An EU rapid reaction force ought to be sent to West Africa to join American troops and military doctors on the ground; yet whilst Obama names Ebola Czar, EU responds by scheduling a workshop
As the late summer sun descended above the roofs of Brussels, and the Belgian sky once again exceled in splendid nuances between blue red and black, Magritte style, it seemed similarly surreal to digest two opposing narratives from this weekend’s papers: There is the alarm cry from WHO and the prospect of 1.4 million Ebola infected by mid-January, and there is the panic warning from doctors and psychologists labelling Ebola alarm a reflection of “the insecurities of the modern mind far more than any significant danger to public health”, according to the New York Times.
Sadly, it seems Ebola might be both in different places; that is dystopia in West Africa and the prospect of panic across the rest of the world, potentially threatening social cohesion within our crisis ridden societies.
In the US, Obama has named Vice-President Biden’s former chief-of-staff, Ron Klain, ‘Ebola Czar’ responsible for a coordinated domestic response to the virus spread, and pledged to send 3000 troops to West Africa to erect health care facilities and coordinate relief efforts.
Meanwhile in the EU, Health Ministers on Thursday failed to agree on any coordinated response. Scheduling a workshop on “best practices on infection control”, they left it for Member States to play domestic politics and fuel EU scepticism with ad hoc and inefficient national responses, such as screenings at random border crossings – the Eurostar terminal at London Saint Pancras and Prague’s Vaclav Havel Airport, amongst other venues with no direct West African connections.
Conversely in Belgium – alongside France the only EU country to retain commercial air links to Monrovia, Freetown, and Conakry – the country’s Health Minister Maggie De Block, herself a doctor, opposed screenings of incoming passengers from West Africa: “I don’t want panic to break out in the country,” she said.
So the EU Ebola response seems mosaic, uncoordinated and pathetic; so sad, because another European response is possible, and the prospect of non-action so potentially terrifying.
The UN Security Council and President Obama agree that Ebola is a threat to national and regional security in West Africa, and the fear of Ebola a threat to social cohesion and the world economy.
Hence, tomorrow EU Foreign Ministers could agree to confront Ebola, using the means at their disposal within the European Security and Defence Policy – the ESDP. An EU military rapid reaction force ought to be deployed alongside the American troops in West Africa; military doctors should be sent to staff treatment facilities in dire need for medical reinforcement. No one can blame the lack of volunteers to take on the epidemic in West Africa, but military medical personnel can be ordered on a mission to avoid a looming humanitarian catastrophe. And military personnel could secure the three West African airports concerned, requiring departing passengers to observe a quarantine at the airports, so as to effectively contain the risk of the spread of both the virus, and the spread of the fear that accompanies it.
Sadly, tomorrow, EU ministers might be considering mirroring the American response, but in all likelihood they will fail to do so.
In a sense, the EU response to Ebola is similar to the world response to climate change; one observes the iceberg ahead; only, whilst climate change is set to strike within a generation, Ebola poses a risk to our societies in real time.
The designation of the Spitzenkandidat calls for reflection amongst all those pundits, who were so sure it would never happen
“That’s an hour and a half you’ll never get back. NONE of these so-called ‘candidates’ will become the next Commission President”, a friend lamented on May 15th reflecting the media sentiment at the time, when learning my excitement about the Eurovision presidential debate; that night outside the hemicycle at Brussels, in a moment the European public sphere found a form and a shape. Journalists encircled Ska Keller – she was the Green star of the evening and the winner of the debate – whilst Martin Schultz stood firm for the emerging democratic selection, if not election, process.
So the European public space, which many think is to remain an illusion, conceived itself.
Where does this leave the European media establishment, which decided to ignore the Spitzenkandidat process labelled irrelevant? How do they feel, all those pundits who systematically chose not to inform the public about the relative strength of the two biggest European parties – the EPP and the S&D – in the lead up to the vote?
The designation of Jean-Claude Juncker as the next Commission President has led some observers to question his democratic legitimacy on the grounds that most Europeans were unaware of the process; so rather than admitting their own failure to report on relevance, in what resembles a catch 22 chicken and egg line of argumentation, the whole process is blamed for failing to attract their attention.
