In order, to tackle relations with its neighbourhood the EU set up the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), operational now for the last six years. Although the policy is quite a young one it requires rethinking. Recent developments in the Southern Mediterranean have demonstrated that the framework of the ENP has failed to deliver.

The EU needs to be clear and honest when it comes to defining objectives, principles and values on which the revised ENP should be built. Moreover, the EU needs to overcome its internal differences on the priorities it sets. Without a truly common position on the EU’s neighbourhood there can be no effective plan of action. The ENP has to become more dynamic. Otherwise the Maghreb partner governments and, more important, the populations of the region will not accept ENP as a policy tool for change. Therefore:

• The EU must put the ‘political’ and the ‘human’ element at the top of its agenda. Recent events show that citizens of the Southern Mediterranean demand political change. The EU must try to politically engage with local movements and even establish a dialogue with the Islamist parties of the region in order to make them see the benefits of moderate politics. Early pre-emptive action in the form of close interaction with society is necessary in order to avoid unpleasant surprises. If the EU fails to interact with its neighbours it will only reap storms in the future.

• The EU must be strict in policy monitoring, and become more demanding in the nature of its partnerships. If the ENP is to be taken seriously by the non-EU partners then it must be strict in monitoring the pace of changes that are happening on the ground. It should reward countries for progress but also punish them when progress does not happen. ENP must not be an EU Public Relations exercise (as it was previously) but, rather, a maker of change. It is also time for the EU to become more demanding with itself, setting up a less bureaucratic, more flexible and more proactive ENP.

• The EU must allow for more resources to be directed to the ENP region, in a truly distributive manner. The EU must ask more from its partnerships but it must also offer more in return. So far the EU has allocated limited resources to its partners, thus making it less appealing to engage ENP countries in its initiatives. This must change if the ENP is to become an effective tool of policy change.

• The ENP should clarify its position and relationship with regard to other similar projects. In 2008, French President Sarkozy launched his own ambitious plan for the region, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). However, the relationship between the ENP and the UfM requires further elaboration and clarification. The EU must also coordinate its ENP targets with the policies of financial institutions (such as the EIB, EBRD, the World Bank) and other NGOs that are active in the region.

• Stability in the neighbourhood should not be built at the expense of democracy. The EU should be brave enough to demand more progress in the difficult chapter of human rights. It should insist on the freedom of the press and the media. There is now a hope for the flourishing of democracy in the countries that have recently experienced a political revolution. It is time for the EU to help the fragile transitions, by any possible means. It is also time for the EU to decide how to relate to other undemocratic countries that have not experienced the wave of democratic change yet (e.g., Morocco).

• The launching of new democratic political parties is an important task. The role of the European Parliament is decisive in this respect. European political parties and European political groups within the European Parliament must also establish their own missions and help to establish sister parties in the vulnerable region.

• Furthermore, the EU should use various instruments in order to help towards the organisation and monitoring of free elections as well as work with civil society and NGOs to support rule of law administrative tasks.

• The EU should establish more efficient ways to cooperate in issues of migration and human trafficking, by forming new networks between the EU and the Neighbourhood countries. When setting its bilateral plans, it is also vital for the EU to insist on progress on transborder cooperation and good relationships among the Maghreb states themselves, the way it did in the Western Balkans. In this way, the EU will avoid any future tensions between the fragile Maghreb countries that may lead to new, dangerous clashes.

• The EU should be able to find new ways to engage Neighbourhood countries in its own policies. For instance, ENP countries may be called to contribute to peace-keeping missions under the umbrella of the Common Security and Defence Policy. In this way, a Maghreb EU ‘socialisation’ process will be cemented.

• The EU countries must also find ways to curb their own bureaucracy in order to make the circulation of visas easier for target groups such as students, researchers and NGO officials. In the current conditions of political upheaval it is vital for Maghreb society to communicate with the rest of the world, absorb new ideas and to see ways of organising democratic states.

I had the opportunity to attend the introductory meeting for the Twin Cities Project between Turkish and EU Municipalities that took place in Ankara on 31st January till 4 February.

The meeting was supported by a number of high profile institutions, notably the EU Delegation Office in Turkey, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP Turkey), the Turkish Union of Municipalities, and the Ministry of Interior and Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU). It hosted 10 Turkish and 15 European local authorities who gave presentations about works of local authorities. The meeting grouped a number of Turkish Municipalities from all geographical parts of Turkey and gave the participants a very comprehensive view of the problems that these Municipalities face.

Workshops were held on various themes including social services, environmental issues, local economic development, tourism and culture. Participating Municipalities had the opportunity to exchange good practice and to discuss problems and opportunities in each of these fields. We learnt a lot from each other as we shared ideas on how citizens’ issues can be solved. We all enjoyed the great hospitality of the organisers and were grateful to them for the experience.

