Nabucco is dead. BP killed it. The epic 5-country natural gas pipeline that was to bring Caspian resources to Central Europe to lessen EU dependence on Russian supplies was scuppered in late September by the very same supermajor that was supposed to supply it with gas from Azerbaijan. As an October 1 deadline approached for Nabucco and its smaller competitors to submit their commercial transit and tariff terms to Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz consortium – one of the holders of the gas – BP, with a 25.5% stake in Shah Deniz, proposed its own alternative project: the South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP).

Essentially a portion of Nabucco, it is smaller, cheaper and more realistic than its operatic alternative. And it’s got a gas-holding supermajor behind it. Most importantly, while Nabucco at around 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year was a project with three times the capacity of natural gas immediately available from Shah Deniz, SEEP’s capacity hovers around 10 bcm – just enough to realize the task at hand. BP representatives have also discussed the possibility for that capacity to expand in the future, should more gas – from Azerbaijan’s newly confirmed Absheron field or from Turkmenistan across the Caspian – become available. On the face of it, SEEP provides less risk up-front and flexibility in the long run.

In some ways, this is welcome news. Although just an idea, Nabucco was always a white elephant of sorts. It was endorsed by the European Commission as a strategic project to help solve Europe’s energy security woes, but it put the cart before the horse. Building transit capacity without available resources to fill it is not the way that pipelines are built. There were also serious concerns about its cost (up to 20 billion USD at last estimate) and financing. Even with seed funds from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, (EBRD) it would have been an enormous challenge to find private sector investment for a project of this scale in today’s economic environment. Nabucco’s consortium, a hodge-podge of national energy companies along its route and larger players such as Germany’s RWE, never had the clout that even a beleaguered supermajor like BP can bring to the table. It is perhaps not surprising that Nabucco’s start-date was delayed at least four times over an eight-year period.

All this said, BP’s alternative may have killed off a competitor, but it is far from the ideal project. Ironically, one of Nabucco’s original smaller competitors is closer to fitting the bill. The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is also a 10 bcm project, but with the important option of expanding to 20 bcm should gas become available. It has strong shareholders in Statoil, E.ON Ruhrgas and EGL, so that it won’t have to go begging for investment. The main difference is that SEEP will terminate in Austria, whereas TAP plans to head to Italy through Greece and Albania. A notable difference is that TAP has laid the groundwork with transit countries and regulatory hurdles for several years, whereas SEEP was just announced.

SEEP may well have legs. With BP’s Russian investments foundering, it has announced that it is doubling down on commitments to develop Azerbaijani gas and oil reserves. Having its own export pipeline fits neatly into its new strategy. But, it will face competition from its Shah Deniz consortium partner Statoil – also with 25.5%. As a major shareholder in both Shah Deniz and TAP, Statoil claims there are “Chinese walls” between the two operations. But, it will probably take the opportunity now that Nabucco is out of the game to push its own realistic, cheap and flexible project.

In fact, Statoil and TAP may well be the thinking man’s horse in the race. BP may have come back strong in Azerbaijan, but in the years that it was focused on its Russian investments it had to deemphasize its Caspian presence so as not to be perceived as competing with Moscow’s Gazprom in the region. In the meantime, Statoil filled the void and has now emerged as the player with the most influence with the Azerbaijani government. This is of paramount importance, because now that the four pipeline projects have submitted their proposals, the decision lies with the holders of the gas. And, while BP and Statoil may be majority shareholders in Shah Deniz, the nature of gas development in Azerbaijan means that the government in Baku will have the final say.

Alexandros Petersen is Advisor to the European Energy Security Initiative at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

This post first appeared in Oil and Gas Journal.