Might one not ask for just a little more self-reflection? Even the most devoted intergovernmentalist observer would be well served to notice that the anti-Juncker narrative has completely lost its appeal in the EU’s most populous nation and economic power house; read Mathias Döpfner (http://www.bild.de/news/standards/mathias-doepfner/juncker-muss-praesident-werden-36187236.bild.html), listen to Jürgen Habermas (http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/juergen-habermas-im-gespraech-europa-wird-direkt-ins-herz-getroffen-12963798.html), forget about The Times of London, its praise for Cameron and call for ‘Splendid Isolation’ (http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/leaders/article4132572.ece).
Yes, only in Germany did a significant portion of the electorate consider the difference between left and right wing policies at the top of the EU’s executive. Yet thanks to Habermas and Bild Zeitung (might one anticipate a broader marriage of minds?), such a new level of European democratic reflection is being recognised. It has escaped the bottle of the pundits; sooner rather than later, they might be well placed to acknowledge this new fact to regain relevance.
The Liberals have lot to win backing a Social Democrat Commission President
Two days before Sunday’s elections, Europe’s conservatives in the EPP are heading for a major defeat; yet whilst set to lose more seats than any other group, the EPP is likely to remain the single biggest political force in the next Parliament. On the left, the Social Democrats in the S&D head for gains, but remain unlikely to win enough seats to out-seize the EPP. Whilst far-left and far right groups increase their numbers on the fringes of the political spectrum, where does this leave Europe’s Liberals at the centre in the ALDE group?
A clear win by the EPP or the S&D – similar to past victories by the EPP five years ago, and historically the S&D prior to the Eastern enlargement in 2004 – would translate the new Lisbon provisions on the designation of the next Commission President into a British style two party system. Yet, the current weakness of the Parliament’s two biggest groups might take the EU’s emerging party democracy in a somewhat different direction – that of German style coalition politics.
In Berlin, Ms. Merkel is Chancellor although she faces a red majority in the German Bundestag. The political left – Die Linke – is considered out of the mainstream, and its MPs excluded from the political consensus that establishes the Government’s parliamentary power base.
In Brussels, far-right and far left parties are heading for a similar exclusion, essentially leaving the vote on the next Commission President in the hands of MEPs from five groups – the Conservative reformists in the ECR and the EPP on the right, the S&D and the Greens on the left, and ALDE in the middle.
According to the latest PoolWatch opinion pool, the ECR and EPP jointly hold 259 seats, whilst the S&D and the Greens are predicted to take 245. Hence ALDE’s expected 59 MEPs might prove decisive.
So which way is Verhofstadt set to cast the Liberal vote?
In the public mind, Liberal support for the EPP’s Juncker as Commission president would strengthen the link between European elections and the Brussels executive, and it would cement the Spitzenkandidat process. On stage in the Eurovision debate at the Parliament last week, Verhofstadt forcefully backed this experiment in European democracy. Yet, establishing a precedent for the Commission President to always represent the biggest-party is hardly in the interest of the Liberals – Parliament’s third largest group.
Instead, might Verhofstadt look left? At the risk of internal friction within ALDE, which is divided between left leaning Liberal Democrats from the UK and German right leaning Free Democrats, the case for liberal support for a Social Democrat Commission President – Schultz or a compromise Council alternative – seems convincing.
Indeed, on the economy Verhofstadt has challenged Juncker’s business as usual austerity policies, and on social issues, ALDE traditionally votes with the left. Moreover, having failed to secure a first-party position, the Social Democrats might be willing to pay a higher price for Liberal support than the EPP, possibly propelling Verhofstadt to the 12th floor in the Parliament – the seat of its president.
With the Social Democrats (S&D) and the conservatives (EPP) neck-and-neck in ever more refined EU wide opinion pools, the lead up to the European elections has never been more exciting. It’s down to one seat whether the next Commission president is Social Democrat or Conservative.
214-213; Europe’s Social Democrats retain a one seat lead over the EPP in the latest EU wide opinion pool from Poll Watch / Burson-Marsteller; the Liberals regain third position with 66 ALDE MEPs.
Whilst national media across the EU focus on the rise of Euro-sceptic and extreme right and left wing parties in countries such as the UK, France and Greece, the real drama in May’s elections takes place largely unnoticed at the very centre of European politics.
To the surprise of many observers, Europe’s conservatives in the EPP appear to be heading for a major electoral defeat, down from the 274 seats the EPP holds in the current chamber, whilst the Social Democrats, having suffered a historic defeat five years ago when the S&D group got only 174 seats, are set to regain the position as the largest political group in the European Parliament.