One of the main aims of the meeting was to help Turkish Municipalities implement locally the EU ‘acquis’ that affect citizens in every part of their daily lives. Although the meeting had a ‘Europeanisation’ agenda, it also had a ‘citizen empowerment’ dimension, as initiatives came from the people who are far away from the decision-making process of Brussels.

One innovation of the meeting was that Municipalities that opted to cooperate together would do so in a structured way after having chosen a particular policy and theme. Therefore, this was not another ‘happy hippie twinning for peace’ exercise but rather a strategy that will bring Municipalities together in a detailed, practical and well-planned manner.

I admired the will of various Turkish Municipal administrations to transform the lives of their citizens and to get engaged in new projects. Turkish Municipalities are already experimenting with innovative techniques and are eager to learn more. They have a huge potential for economic, social and cultural development. And so has Turkey overall: a country that is booming, opening up to new ideas and methods of cooperation.

I am sure that the event will spur a new wave of cooperation amongst cities. In the case of Greece and Turkey, I do hope that the development of Municipal cooperation projects will contribute to bringing together the two sides of the Aegean. We need this rapprochement more than ever before.

Too many commentators focus on covering the current European financial problems. Although the deadlocked financial situation of the EU cannot be disregarded one should also pay attention to the political/ideological vacuum of the European Union.

The crisis of Europe is a crisis of values. In the last few years there has been no equivalent of the idealism that cemented the European project back in the 1950s. I am on the side of those who believe that ideas do matter and that the EU cannot simply be run by competent technocrats (no matter how efficient they may be). Technocrats may offer a brain to the EU project (although this is debatable!) but they cannot offer a soul. And it is the soul that is currently lacking in the European project.

A soul searching exercise is thus necessary, but who can carry it out? As former German Councillor Helmut Schmidt claims, Europe lacks leadership. He is more than right. Merkel behaves more like a small Town Mayor whose narrow-mindedness cannot escape the borders of her little constituency rather than a leader of a united Europe. In other member states things are not rosy either: in France, Sarkozy has been weakened by his internal policies and tries to gain political momentum by exercising the populist trick of Roma expulsions; in Italy, Berlusconi does not offer a leadership model (for many good reasons).

A crisis of ideology is also evident in the EU. The uncritical acceptance of a deregulated free-market vision within the EU circles has damaged the economy of the Eurozone and is no longer viable. The EU became a political space where a conservative free-market mentality has gradually taken over without any major thinking and debate. This kind of “acquis” has silently been imposed in every EU policy area by the large majorities of the EU establishment. The “Celtic tiger” economy was fervently promoted by this establishment as an example that all Southern European economies had to follow. Now that Ireland is bankrupt, who will take the blame?

The European Parliament, which was supposed to be the representation instrument of EU citizens, has become the hub of big industry lobbies. In addition, the ideological poverty of social democracy, along with the weakness of any other left-wing force to provide answers to the ongoing EU problems, has deprived the European public of a viable alternative political solution.

The weakness of promoting Europe as an alternative to the nation state has brought a re-nationalisation of mentalities. Populism reigns in every part of Europe paving the way for extreme right wing parties to flourish. There is a great public unease, from egalitarian Sweden all the way down to the metropolitan capital of Catalonia. This unease gives birth to alarming new political movements propagating a discourse of national purity.

The EU problems are also an outcome of the lack of competent mechanisms and strong policies. Although much was expected from the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, it seems that a strong form of European economic governance is still lacking. Many economists suggested that the Euro should have been the last thing to happen after the successful establishment of a real functioning common EU market. Nevertheless, it is now too late to say what should have been done better in the past. The adoption of the Euro was the first major move toward a common market and European leaders have the responsibility to protect it. Brave decisions need to be taken now. European leaders must surpass the frontiers of their member states in order to promote solutions that will fit a “European” rather than a narrowly defined national interest. It is unlikely that they will be brave enough to do it though.

If European leaders would like to regain some of their lost credibility they must start speaking the language of truth. Rather than explaining the real issues to their publics, politicians tend to demonise certain countries (the so-called PIIGs) in order to justify errors and cover-ups of the past. Loans that will give great returns to the lenders are presented as big favours to the smaller indebted EU countries. Very few EU officials will say that the Euro benefits the stronger EU economies more than anyone else. I will explain it myself: with the adoption of the Euro, devaluation among the Southern countries became impossible. As a result, German products got a comparative advantage over those of the financially weak EU countries who could not devalue their currencies in order to boost their exports. Although Germany is experiencing growth, allowing it to build surpluses, the weaker European economies may end up in a continuous circle of recession by implementing vicious social cuts. The face of dishonesty: EU demands austerity in labour and welfare issues but makes no demand for cuts to arms spending either in Greece or in Portugal which buy many of their weapons from the bigger EU countries.

