Let’s add a few more qualifiers. Your friend is bigger and more powerful than you. It shouldn’t matter, but of course it does. Meanwhile, there is a risk that in the future you may find yourself compelled to behave as your friend did. So, again, are you going to hand in those legal papers?

Such little quid pro quo deliberations were part and parcel of the ‘old’ stability and growth pact – the rules underpinning the euro that were famously applied with something approaching vigour to smaller countries and not at all to France and Germany.

(The rules have since been revamped to make sanctions “semi-automatic” under the a series of EU laws (the six pack) that came into force in December. Essentially the rules mean member states can no longer ignore European Commission deficit warnings. And the commission has already flexed its muscles to this effect – although, not yet, it has to be said, against any member state of consequence.)

Over, duplicating and beyond the ‘six pack’ is the Fiscal Compact – the Berlin-pushed document agreed at the January summit that seeks to virtually outlaw budget deficits, by having the signatories implement a balanced budget rule.

Only, thanks to the UK’s not-entirely-relevant fit of pique over the City of London during December’s European summit, it is not a normal EU treaty but an intergovernmental one.

So all these little considerations about whether you really want to take your misbehaving larger neighbour to court are once more on the table. This is because the core of the treaty – this balanced budget rule – can only be enforced by member states policing one another. (Liberal MEP Guy Verhofstadt has some useful figures on this – member states have taken the legal route against one another just six times in the EU’s history).

The only role for the European Commission is to issue a report on whether member states have properly implemented the debt brake.

EU officials are now working on scenarios to make this highly political sanctions process as de-politicised and automatic as possible.

A declaration in order to make sure “there is no doubt about who should act” in the event of a negative commission report is supposed to be tacked onto the fiscal treaty, due to be signed by EU leaders at the beginning of March.

One option under consideration would be for the EU presidency country to do the job. Technically any of the 25 signatories could make the legal move – although things could be awkward if it was a small (non euro) country taking a large euro country to court.

So far, France and Germany have deftly avoided being too precise on this. When German chancellor Angela Merkel was asked after the January summit if she could envisage Berlin taking Paris to court for failing to adopt a balanced budget rule, she said:

“I cannot imagine taking legal action against France because I cannot imagine that France will not institute a golden rule.”

The point came up during a TV interview with French President Nicolas Sarkozy on Monday evening.

“We are not making the debt brake in order to bring each other to court but out of the deep conviction that we want to keep the rule,” said the chancellor adding that it should not be thought of in terms of one country going against another but rather “something must be changed because there is not enough thought about the future.”

Yes it is all a bit academic at the moment. But the treaty is not popular. And French presidential elections in April may see the anti-treaty socialist contender Francois Hollande voted into office. In which case the wording of the declaration will become very interesting indeed. Although, given Merkel’s utterly dismissive treatment of Hollande to date, Germany and France would likely no longer be friends anyway.

By the time French elections come about – the first round is on 22 April – the treaty will have been signed by President Nicolas Sarkozy but not ratified by parliament.

Hollande has promised to renegotiate the treaty if he wins. “If he is elected, he will ask for the renegotiation of this treaty to complete it and rebalance it … to get Europe out of its spiral of austerity,” his campaign manager Pierre Moscovici said Tuesday. Indeed, Hollande, who would be the first Socialist president in 17 years, has said his first trip abroad if he wins would be to Berlin.

He wants more focus on growth and has spoken out in favour of a greater role for the European Central Bank and the creation of eurobonds.  Good – he is in campaign mode. He can say what he likes without being constrained by the political realities of a) office or b) the wishes of other member states.

Still, the latest opinion poll gives him 31 percent support. Sarkozy – who has yet to declare his candidacy – has 24.5 percent.   Sarkozy’s camp are saying it is not possible to renegotiate after the president’s signature. Certainly it would be difficult and it would depend on what other member states  (many of whom – Italy, Spain, Lisbon, Athens, Dublin – need Berlin) say.

But the Socialists have had a similar such experience in the past. In 1997 they kicked up a fuss about the stability pact – the rules underpinning the euro – and threatened to renegotiate it.  Eventually they won some small concessions including having the pact named the stability and growth pact.

