than what we see in the Balkans now. But unfortuntaley much more lives have been lost in the Balkans. And this has to be acknowledged.
Wim – I don’t think the EU policies in the Balkans failed. If things were being sorted out through wars in the 90 (and even 2001 in Macedonia) – now in the Balkans problems are being sorted out through political crises. Making the step from wars to political crises is a big step. Of course this is debatable how much this is due to the US, EU, Russia and the Balkans’ countries themselves. But the Balkans look much better now than they did in the 90s.
#5 by andria on May 19, 2009 - 7:45 pm
Wim, you know, in Georgia it feels like Spielberg movie with a name “Saving private Georgia from Russia”. The case of Russia is a PROBLEM, cos u can not just remove Putin or Medvedev as you did it with Slobo Milosevic. And they (Putin & Co.) are pushing Georgia towards disaster, but no one knows what that disaster mite be (whole annexation or splitting into several parts or staying “independent” with governance appointed by Russia). That ambiguity or illegibility causes panic atmosphere in which opposition, government and whole society unable to find out the way out of the problem. That “panic situation” should be given credit in creating internal political crisis.
That is why Georgia needs a REAL European backing, not just Medvedev-Sarkozy signed paper that everyone knows has no power, because Europe doesn’t do anything to cope with the problem of crisis in its roots, that is Russian factor. Of course, job done here in Tbilisi by special representative in the region should be admitted and given its credit, but that ain’t enough, unless it is backed by and based on steady European policy towards the region including all levels of interaction (from experts up to heads of government). There should be not just technical (Their teams of experts on crisis-management, conflict mediation and peace-keeping), but also high level political support. That will let society and politicians here clear out their minds and get together about the idea of future of Georgia, about the question where are we going to and what are the tasks on our way to success. But that won’t happen unless there is European involvement.
Nicu is rite when he says that soft power ain’t adequate for this situation, and you know why? Not because that Georgian internal problems can not be solved by traditional EU “slowly but steadily” soft power mechanism, but because Europe should deal with Russia. And with Russia, soft power means no power when a counterpart uses violence (energy policy, bombing, coup planning and aiding, violation of international law on a daily basis, etc.).
You need to be tough, guys, in case you want peace & democracy in the region.
Nicu, I agree with you about the quantity of lives lost in the conflicts of Balkans and Georgia (if you don’t take conflicts of early 90s in Abkhazia and South Ossetia into account ), but you should also take into account the fact that Balkans conflicts are over, there is stability thanks to NATO and EU as well. While in Georgia, the crisis is continuing and no one knows what will happen tomorrow. That must be acknowledged, too.
#6 by Andreja on May 21, 2009 - 10:12 am
I completely agree about the need of immediate action from Brussels towards the region. In my opinion a strong European perspective is what is missing when Brussels communicates the region. Yes, there is the EU’s soft power…but this power (from the experience we had in CEE and now in the Western Balkans) can be only effective if at the end of the tunnel there is the EU membership perspective. The relation South Caucasus – Western Balkans has many things in common, but one thing is greatly different. Not all SC countries are willing to join the EU and especially NATO, except for Georgia. If all countries are sharing the same idea (the case of the WB) then there will be much greater regional cooperation and joint initiatives.
#7 by Wim Roffel on May 25, 2009 - 2:28 pm
Andria, the problems in Georgia were started by Georgia in 1991, not by Russia. It was Georgia that followed a racist policy that managed to reduce the number of non-Georgians in Georgia from 27% to 17% in a few years. One of the victims were the Ossetians from outside South-Ossetia of which some 55,000 were driven into exile. If it hadn’t been for Russia’s “humanitarian interventian” the number would have been higher. Until now Georgia has effectively blocked the return of the exiles by throwing up judicial barriers for the return of their properties.
If Georgia had been serious about a reunification with South Ossetia it would have done something about those returns. I think they would have had a good chance as there lived more Ossetians (in Georgia) outside South Ossetia than inside. Instead they indulged in another orgy of ethnic cleansing. The US encouraged them as the only thing they are interested in is humiliating Russia.
Georgia was doing quite well before the war. There was nobody that forced Georgia to attack South-Ossetia. So please take some responsibility and accept the consequences of this ill-advised operation.
#8 by Dmytro Potekhin on May 26, 2009 - 11:04 am
Nicu,
EU high-level mediation is great, especially when timely – not 5 days after clashes.
however, mediating protest clashes differs from dealing with traditional secessionist conflicts, although linked politically of course since used to set precontext.
when done after unrecorded (or poorly recorded) provocations, mediation is likely to turn into human rights mission taking people out of jails. put there after provocations done mostly by a regime.
so everybody is happy – beaten people are out of jails, diplomats report successful mediation, regime shows humanism towards ‘extremists’, activists become heroes… and almost nothing changes!
so to your to do list I would add at least two things that seems to be out of the agenda in the Brussels – 1) prevention / early warning for both regime and the activist groups 2) international street nonviolence observation.
diplomatic practice must also be changed. as of today the Brussels has bought Kremlin’s post-Orange revolution rhetorics and seem to be afraid of being accused of setting protests, which is stupid. on the contrary – it must openly provide support for non-violent groups.
such groups must start promoting non-violence culture among activists long before possible clashes, not after them. at the mediation stage this would make distancing from the provocations much easier.
I don’t see how Eastern Partnership can be successful without an early warning and prevention instrument, a civic security system if you wish.
#9 by Maka Khvedelidze on March 9, 2010 - 1:24 am
I come from Georgia. I have been involved in the academic life dedicated to the Politics of EU, EU’s approach towards the Eastern Neighborhood and community integration issues. I had the opportunity to do my MA in Romania, the country that has just entered the EU and also I have been working towards my MA degree in France, the “VIP Country of the EU”. I can admit that the experience gained in both countries gives me the platform of the logical framework within the scope of Georgia’s, as EU-oriented country, initiatives on the threshold of the Eastern Partnership. The main challenge for Georgia at present is the conflict resolution, but I we can hardly see any concrete initiatives in this direction. We can admit that the “EU” activeness in this respect is somehow invisible. I totally agree that the EU involvement must be oriented totally to the REAL PRACTICAL NEEDS ASSESEMENT of Georgia, but at the same time I MUST admit that MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COPERATION can be achieved if both sides: EU and Georgia work in close collaboration. I think that the Georgian side should present the concrete initiatives, projects and political agenda giving the EU the CLEAR and DEFINITE background for taking the position of a “MODERATOR”.