The semantic poverty of the term “Europe” nowadays is indeed frightening. Under the current crisis, the term “Europe” may end up being an empty shell. Worse than that, as Leigh Phillips mentions in his series of EU Observer articles, the EU may become synonymous with brutal austerity in the minds of its citizens, which gradually may threaten its very own existence.

Pro-Europeanists agonise over the future of the European Union. What can inspire citizens and politicians to continue with the European project? Can there be a new beginning? And if so, how can this happen?

Now that the Labour Party leadership contest is over, it will be interesting to observe the process of regeneration that the party goes through.

I would like to see many things change in the Labour Party and I do hope that Ed Miliband will bring lots of change, not only for the sake of the party but for the democratic system as a whole. Real discussions should take place on sensitive issues that have been stifled in the past. A more democratic and accountable party should be created. Labour should think less in terms of spin and more in terms of substance. It is also time for the party to find its real position in the left-right pendulum by adopting truly progressive, centre-left positions.

While in government, the Labour Party adopted a wishy-washy position on many issues. Europe was one of them. Although the victorious 1997 party manifesto aimed at putting Europe on the agenda the issue was never developed to the full. Apart from a very short-lived era of cautious EU-phoria during the first years of Labour government, the question of Europe was widely neglected. Such absence of debate allowed Eurosceptic/extremist elements to manipulate the public debate towards an inward-looking position.

I know that many will be interested in the Labour Party’s ideas on tackling the debt and facing the budget cuts. For all social-democratic parties, health, education and welfare are always on the top of the agenda. Nevertheless, one should not forget the important impact of foreign policies. In the end, Blair and the Labour Party did pay a heavy price for Iraq.

Many in continental Europe want to see the UK lead in the EU. There would be an added value for both the EU and the UK from an active UK participation in finance, economy and foreign policy. There will also be a positive mentality impact on the bureaucratic EU mechanism, since we admire UK officials for their efficiency, flexibility and imaginative solutions.

No country can stand on her own; alliances are necessary. In Europe, the UK can lead. It cannot lead in the rest of the world, on a level with other global/emerging powers such as the USA and China. A partnership cannot really be established on an unequal footing: a small country cannot be hand in hand with the world’s superpower (e.g., USA and the UK). However, the UK can lead in a group of middle-power states which form the European Union.

If the Labour Party will speak the voice of truth on Europe, there is a hope that the public debate will gradually shift to more logical positions. This is by no means an easy task, since large sections of the British media are Eurosceptic. However, one should make an effort in order to put the Europhile argument forward. This cannot just start to happen at the crucial time of elections – by then it will be too late. It has to be cultivated much earlier. It is time for the Labour Party to start speaking the truth on Europe.

I read a Speech by Professor Jolyon Howorth called ‘Strategy and the importance of defence cooperation among EU Member States’. The speech was given on 13th of July at a seminar on Permanent Structured Cooperation which was organised by the Belgian Presidency. Overall, the speaker argues in favour of more integration in the field of security and defence. As always, the writings of Jolyon are thoughtful and stimulating. Howorth mentions some sound ideas that would boost integration in the field of security and defence: the establishment of a European Security Council, a formal Council of Defence Ministers, a European White Book on Security and Defence, an integrated Intelligence Agency, a permanent OHQ, an upgraded EDA (p.3). The author is also right in underlining the importance of the upgrade of capabilities and the pooling of resources. These measures are more than necessary in times of funding cuts.

Howorth mentions that the obstacles of cooperation in security and defence are due to national inhibitions. He claims that no one expected such guerrilla warfare on the tiniest details of External Action Service responsibility. Indeed, the resistance and cautiousness of the EU Member States to any form of EU empowerment in foreign affairs is characteristic of the climate of inward looking ‘re-nationalisation’ that one sees in Brussels. The failure of the Europeans to provide a cohesive approach to the current financial crisis is also a proof that narrowly defined state interests prevail.

The author also claims that a new narrative is necessary and that Europe needs a new strategy. However, we did not lack narratives in the past. On the contrary, we had too many of them. All these narratives have failed to build a common identity and to forge a common strategic culture. Some of them were truly wonderful texts with great ideas. The European Security Strategy had a notion of a Grand Strategy. But what happened to it really? The new comprehensive EU strategy called EU 2020 also failed to cause any major debate. None of the EU texts managed so far to inspire citizens or stir any major debate that would contribute to the creation of a European demos.