(Technically, France does not have to ratify the fiscal compact for it to come into force elsewhere. It goes into effect once 12 of the 17 eurozone countries have ratified it. Politically, of course, is another matter entirely. France refusing to ratify the treaty would poison relations between Paris and Berlin. Hollow out the point of the treaty as France has a long record of high public spending. And cause more uncertainty in the markets.)

Merkel has been pushing the treaty saying that a fiscal discipline pact will calm markets – not to say her backbenchers – but there are real fears that its belt-tightening focus may compound Europe’s economic misery.  And French people are already jittery. Unemployment is at its highest rate in 12 years. Tough austerity measures have been taken. More will come. Hollande’s anti-treaty rhetoric may well strike a scapegoat chord.

In that sense, Merkel’s remarkable offer to make campaign appearances with Sarkozy is very tricky. Sarkozy, assuming he runs, will have to judge whether Merkel is good for his image or whether the German chancellor becomes associated in French voters’ minds with austerity and job loss.

She appears to be reaching the outer limits of good will, at least as far as her EU counterparts are concerned.

The proposal for an EU budget tsar specifically for Greece – revealed by the Financial Times – appeared to be a step too far. Sent to eurozone finance ministries on Friday afternoon, the proposal said the new budget commissioner

 “will have broad surveillance competences over public expenditure and a veto right against budget decisions not in line with the set budgetary targets and the rule giving priority to debt service.”

 It goes on:

Greece has to ensure that the new surveillance mechanism is fully enshrined in national law, preferably through constitutional amendment.

The language is reminiscent a school head reprimanding a wayward child. It was always going to be leaked at some stage over the weekend. Greek politicians reacted with fury.

The idea did not find fertile ground else where either. Sweden gave it the most fulsome backing ahead of Monday’s summit but even then the prime minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, limited himself to saying he understood Germany’s “frustration”.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy defended Merkel in the first half of his response to a journalist’s question on the issue noting ”it is not a position that was expressed, or still less defended by Chancellor Merkel,”  but he went on to add that the idea not democratic, reasonable or effective. Austria and Finland, traditional allies in the belt-tightening camp, were also dismissive of the proposal.

Merkel herself tackled the issue during the summit’s press conference with both Berlin and Brussels in mind.

She took refuge in conclusions by eurozone leaders in October which called for continued on-the-ground surveillance in Greece. “Therefore, in terms of quality it is nothing new.” She made it clear she wants increased surveillance of Greece’s reform pace – but did not mention the budget overseer idea in particular. The tightrope again.

The fiscal compact – agreed by 25 member states on Monday – is the tightrope in black and white. It enshrines German thinking into its short 16 articles. The debt brake is the major domestic hook. Here is what Merkel said on it yesterday:

“The debt brakes will be binding and valid forever. Never will you be able to change them through a parliamentary majority.”

Most of the rest is either already in EU law or on its way in. Still, for all its slightness, it could raise difficulties. Dublin will be under tremendous political pressure to hold a referendum – even if the legalities say otherwise. A poll for the Sunday Business Post found that 72 percent want to have a say on this issue. A referendum on a treaty that was written largely for German domestic consumption and which will not solve the crisis at hand. That is a big political ask.

It was Merkel’s summit on Monday. She got her treaty. But her EU partners are going to be looking for something in return. The question is – will she be able to deliver?

Merkel is de facto in charge of the running the eurozone. She is criticised on substance. But her style of delivery has not helped. Many see it as prescriptive and lacking in passion. To her critics, she has – particularly at the onset of the crisis – missed occasions to say why the eurozone is worth saving, how Germans benefit from it and what Germans will lose if it all collapses.

Part of this reticence is due to personality, part due to the fact that she is mindful of the restive parliament and constitutional court behind her. (These last considerations have been directly responsible for the fiscal compact, cementing the German fiscal view of the world into one little unloved and not very useful intergovernmental pact).

Criticism about enshrining fiscal and monetary rigour into the fiscal pact has increased lately. Opponents point to duplication with current or in-the-pipeline laws and, more importantly, say the focus on balanced budgets could prolong the economic crisis.

In any case, the latent resentment over Germany’s fiscal union has obscured Merkel’s other plan for Europe – the political union.

In an interview with five newspapers published on Wednesday, Merkel – in typical understated way – outlines her vision for the future.

The Guardian reports her as saying:

“My vision is one of political union because Europe needs to forge its own unique path. We need to become incrementally closer and closer, in all policy areas. Over a long process, we will transfer more powers to the [European] Commission, which will then handle what falls within the European remit like a government of Europe. That will require a strong parliament.”

