How the European Parliament is in its element at the moment! Its de facto veto on the diplomatic service make-up – an issue that brings the institution within spitting distance of glamorous foreign policy – is making MEPs giddy with joy. A finger-wagging, puffed-up, here’s-my-list-of-demands, kind of joy.

The dynamics of this little power play are interesting to watch. At a debate hosted by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung last night, Poul Skytte Christoffersen, advisor to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, and Peter Tempel, head of European affairs in the German foreign ministry, laid out their views on the new EU diplomatic service (on which member states reached political agreement earlier this week.) Each finished by saying something to the effect  that they felt that they had taken many of parliament’s concerns on board and they hoped it would be enough for MEPs.

Then it was Polish MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski’s turn.

He smiled. And in the manner of someone turning down an invitation to dance, he pronounced the proposals “not sufficient.”

First noting that parliament felt “sidelined” in discussion in recent months, he then unfurled his notes and listed a series of complaints or concerns held by the EU assembly.

Here they with some replies and/or comments.

1) Political deputies should substitute Ms Ashton rather than civil servants so they are politically accountable. This is not foreseen in the treaties. There are two legal opinions on this. One says that if something is not foreseen in the treaty it is not allowed. According to Saryusz-Wolski, a legal opinion in the EP says that what is not forbidden is allowed. (Rather handy, these opinions.) Christoffersen, for his part, said Ashton was against the service becoming too “politicised.” (Which, I assume, means they don’t want parliament playing their political family games with the appointments.)

2) MEPs want ex-ante consultation on the main decisions and basic choices of foreign policy. Interestingly, Christofferesen, threw a line to MEPs here. “We think it is a natural thing that if we are about to plan an important CFSP mission that implies important cost, that parliament has a possibility to have its say on that mission.” (Personally, I think this would most likely open the door to parliament discussion on the ethics of the mission, somewhere that I am sure member states don’t want to go.)

3) Democratic scrutiny over development/external assistance policy

4) The trade committee is worried about trade policy and how it will be represented by the delegations

5) Appointees to senior posts should be heard before parliament

6) There should be political control over military part of the structure (not bureaucratic control).

7) There should be a single line of command between the centre and the delegations. In other words, they are against a commission suggestion that the commission gives direct orders to its officials in a delegation, by-passing the head of delegations, when it concerns a commission competence.

8.) MEPs have numerous doubts about the rights of discharge and budgetary control and transparency. (Here Christoffersen noted that Ashton will accept the same degree of budget discharge as the commission. Ashton will appear before the budgetary control committee if “there are things that need correction.” But he refused to have the EAS budget being part of the commission’s budget. Ashton wants budgetary autonomy for administration, including CFSP-related personnel, fearing that otherwise every little administrative change would have to go through torturous approval route inside the commission. Everything beyond the administrative budget would be managed by the commission, including operational expenditure.)

9) Geographical balance. This should be written into the staff regulation and not just a political promise. According to Saryusz-Wolski, 16 member states are already “highly under-represented” in the external relations DG according to a system of calculation drawn up by former commissioner Neil Kinnock. (Malta has achieved 0% of its quota; Bulgaria 16%; Cyprus 16%, Luxembourg 18%, Romania 18 %, Latvia 20%, Slovakia 22%, Poland 26%, Slovenia 28% Lithuania 33%, Estonia 33%, Czech Republic 36%, Hungary 44%, Germany 70%, UK 73%, Italy 95%). Good news for the Belgians though – they are massively over-represented. Indicative targets should be set by member states and there should be a temporary fast-track for those who are under-represented.  “How representative will the High Representative be if her service is not representative?,” asked Saryusz-Wolski. Well quite. (Christoffersen: We get the message. But be patient. I paraphrase.)

Communitarisation of EU foreign policy?

Some other interesting points in the discussion. Christoffersen, for long Denmark’s ambassador to the EU, firmly refuted parliament’s charge that the EAS is shaping up to be more intergovernmental than what it replaces. Suggesting that Peter Tempel might like to “close his ears for a moment” he said that the fact that CFSP is being brought closer to the commission will soon or later mean that CFSP decisions become a part of internal decision-making structures in the commission. He also noted commission officials will eventually appear in areas such as crisis management structures. Currently, these are manned only by national experts or council secretariat officials.

On numbers. Nobody knows exactly, it seems. But Christoffersen reckons around 600-700 people from the commission (AD level); 150 people from the council secretariat (excluding military personnel); and around 300 people from member states over the next two to three years.

On timing. Recent events, such as the Russia-Ukraine gas deal, show the urgent need to have the service in place to have an assessment of its implications. Meanwhile, the EU is reminded almost daily of the importance of other powers in the world. For the record, parliament’s approach will be “constructive but putting quality of the solutions above time requirements,” said Saryusz-Wolski. So no solution before summer is expected.

Giles Merrit of Friends of Europe asked perhaps the most pertinent question of the evening – namely what will the service actually do? Who will be in charge of, say, negotiating deals on Caspian gas. Will member states step aside? So deep were the panellists into the nitty gritty of the shape of the service that the question rather flummoxed them all. Christoffersen maintained that the service would at the very least enable the EU to sell its policies better. And to ensure that the right hand is knows what the left hand is doing – i.e. ideally a third country would not be told that an anti-dumping procedure was being started against them just as the EU is hoping to secure a return agreement on illegal immigrants with the same country.

This already an excessively long posting. My apologies. But I will finish on a lighter note. I was amused by Saryusz-Wolski’s justification for the parliament’s position on the diplomatic service. “As directly elected representative of Europe, we feel the breath on our back because (citizens) want to see the foreign policy of the Union strong and legitimate.” And later “Once every five years, we go to the polls and citizens ask us questions…”

I have my doubts that accountability of the diplomatic service is high on voters’ wishlists… but still it’s a useful old  trump card to have in your pocket. Your interlocutors can’t challenge on you on it. Even if they might be cursing you privately.