I am also sceptical when it comes to the advantages of the EU in foreign affairs that are mentioned in the Speech, one of them being the idea of the EU’s strength of effective multilateralism. Indeed, there has been an increase in frequency of multi-lateral contacts. There are too many roundtables, too many discussions, too many meetings and frequent exchanges of views. However, this frenetic activity does not necessary guarantee results. Many of the multilateral fora are simple talk shops with no appetite for action.

Howorth also claims that the EU engages in an intensifying circle of complex interdependence. But is this intensifying circle of interdependence characterised by ‘deepening’ or simply by a loose enlargement of themes and actors? A simple glimpse of the external relations of the EU shows that little has been achieved. Relationships with Russia remain inconclusive with none of the two players (EU/Russia) knowing what they really want to make out of the bilateral relationship. The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy is undermined by national priorities and institutional weaknesses. No major plan exists on how to deal with the rise of China. The EU-US relationship is not characterised by effective synergy. In short, the EU is good in talking about interdependence but I am hardly convinced it knows how to deal with it.

It is positive that the EU has understood the importance of combining civilian and military instruments in foreign policy. As the author claims, international crisis management is an added value which the EU is well-placed to deliver. However, the inertia that follows the actorness of the EU in the field of crisis management isn’t.

The same accounts for the EU’s ‘radical IR approach’ that the author mentions. The EU simply says too many good words but in most cases is unwilling to act. And I still remain sceptical on Howorth’s sentence ‘where human rights become as important as states rights’. A look at the sanctions of the EU on human rights abuse shows that they only happen in a small number of cases, against small countries where no major financial interests are endangered.

Howorth also describes a ‘new acquis’ in International affairs which has to take the form of a Global Bargain. According to Howorth, ‘[t]he global grand bargain will involve a necessary series of trade-offs, some bilateral, some multilateral, between the rising and the declining powers’. In addition, ‘[w]hat the new grand narrative should aim for is a world of cultural and political diversity in which, nevertheless, stability, security, prosperity, development, environmental sustainability, and self-determination are considered in holistic terms as key elements of global inter-dependence’ (p. 6). But isn’t this process already been taking place for a long time? Isn’t cultural and political diversity already being part of the EU’s dealings? Aren’t these ideas already part of the European Security Strategy?

Howorth is on the pro-European side and has always seen the EU in an optimistic way. However, optimism may well be part of the problem. The idea that ‘the EU can do it’ that many of the EU academics subscribe to (including myself) may have led to a general climate of self-satisfaction, arrogance and laziness. The idea that the EU is able to move on by a series of mini developments (an idea mentioned in many academic texts) also helps to perpetuate inertia. The message that should be transmitted by the academic circles is that the EU should run to catch up the lost time. ‘Run before you get completely marginalised’ rather than rest on your laurels and improve.

No one disagrees with the fact that there has to be a new type of EU motivation in both EU internal and external affairs. But what kind of motivation can this be? Boredom has replaced enthusiasm. Rigid EU bureaucracy has killed any form of innovation and creativity. Lacklustre political elites provide no vision and have no roadmap of values. A soul searching exercise is important: a reflection of where we stand and where we want to go is always useful provided the fact that it is based on true motives to improve. This may take the form of an EU Security and Defence Strategy. However, in order to fight the climate of inertia the EU must work with the aim of producing tangible results. Dynamic actions must accompany an integrated strategic thinking if the EU wants to be successful.

‘Strategy and the Importance of Defence Cooperation among EU Member States’ by Prof. Jolyon Howorth.

For a full copy of the speech please visit the Egmont Institute webpage:

http://www.egmontinstitute.be/

It has been a tough year for all of us. We have been bombarded with salary cuts, seen our friends dismissed from work and felt the consequences of the financial crisis in all aspects of our daily lives. Nothing has been more frightening than the daily “gloom and doom” situation that the media propagate.

The summer time provides the time for short-term escapism. And this is something we all need. Therefore, this article has a summer theme.

Can holidays save us? Europe is experiencing a period of stagnation. Tourism is one of the major EU industries but requires special attention and planning. It is a sector that is doing well but can be developed further. The Lisbon Treaty provides room for further progress in this particular field. Discussions are already taking place at the EU level on the prospects for tourism. Nevertheless, EU plans should not remain on paper. The EU should grasp the opportunity to extend its policy remit. Such policy extension requires imaginative responses to problems and a combination of instruments from various EU policy fields, as tourism cross-cuts many other EU policies (environment, economy, regional development). If the EU wants to be productive in the field of tourism it has to be more flexible and creative. It has to set up clearly defined targets and engage all the different actors in tourism in a bottom-up manner.

The right to have a holiday has been consolidated after long social battles. It is interesting to see how European citizens see it as an “acquis”. The travel/holiday sector has been in decline due to the financial crisis but did not suffer a catastrophic blow. The latest statistics show that the sector is on the road to gradual recovery.