Yet the excitement of this ongoing battle for the EU’s political centre and the post as the next Commission President is rarely shared with the European public; in the national media, to the extent that there is any coverage at all of the first time presidential election, articles focus on the uncertainty that is associated with the candidacies of the German Social Democrat Martin Schultz, the Luxemburg Conservative Jean-Claude Juncker, and the Belgian Liberal Guy Verhofstadt.
Indeed, under the Lisbon Treaty, it is for the European Council to propose a candidate for Commission President, taking into account the outcome of the European vote.
In Parliament’s interpretation of the Treaty, EU leaders should choose amongst the designated candidates; yet the Treaty makes no reference to such party designations. So the press is right is questioning the likelihood that any of the candidates will make it to the top post.
However, the often reported assumption that the Council will then be free to pick and choose whoever it sees best placed for the job also seems highly unlikely.
Instead, here is a prediction of what might happen following the elections: If the S&D retains its lead on Election Day, the Social Democrats will call for Schultz to be appointed. However, a country eager to challenge the Parliament and show sovereignty – one such candidate being the UK – will veto Schultz deemed too federalist.
In the national press, this might than be interpreted as the Council throwing in its weight and setting things straight, designating an alternative candidate of its own choosing.
Yet imagine the constitutional crisis that would prevail were the Council subsequently to designate a conservative candidate for Commission president in the face of the S&D regaining its position as the strongest political force in the Parliament. Clearly such a decision would not respect the Treaty’s provision to take account of the election result, and it would be highly unlikely that the European Parliament wold vote to approve such a candidate.
Conversely, were the EPP to become the biggest party in the next Parliament, and a Member State on similar grounds vetoed Jean-Claude Juncker, it would be next to impossible to imagine the Council coming out in favour of a Social Democrat alternative.
Hence the fate of the shadow candidates who are frequently mentioned as jokers in the presidential power play, such as Danish Social Democrat Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt and Irish Conservative Prime Minister Enda Kenny, amongst others, comes down to the narrow struggle between the S&D and the EPP about the position as the biggest party in the new Chamber.
Now, this struggle is truly exciting to follow, and a hundred times more relevant than the usual reporting on the growth of euro-scepticism and radicalism across the continent.
At the end of the day, even a protest vote sending 180 or so radical MEPs to Brussels will not fundamentally change power politics at the European political centre, but one or two MEPs more or less for the EPP and the S&D stand to determine the political colour of the next Commission President.
Consider rationality, and consider four statements: Anthropogenic climate change is real, because most scientists find evidence in support; GMO foods are harmless, because most scientists agree that GM technology is just a more advanced method of plant breeding; migration to Europe is needed, because of demographics and falling birth rates; and animals do not care if they are bread up for food or fur production – or indeed, like Marius the giraffe, fed to the lions at Copenhagen zoo.
Why are these controversial views?
In Europe, mainstream political ideologies from socialism to liberalism stand on the shoulders of the enlightenment; they are inherently rational and humanist with a belief in progress and a rejection of ethic, religious or social dogma. Yet political ideologies are in decline.
For decades the number of party members has fallen, and alongside increased political apathy, Europe has seen a rise in swing voters, in political theatre and ad hoc mobilization within single issue movements; rather than the relative eminence of ideas, trust has emerged as kingmaker in politics; perceptions and feelings have become more important than facts.
In political science, this development is reflected and described by constructivist theories, which have grown in importance and relevance since the 1960s, replacing the previous dominance of political realism. One of these newer schools – the Copenhagen school – sees a process of ‘securitization’ and ‘politization’ whereby a dominant actor – that is often a party leader or a minister – through a speech act convinces the majority of the need to embrace or reject a concept or action; crucially, the relevance of the act is defined in terms of its subsequent acceptance amongst the public rather than on the basis of factual necessity.
So today political rationality is on life support amongst technicians and bureaurocrats outside the political and media sphere; yet from time to time and especially in a time of crisis, reality strikes back, often taking the form of a ‘political necessity’ or specialist politics within technical regulations or standards. In the EU, the Commission services have emerged as a bastion of political rationality and successfully established an internal market through spillover technical integration.
Hence, part of the difficulty many Europeans find in trying to understand the EU and its political processes might spring form the fact the electorate is no longer accustomed to considering old fashioned – some might say boring – rational politics.
Indeed, national media and national politicians seem to pursue a joint interest in neglecting the rational EU bubble and continuing an emotional domestic political theatre; unfortunately, amongst the political effects of the preeminence of perception over progress are rejections of science and rational politics.