A kind of second chamber, if you like, will be the council comprising the heads of [national] government. And finally, the supreme court will be the European court of justice. That could be what Europe’s political union looks like in the future – some time in the future, as I say, and after a goodly number of interim stages.”

She made similar but less defined remarks in front of German parliament following the summit of EU leaders in December noting that “this common sense of responsibility will remain with us far beyond the crisis.”

“Some time in the future” is pure Merkelese – she spent much of last year reminding eurozone watchers – the entire globe these days – that a solution will not appear overnight but only in many year. Nevertheless it is a remarkably bold vision for Europe. It is also remarkably different to current thinking in France. And, of course, Britain.  Which will lead to the “goodly number of interim stages” she refers to.

Some of these points applied to other treaty-making rounds. But not all of them at once.

The whole point of this treaty exercise – which is using an inconvenient intergovernmental track because of the UK – is political.

Germany needs some sort of pact that makes it look like it will be almost impossible for member states to be big and careless spenders in the future. A fiscal straitjacket. The document could then be served up when Germans are feeling unenthusiastic about mutualising eurozone debt,  or greater involvement of the European Central Bank, for example.

The problem is most of what is in the slim draft (now 16 articles) could simply be done using the normal EU law-making procedures.

The six-pack of economic governance legislation – in place since mid-December – already represents a ground-breaking shift in Brussels’ relations with member states when it comes to budget matters.

New legislation, announced in November, consolidates these budgetary powers still further, giving the commission even greater discretionary powers over national spending.

So what is left? Not much but still two things to which Berlin remains very attached – a constitutional debt brake and automatic sanctions for excessive deficit countries. These cannot be done via the current treaties.

But the “fiscal compact” is having difficulty delivering on just these two points. Language requiring a debt brake to be written into national constitutions has been softened when compared to earlier versions, to head off any referendums.

Meanwhile the very (German-esque) essence of the treaty – namely language getting fiscal miscreants to cut their deficits – has also been softened.

Under the latest draft, member states may ignore the tough budget deficit limits in case of an “unusual event” or a “severe economic downturn.” Echoes of the not very forceful Stability and Growth Pact. Language allowing the European Commission to take member states to court for not implementing the debt brake has also gone. Instead member states should take one another to court. An unlikely proposition.

Mario Draghi, head of the European Central Bank, and inventor of term fiscal compact had this to say of it on Thursday:

“The wording of such rules needs to be unambiguous and effective.” Hardly a ringing endorsement.

MEPs say the latest draft does not reflect the actual discussions. Technically what the parliament thinks does not matter. But if it were to ultimately reject the outcome, it would make it harder to get the document through national parliaments.

The European Commission will not accept any conflict with EU treaties or establishment of parallel structures. France, quite happy to have parallel structures, does not want the EU institutions having too many powers

Meanwhile, no one wants to set off a national referendum if at all possible.

It is hard to imagine what will emerge by end of January when EU leaders are supposed to give the nod to the first draft.

In sum: up to 26 member states are set to forge ahead with an intergovernmental ‘Fiscal Compact’ treaty. Only Britain has refused to join.

Recriminations about the summit are already flying around. The dramatic outcome seems to have come about as a result of underestimation on both sides. British Prime Minister David Cameron underestimated the effect that his demand for a full protocol on having a veto in financial services regulation – and thus a reintroduction of a veto in the internal market – would have.  The others underestimated the pressure Cameron is under to deliver to his eurosceptic backbenchers.

Late-night, lack of sleep, dynamics surely also played a role. And suddenly by 5.30am on Friday morning, the die had been cast.

French president Nicolas Sarkozy was first off the mark to brief the press. And if the outcome could be perceived as pleasing anyone (aside from Tory eurosceptics, of course), it would arguably be those in the Elysee Palace.

An intergovernmental agreement, where the legal status of the EU institutions is in flux, fits well with a French view of how the European Union should look.

For everyone else, it is difficult to see where the good is.

Britain, the EU’s third largest economy, will now legally be beyond mainstream Europe. Politically it has always been so, and prided itself on being so. But it had a seat at the table. And it had allies. It is hard to see how Cameron will be able to effectively protect ‘The City’s’ interests, as he claims to have being doing, if London is only a bit player in the EU set-up. Was this the outcome London wanted? (Tellingly, while Sarkozy rushed out to tell the press his version of events, it took Cameron about half an hour to appear).