I see all the “ups” and “downs” of tourism, as I come from a tourist destination, an island of the Aegean Sea called Mykonos. I feel privileged to have grown up in Mykonos. It is a beautiful island with traditional white houses, windmills, beaches and rocky scenery. It has many facets – archaeological (neighbouring Delos was one of the most important Ancient Greek cities), folkloric (a multiple number of feasts, religious celebrations, cultural events), natural (unspoilt beaches, rocky spaces, sun, sea), and recreational (party atmosphere, relaxation). One should not forget the hospitality of its people, who have made the island a very special destination for all kinds of visitors.

Mykonos is a hub of multiculturalism. It is open to people from all backgrounds and all aspects of life. It has never been “exclusive”. It is a cosmopolitan place, a global mosaic, a real picture of our ecumenical world. Everybody is welcome: no ageism or sexism is permitted. Mykonos hosts many different “tribes”: party animals, curious visitors, beach lovers, fashion people, artists. There is an uninstitutionalised respect for “minorities” as the island has a strong gay following. Mykonos is a place which put into practice “acceptance” long before it became the norm. I sometimes feel that Mykonos does a lot more to fight stereotypes than many of the established national/EU policies. Tourists make new friends in the island and they meet each other there every year. There has been a strong link between tourists and the local people who treat them as more than mere customers. Tourism is a form of culture and communication. Many of the tourists we met through the years became our friends, and play a part in our lives. We were invited to their weddings, visited them in their places of residence, felt their pain in difficult moments, and shared the sorrow when they lost a relative or a partner.

Mykonos is a small part of the world that has been at the forefront of changes: various artistic, musical and fashion trends occupied the island for as long as they lasted. Mykonos also became a hot spot for sexual liberation. It survived the HIV epidemic and struggles with drugs. It has paid the price of uneven environmental protection and unplanned construction. It now faces the burden of the financial crisis. Over the years, the island has changed a lot. From a trendy hippy destination to a place that the media portrays as an endless binge drinking party. Spontaneous communication has been threatened by big impersonal bars and a nouveau riche lifestyle.

Still, notwithstanding some negative development, the island has the power to keep much of its beauty intact. It is a “topos” where different wishes can be fulfilled. Nevertheless, it requires special attention, and I do hope that Mykonos will become a space where policies of alternative touristic development will be developed in the near future.

Below the superficial surface of the media coverage of Mykonos one can see that the local people have their own worries and problems. Life was never easy for the islanders and it is not easy today. Inhabitants of islands have long suffered from the cut-off effects of insularity. Still they manage, as they have a strong spirit of survival. It is worth talking to local people in order to grasp their feelings and fears. Each year is one of agony. Will tourists come? What will be the impact of the crisis? What will happen with the water reserves? Will there be enough boat connections with Piraeus? What about our lives? The education of our children? When will we have sufficient medical coverage in our local health centre?

For many of us, Mykonos offers a space for self-reflection and peace. It offers us the time to reconsider the practices of everyday life, to think about the future. The eternal light of the island is a source of energy and life that contrasts with the dark mediatised projections of our times. Mykonos inspired artists through the years. It still inspires today. It makes you inward-looking as you want to stare at the sea and think. It also makes you extroverted as you want to go out and communicate with the different “tribes” of the island.

I would like to wish you a happy holiday. For those of you who will be visiting Mykonos, just give me a shout. I will be the one sitting in front of the port café with my books, notes and laptop, agonising over the future of the EU. Research never ends!

As an academic I always have to invent new ways to stimulate the minds of students. As personalities always matter in politics, I thought that it would be interesting to mention to students the idea of different leadership styles.

As the discussion evolved, I asked students to compare and contrast different leaders, in order to see commonalities and differences, and then to present their findings. One of these presentations focused on the Merkel -Thatcher way of leadership.

I know that some of you may have objections regarding this particular exercise. Besides, the time and conditions of the reign of these two personalities differ considerably. Still, there are certain striking similarities that are worth mentioning. Some of them follow.

Both Thatcher and Merkel started out as nice, caring, smiling ladies and ended up being butchers of the welfare state. They both implemented (or are about to) major budget cuts and became responsible for rising levels of unemployment.

They are both neo-liberal, big business friendly and pro-market. They followed the path of ‘cuts for the many, benefits for the few’. Both demonised the poor and the unemployed. Merkel targeted poor kids benefits (Hartz IV) –although her attack on the welfare state was milder to that of Thatcher. Thatcher got the free milk out from schools and cut down public funding drastically. In the meantime, fat cats were left free to earn as much as they wished. Brokers were encouraged to speculate on financial products that brought the demise of the financial system.

By attacking social benefits and welfare in general, the two “Iron Ladies” became social consensus breakers, thus marking a new phase in the political scene of their respective countries. However, in the case of Germany one has to admit that many of Merkel’s current policies were initiated by the former Red-Green coalition.

Former UK Prime Minister Edward Heath could never understand how it was that Margaret Thatcher that was elected as Tory leader. It also seems that Helmut Kohl and Helmut Schmidt have their own objections to Merkel’s handling of European and financial affairs.

Thatcher and Merkel both played with populist tabloid instincts – although Merkel is a latecomer in this game. Thatcher nurtured the obsessions of the tabloid newspapers by attacking weak sections of society, trade unions, homosexuals and the so-called “loony left”. It seems that Merkel takes a similar path against the welfare state, although in a milder sort of way.

Nevertheless, Greece was another victim of the Merkel attack, as the German Chancellor demonised a country of the South (which only accounts for 2% of the GDP of the Eurozone) for all the evils of the current financial system. It seemed that Greece became the scapegoat for all the problems of Germany, Europe and the world.

Neither Thatcher nor Merkel is renowned for their diplomatic manners.

The actions of the two can be seen as an exercise in Euro-cautiousness. Merkel adopted the Thatcher style of the stubborn “No, no, no” in the negotiations for a European Financial Stability Fund. Thatcher preferred to have a special relationship with the USA rather than invest in a strong UK-EU relationship.

Merkel did not boycott the EU in the way Thatcher did. Still, she has not managed to create strong relations with other European leaders. She failed to cooperate with her European partners when it was necessary, thus allowing the financial crisis to snowball to the proportions of an avalanche. Her snobbery toward the EU came at a high cost, as her actions undermined the stability of the Euro.

It is worth mentioning that neither of the two women managed to maintain a good working relationship with France.

Thatcher was seen as pro-militarist. She even led the UK to war with Argentina over the Falklands. Although Merkel did not support the US’s Iraq invasion, she declared herself in favour of further involvement of German troops in Afghanistan. Germany became one of the major troop contributors to Afghanistan, although protests in German society are still strong on this issue.

Another similarity with Thatcher is that Merkel adopts a patronising style of politics – only she seems to know what is good. Their failure to take into account social sensitivities and intellectual analyses seems to be a common point of weakness.

What about the results of the Thatcher/Merkel policies? The British Prime Minister left us with a “Reaganised” world, the German Chancellor left us with a “Merkelised Europe”, as a fellow EUobserver blogger recently mentioned.

We have seen the disastrous results of Thatcherism. Now we are living through a revival of Thatcherism under the reign of Angela Merkel. The image of a leaderless, weak and socially drained Europe is gradually being consolidated in the minds of its citizens and the citizens of the whole world.

Everybody hoped that having a common currency would lead to united action against speculation. It did not happen, though – and Merkel is much to blame for that. Another opportunity was lost, another “hour of Europe” has not come. And how bored a political scientist becomes by recounting the same Euro failures again and again over the years! It seems that very little changes in Euroland.

One may (grotesquely) argue that it was in Thatcher’s interest to maintain a weak Europe. She had a privileged partnership with the USA and a good personal relationship with Ronald Reagan.
US-UK cooperation in the financial field was and remains strong. Under Thatcher, London became a hub of US financial interests. The Pound is a matter of UK national pride. There was never any great interest in joining a common currency. Nor there was a tradition of confederalism that could serve as a European model of organisation.

But what did Germany win by the weakening of the EU and the Euro? The answer is nothing.

It will be interesting to see what the future holds for Merkel, now that she is becoming a bit of an electoral liability. Thatcher left politics in a disgraced manner as her own party staged a coup d’état against her leadership. Will Merkel end her political career this way too?

I have recently published a paper on the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) for the Centre for European Policy Studies. The paper analyses some of the major provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that impact upon the CSDP. It argues that although some of these provisions sound positive on paper, they will not necessarily enhance the development of a common strategic culture. And without the consolidation of such a culture, the CSDP cannot deliver ambitious results.

The strategic culture of the EU is defined as: “the ideas and values of Brussels-based ESDP officials regarding the current and potential use of force as well as their practices on the deployment of police and military instruments in various ESDP missions”. The strategic culture of the EU consists of ideas, values and policy practices, which are manifested in the way missions are discussed and planned.

As it is argued in the paper, with the establishment of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1999, the EU aimed to tackle challenges in the field of security by deploying various police and military missions in troubled crisis areas. The consolidation of the CSDP raised hopes for the EU’s role in external affairs. However, the majority of CSDP missions are still on a small scale. Strategic disagreements among EU partners persist on issues of UN legality, NATO neutrality and the geographic deployment of missions. This lack of consensus is due to a lack of common ideas, values and practices regarding the use of police and military force in Europe. In short: there is no solid EU strategic culture, although there are some primary elements of consensus.