For Germany, too, it is a poor result. Berlin had pushed for full EU treaty change. More than any other country it wants more Europe to solve the eurozone crisis.  It is now stuck with what is by its own admission a “second-best” solution.  Sarkozy’s interview with Le Monde, published Monday, will remind Berlin of this.   “We will not delegate our economic sovereignty to others,” the president said.

A full treaty change would have been difficult to implement. And there was little appetite for it. But the scale of the process – with MEPs, MPs, and member states – could have resulted in some balancing of the ‘Fiscal Compact’ agreed on at the summit. The  Compact is about discipline only. Solidarity and growth are not addressed. (And Ireland may have a referendum anyway).

So what are we left with? A fundamental change in the state of EU affairs.  The 17 eurozone states are now the core of the EU. (“It should be recognized that another Europe is emerging: that of the eurozone,” Sarkozy told Le Monde). Tied to these countries are up to nine others who have pledged, pending approval by their parliaments, to get on board too. In the third tier, currently in isolation but possibly to be joined by others in future, is Britain.

All this for an inadequate deal that has once again failed to draw a line under the eurozone crisis.

Here is a list of some of the grumbles / issues.

Tightening economic governance in the eurozone -  there are several options.

Full-blown EU treaty change – with all the Pandora-box-drama that this potentially entails

The 17 euro countries forge ahead with their own pact, and the European institutions – according to the Franco-German letter sent Wednesday – play “an important role”. This new accord should be “integrated into EU law as soon as possible”. This is legally and politically difficult. Would need the agreement of all 27 member states.

The protocol 12 option – European Council President Herman Van Rompuy pulled this legal trick out of a hat on Tuesday. This would see Article 126, para 14 – previously unknown to most of Brussels – put into action. This allows protocol 12 – outlining excessive deficit steps – to be changed simply by agreement among EU leaders. Much, though not all (extended ECJ power), of economic governance rule-tightening could be shoved into Protocol 12. However, the final outcome would likely still have to be approved by the UK parliament.

The treaty change question has opened a whole subset of complaining.

The Germans still want to press ahead with full treaty change and have dismissed Van Rompuy’s protocol option as “trickery.” From Van Rompuy’s side there is exasperation that Berlin is not prepared to accept this solution when there is so much reluctance among other member states to change the treaty. But Van Rompuy’s team is quietly confident that their solution will prevail because it is the least complicated and the most legally sound (this last is a reference to the 17 plus EU institutions idea). German officials complain that others are not understanding the seriousness of the crisis and the need to take quick decisions – something bound to cause some spluttering as this is what Germany has been accused of from the very beginning.

The Franco-German letter, outlining what the economic governance future should hold, is also raising hackles.

The Finns say they cannot accept the proposal to introduce “super majority” decision-making when it comes to the permanent bailout fund (ESM). Finance minister Jutta Urpilainen called it an “alarming arrangement.” They are also against ruling out private sector involvement in future bailouts under the ESM. (In a major climbdown, Germany has agreed that language in the ESM treaty requiring insolvent countries to negotiate bondholder losses has been removed.)

Meanwhile proposals by Van Rompuy that the ESM be given a banking certificate have long been opposed by Berlin. Finland and the Netherlands are also unlikely to support this.

Ireland, which views EU treaty change through referendum-tinted specs,  is heading to the negotiation table wanting to make the terms of its EU-IMF bailout deal more flexible. It was thoroughly irritated at bilateral summit in Berlin last month when its demands to this end fell on deaf ears. It is now also alarmed by Paris and Berlin’s push for a common corporate tax base, something Dublin views as tax harmonisation, via the “back door”. (Incidentally, Enda Kenny, the Irish PM, is heading to the summit with 12 advisers, the Irish Times tells us).

Eurobonds are another bone of contention. Germany is refusing to consider the idea for now. But the European Commission and  Van Rompuy have kept it on the table. (This forms part of the solidarity/discipline debate. Those complaining about Germany’s solutions to the crisis say Berlin is only focussed on budgetary discipline. A fiscal union cannot exist without some form of  solidarity).