Various institutional innovations have been included in the Lisbon Treaty in order to address the cohesion and effectiveness problem of the EU. However, this policy paper adopts a more ‘constructivist’ approach, arguing that ‘ideas matter’. Unless the EU acquires its own solid strategic culture, it will not be able to act in an efficient way in the field of security and defence. The acquisition of such a strategic culture is no easy task. Member state strategic cultures have been strongly consolidated, since they have followed the identity formation of their own national identities. The EU needs to engage in a construction of its own strategic culture that will combine elements of the strategic cultures of its member states, but since the strategic cultures of EU states are somewhat contradictory (e.g., ‘Atlanticist’ versus ‘Europeanist’), the difficulty of such a task can be appreciated.

Nevertheless, due to the successful development of CSDP, it can be argued that the EU possesses its own nascent strategic culture, characterised by certain values and ideas. This strategic culture has the Petersberg Tasks at its epicentre and is characterised by a selective approach to humanitarian crises. The strategic culture of the EU is based on a selective protection of human rights and the promotion of law. The EU humanitarian agenda is still important, as most CSDP missions have a humanitarian background. However, these terms have not found their way into clearly defined EU strategies and remain loose and open to interpretation, as may fit the different (and conflicting) interests of the EU member states.

Although the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty may bring some positive amendments to the CFSP/CSDP, it is highly unlikely that these institutional developments alone will provide the stimulus for further robust external action. The strategic culture of the EU suffers from a lack of defined EU interests as well as from the insistence of EU member states on maintaining intergovernmentalism as the main form of decision-making. Different geographic approaches among EU states and the cultural differences between ‘new’-er and ‘old’-er EU nations constitute a hindrance to its development. Other issues also manifest its weakness; the Atlanticist strategic culture of the EU being one, and the nature of the EU-US relationship still needs to be properly defined. Furthermore, the importance of a UN Security Council mandate prior to the undertaking of CSDP missions remains important but is not accepted by all countries as the primary prerequisite for strategic action.

The strategic actorness of the CSDP is mostly limited to relatively small missions. Such cautiousness risks rendering the CSDP a repository of small symbolic humanitarian missions with little impact on the global geopolitical agenda. If the CSDP is to succeed it needs both the political will to proceed with the CSDP agenda and a concrete signal of engagement in its capabilities. The era of being content with mini-institutional developments at EU level is over. The EU needs firm commitment to common projects and a generous dose of self-criticism in order to move forward. The EU cannot simply hide behind the gaps in the Lisbon Treaty. It has to assume more responsibility if it wants to count as a global actor.

‘Common Security and Defence Policy and the Lisbon Treaty Fudge: No common strategic culture, no major progress’ by Vasilis Margaras

For a free copy of the report please check the following link:

http://www.ceps.eu/book/common-security-and-defence-policy-and-lisbon-treaty-fudge-no-common-strategic-culture-no-major

The government of the Balearic islands has recently presented a Declaration called ‘Proposals for improving the way island territories are dealt with by European Regional Policy’. The document came in the form of a Final Declaration after the conclusion of the Summit on the recognition of insularity in the European Regional Policy that took place in Palma de Mallorca on 26th April. The Summit was attended by a large number of elected officials and civil servants, mainly from islands of the EU territory.

It is a fact that islands – in general being small entities – constitute the ‘weakest link’ in the EU. Many of them are located on the periphery of the EU, far from metropolitan regions and/or urban centres. They are characterised by sensitive environmental, social and economic structures. They are underepresented in the Brussels-based lobbies. Many EU islands are close to conflict zones and are exposed to clandestine immigration or other kinds of trafficking. They are vulnerable to accidental or deliberate marine pollution. For all these reasons, islands require special attention by the EU.

The Summit Declaration claims that a better assessment of the impact of insularity is necessary and that various insular conditions should be taken into account in the framing of EU policies. It also states that particular attention should be paid to islands when considering policies aimed at reducing the backwardness of the least favoured regions. This demand is in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty which recognises that islands suffer from a severe, and permanent, natural handicap.

According to the Declaration, GDP per region has been one of the main indicators in the shaping of European Cohesion policy. However, new social and environmental indicators must be used in the case of islands, in order to assess the state of insularity. Importation of goods or services, the absence of scale economies and the geographical handicaps that characterise many of the EU islands generally imply higher costs when it comes to policy implementation. Besides the mere acknowledgment of insularity, the EU should recognise that the resulting insularity handicaps have a cost. As the implementation of EU policies is more costly in an insular territory, the EU should therefore bear the extra costs. This recognition should lead to a better use of resources available in proportion to the severity of the particular disadvantages of each island.

Nevertheless, implementing an EU insular dimension is not an easy task. Measures and solutions cannot be uniformly applied to all EU islands without taking their diversity into account. The complex conditions of islands (archipelagos, mountainous islands with low density population, off-shore islands) should be taken into account. Particular care should be taken in order to avoid a situation where islands situated geographically close to a mainland are included in a larger statistical unit at Nuts 2 level, thus losing various benefits.

The Declarations suggest that at the EU level, a first step towards such an integrated approach would be the setting up of an “inter-services” group within the European Commission with responsibility for the islands, or more generally for all territories which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps.

Some issues related to insularity have been already integrated in the field of maritime transport policy. However, a coordinating ‘all inclusive’ approach is necessary to cover other policy fields such as transport, education, research, the environment, agriculture/fisheries, health care, migration and culture. Such a practice would facilitate a better implementation of EU policies and would limit the side effects of damaging economic factors on insular territories. It would also lead to a better synergy and efficiency among different EU policy tools.

Overall, the Summit Declaration is a well-written and self-explanatory document. It provides various sound policy suggestions that should be taken into account by the EU. The Declaration constitutes a positive contribution on how EU Regional Policy can become more effective vis-à-vis insular territories. EU islands possess considerable potential for growth which remains underexplored. The Declaration makes some practical recommendations which, if implemented, will ensure that insularity becomes less of a handicap.

It is now up to the EU to adopt the ideas proposed in the Declaration so that the insular dimension can be fully incorporated within EU policies. Adopting an EU insular approach will improve the public image of the EU and will be seen as a proof that the EU is taking the specific peculiarities of its island territories into account and working to resolve the difficulties that its inhabitants are facing in their daily lives.

The 2nd Annual Conference of the Women Associations from the Cyclades Islands (Greece) was held on the 17-18th April in Mykonos. Amongst the topics that were covered at the Conference was the contribution of the EU to gender issues. It was mentioned that the EU record on gender is a mixed one.

The idea of gender equality has a long history in EU integration as it has been included in the Founding Treaty of the European Union. Throughout the years, the increasing influence of the EU as a legislative and political body also had an impact on gender policies. The EU may be boastful about some of its achievements, most notably in the field of employment, such as EU legislation to fight labour discrimation, imposition of equal pay and promotion of equal opportunities at work. Furthermore, due to elite interaction at the EU level, various norms have been also transposed to the national level (e.g. issues of proportional representation of women, measures of positive discrimination etc).

However, gender related achievements in other policy fields such as health and social policy remain modest. The resources that are attributed to gender related projects are still minimal and have a limited impact upon the amelioration of the position of women in society. Although progress has been achieved through the inclusion of the gender dimension in various EU funded projects, much remains to be done in order to improve effectiveness and performance.

The results after all these years of European integration still remain unsatisfactory. Poverty amongst women remains higher than that of men in the EU. Women are less paid than men and obstacles still exist when it comes to women moving up the hierarchy ladder in their own perspective professions. Issues of human trafficking, violence and prostitution still need to be tackled successfully in order to better protect the female population. Gender mainstreaming has to be introduced in all EU policy areas so that issues that affect women could be taken into account in all policy fields. Furthermore, a lot more needs to be done in order to achieve higher levels of equality in rural and insular areas.

Unfortunately, rather than attributing higher importance to all the above mentioned issues, the gender agenda has been downgraded from the list of EU priorities in the last ten years. The optimism of the early 1990s gave way to the passivity of the Barosso Commission and the lack of enthusiasm on behalf of most EU member states regarding gender issues. Europe gradually became more conservative as reactionary political forces took over in many of the EU member states. The growth of religious fundamentalism, populism and extreme right wing movements brought back a reactionary discourse in EU politics which does not contribute to the feminist cause.

Things got worse with the current economic crisis which hits women disproportionately. The cuts in public services affect them twofold. On one hand, cuts in public service jobs threaten an employment area which has been so far friendly in providing women with relatively safe jobs. Cuts in other services such as the provision of health and childcare also render women lives difficult as they have to assume a disproportionate burden of care for the children and the elderly. It is also proven that in times of crisis, incidents of violence against women increase.

The gender agenda needs to be always at the forefront of EU decision-making. In times of crisis ‘gender justice’ becomes even more imperative. The EU has an ethical duty to attribute to women what they really deserve. Thus, it is important to keep up the momentum on issues that affect women -which anyway constitute more than half of the total EU population. At times where EU popularity reaches historic lows, EU high officials should not forget that the effort to make the EU more popular also passes through the promotion of gender issues.

Vasilis Margaras