Financial transaction tax – France and Germany are eager to push ahead with this – mentioning it again in Wednesday’s letter. Fiercely opposed by the UK (with the biggest financial services sector in Europe), it is not much liked by the Netherlands either. Berlin and Paris also want to push head with pan-European regulation of finance. Again Britain is not a fan.

Role of the UK – This would need a whole separate blog to itself. Suffice to say that Prime Minister David Cameron, hemmed in by a fiercely eurosceptic Tory party, is heading to Brussels with fists raised and amid a flurry hardball statements on what he will and will not allow other member states to do.  Other countries, which normally allow for Cameron having to play to the domestic gallery, are increasingly exasperated by the tone.  However, the three options outline above would need to be oked by the UK in some way. Of most concern to the UK is it financial services sector. It is worried that if the 17 eurozone countries go off for a permanent huddle, they will opt for more protectionist measures that affect the internal market.

London is already extremely concerned about Sarkozy’s idea to have monthly meetings of eurozone leaders – not so much for the meeting themselves but for the fact that they are supposed to discuss competitivity and growth,  issues that ought to be discussed by all 27 member states, it says.

So where does that leave us? Possibly forgetting that, amid all this treaty talk, solutions are needed now, such as on boosting the current bailout fund (which has failed to attract investors in anything like the order of magnitude that is needed.)

Alarmingly the Germans have said they have no plans for the weekend. Other diplomats – possibly those with plans for the weekend – have suggested they think a deal will be place by Friday evening.

It’s anyone’s guess what the outcome will be. But the meeting could see agreement on all changes that would not trigger a referendum in Ireland and other countries (see this very helpful article), with a promise to carry out more profound treaty change further down the line.

2)   “Bazooka”. First coined by British Prime Minister David Cameron. It is apparently what the eurozone needs. And a big one at that. It’s proved a rather useful term for journalists and politicians alike as it can hide a multitude of solutions. Or nothing at all. Watch out for its use at the summit.

3)   And for eurozone phraseologists, Bazooka seems to have taken over from “doing whatever it takes” to save the eurozone.  This was a similarly catchall/nothing phrase. However, given past form, it is no longer possible to use it with a straight face.

4)   Whereas Bazooka sauntered at a leisurely enough pace into the eurozone disaster lexicon, Merkozy was something of an overnight sensation. Bild newspaper helped us with the visuals. One small quibble. Technically, as a true reflection of the duo’s relationship, it should really be Merkely.

5)    Fiscal Compact. Not a (painful-sounding) medical procedure. But what the *European Central Bank wants in return for going on a spending spree.

6)   * Nobody is really allowed to talk about this institution, as otherwise its independence might be compromised. The omerta-type deal can be gotten around by expressing confidence in the fact that  the * will act in such and such way in a given set of circumstances. A la Sarkozy.

7) Eurozone “Ins and Outs”. The Ins say thank god we were in the eurozone when the crisis happened. The outs say thank god we weren’t. Some Outs remain keen to get in (and some were keen but are less so now). No Ins are allowed to talk about getting out. But one In was told in no uncertain terms it would become an Out if it persisted with its revolutionary ask-the-people chat. It is not legally clear how an In could revert to being an Out. This is self-fulfilling prophecy territory. So no one talks about it. All Outs want a seat at the In’s decision-making table. One Out, in particular, wants a seat at the table but only to make sure it can stop the Ins doing anything it doesn’t like. This makes the Gallic In very angry indeed. The Teutonic In is the only In that matters though.

8)) Treaty-making. Germany wants an exercise in EU treaty change that would involve all the Ins and Outs. France is much keener to see the Ins forge ahead and make their own little intergovernmental agreement together. In the absence of any common EU institution to enforce such an agreement’s rules, France may ultimately feel obliged to call the shots. For the rest, it is a case of deciding which is the lesser of two evils.

9) By quirk of circumstance, ok a court ruling, Ireland’s opinion matters in this treaty debate. It has a potent card to play. It’s called the “oh-oh-that-looks-like-a-referendum-triggering-transfer-of-power-to-the-EU-level” card. Oh the power of the people!

10) The summit will be an occasion to see Herman Van Rompuy again. Last seen at the October summit where he was tasked to look at ways to sort out the eurozone crisis. Including treaty change. Until Germany and France decided to do that for him. Now he will receive the Franco-German proposals on Wednesday, in time to make them look right for Thursday. He’s good for a crisis though. No histrionics. A haiku here and there. It will be nice to see him again.

11) The summit has make or break billing but that is relatively simple stuff. Thousands of journalists will remember with horror the byzantine deals agreed in July and October involving private sector involvement in Greece’s rescue plans. It was of some comfort to find out that EU officials did not understand them either.  This summit should be clear as day by comparison.

12) S&P’s is being given credit for spurring the EU into action. But it does not work alone. French President Sarkozy’s suggestion on Monday that eurozone states meet every month until the crisis is ended should surely prove sufficient enough threat to finally bring the single currency’s crisis to an end.

Kenny, according to one account by someone familiar with the meeting, said he did not think so.

The government is in a political and legal bind on this issue. Even since 1987, following a Supreme Court ruling, all major treaty changes have been put to a referendum.

The ruling held that treaty changes involving the transferral of more powers to the EU should be approved by the people.

Of course this is subject to interpretation. Calling a referendum is a political decision as Irish officials are now reminding journalists.

But if Dublin were to decide not to have a referendum, it would leave itself open to charges that it is ducking the issue. It would also leave itself open to a court challenge further down the line.

Ireland’s potential referendum – it took four referendums and lots of political sweat to pass the Nice and Lisbon Treaties – gives it some sway over the talks at the EU summit at the end of this week.

“If there is a transfer of competencies from the state to the EU level then a referendum will be required. If not, then it won’t,” Irish Europe Minister Lucinda Creighton told the Financial Times.

At a joint press conference on Monday, Merkel and her French counterpart Nicolas Sarkozy gave some indication about their thinking on EU treaty change. They  were at pains to stress that the European Court of Justice – whose powers is one of the hot topics of any future treaty – will not be able to annul national budgets.

Instead the court will be able to decide if a country is complying  with the ‘golden rule’ – to be agreed by all 17 eurozone countries – of balanced budgets.

This (fudged) language was intended for French Gaullist ears as much as anyone else. But these legalities will play a key role in whether Dublin feels it can reasonably argue that no referendum is needed.

The current political and economic climate does not favour a Yes. An Irish Times poll in October showing that just 28 percent would vote in favour of a proposal to change the Lisbon Treaty.

If Dublin does go down the referendum path, I expect to hear much more of the argument advanced by Enda Kenny in his State of the Union speech on Sunday.

 Let me be clear – Ireland supports stronger economic governance throughout Europe, and particularly in the Eurozone. In fact, the Irish people are paying the price now for the absence of such rules in the past.

This second line sounds like the beginning of a justification for voting Yes in any future referendum on a reworked EU treaty.

Further frictions have also surfaced.  Other member states resent the regular meetings between France and Germany to try and solve the crisis (although, from a purely results-based point of view, this resentment is somewhat irrational). While non-euro countries fear that they will not be in the room when plans that affect their future are drawn up by the 17 single currency states.

But for all those capitals grumbling about Germany’s EU leadership, and there is quite some grumbling, I would suggest a read of French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech in Toulon. As a small antidote.

Sarkozy spoke right out in favour of intergovernmentalism.

“The reform of Europe is not a march towards supra-nationality. Europe will reform itself by pragmatically drawing the lessons of the crisis. The crisis has pushed the heads of state and government to assume greater responsibilities because ultimately they have the democratic legitimacy to take decisions.”

“The integration of Europe will go the inter-governmental way because Europe needs to make strategic political choices.”

You can bet that an inter-governmental Europe – where the European Commission is minimalised – would not work in small states’ favour. In fact, it would most suit France (and Germany).

Later in the text, Sarkozy refers to “unwavering solidarity” in the eurozone to which all countries and institutions have to work towards.

“This is the raison d’etre of the government of the eurozone that France wanted and which will bring together all the heads of state and government to decide with one another.”

France is much more relaxed about the idea of a core Europe than Germany is. Berlin is pushing for EU treaty change to enshrine budget discipline in EU law. But Merkel wants it done with all 27 member states so it is easier to involve the European Commission and the European Court of Justice in the enforcement. And also simply because Merkel is against putting treaty divisions between those in and out of the euro.

(Although she has also threatened – as a “second best” option – to make an intergovernmental treaty among willing euro member states if this proves too difficult).

While German medicine is unpopular, and there is much to criticise about this endless prevaricating, Berlin does deserve praise for working to keep all 27 member states together.