Might it be time to once again consider rationality? Ought journalists not to investigate the societal cost of value politics and fearful science dogma in terms of job losses and missed growth opportunities? Can we still afford to lose out on biotech technologies and neglect the potential of labor mobility into the EU? And might it be time to once again consider the value of production and exports and jobs – those are useful for humans – rather than engaging in soul searching into how dead animals might feel about fur skins, or whether it is cruel or not to make an autopsy on a dead giraffe?
It sure feels like we need more rationality, some humanism, and less perception in public.
As the 19th climate talks drew towards an indecisive close beneath a gray Warsaw sky this week, people in all shapes and colors – some vegan militants dressed up as parrots -scattered about the hall ways inside the Polish National Stadium, which hosted the talks; late in the afternoon on Thursday many were sleeping or drifting into daydreams in red beanbags about the corridors, exhausted after almost two weeks of talks.
Yet most starred intensively at their lap tops – typing, tweeting, updating profiles.
In the American pavilion, the mayor of Des Moines, Iowa, advocated local low carbon solutions at a lazy side event whilst European MEPs hung out coffee less outside the Commission secretariat offices, waiting for the next briefing. Earlier in the afternoon, at another side event, Climate Action Commissioner Hedegaard had a cabinet member announce that an EU 2030 climate and energy initiative is set for January, as the Union prepares its contribution to the 2015 global deal climate deal.
Yet in spite of such EU action and cautious rumors of limited progress, most delegates in the food court on the stadium floor shared negative views on the likely outcome – once again the talks seemed to be about to end at best in a new beginning.
In every corner and at every informal briefing, the talk of the town tried to conceptualize a balance between demands from the EU and other developed countries for a clear road map towards the anticipated global climate deal two years down the road at COP 21 in Paris, and parallel demands for ‘loss and damage’ – read money to compensate for ongoing climate destruction in developing countries.
Two years ago, 2011 in Durban, South Africa, whilst the euro was under attack and emergency summits were ordinary events in Brussels, the EU’s climate diplomacy saw one of its finest hours, when negotiators managed to broker a deal to work towards a deal in 2015 – set to be ‘an agreed outcome with legal force’. In Africa, the EU negotiators hat succeeded in questioning the “wall” in the global climate regime, which since 1992 has separated the legally committed from the volunteers, that is Annex 1 and non-annex 1 countries.
Ever since, major emerging countries have tried to backtrack from the more shared concept of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ that Durban heralded, and this week in Warsaw there was a profound sense that constant motion in the talks took a circular shape, like walking the hall ways inside the stadium in one direction and coming back to the same stairway and the same cameras near the East side entrance. Indeed UN climate negotiations seem to have turned away from a chronological concept of time, even if negotiators are supposed to be half way between Durban and Paris in 2015.
So will COP 19 be judged as a failure? Success seems unlikely. On Friday NGOs staged a walk out protesting lack of results, and they had a point. Contrary to COP 15 in Copenhagen four years ago, however, expectations were low this year, and on the positive side there seems to be an increasing understanding amongst decision makers and the public in major countries such as the US and China that the impacts of climate change are real, and that it is in the core interest of the major powers to avoid the 4 degree or more temperature increase that the world is currently heading for.
Indeed, in the American pavilion insights from Hurricane Sandy on how not to place generators in hospital basements fed into the discussion on local means for better climate adaptation, thereby implicitly acknowledging the link between current extreme weather events and climate change predictions otherwise vividly opposed. And in the Chinese pavilion, a seminar on the country’s EU inspired emissions trading pilot projects now covering urban areas with some 250 million people drew significant interest, including from delegates from Pakistan.
So the COP proved successful as a base for ideas exchange, and this would be wonderful if only it was not so much less than what is needed to bridge the ambition gap to the 2 two degrees maximum temperature rise, world leaders signed up to in Copenhagen.
Small progress seemed likely on financing, but the timetable towards 2015 remains highly uncertain. The fundamental rift between developed and developing nations remains, and sometimes it takes grotesque forms even on details in the talks; in Warsaw, for instance, a proposal for a work programme on agriculture was blocked by the island state of Fiji on behalf of G77 to the detriment of farmers worldwide, who are at the forefront of the climate challenge; whilst these very same countries supported the idea in principle.
At the end of the day, climate change is set to become a major 21st century security challenge; hence a deal must be struck amongst the major powers, which are also the major emitters. The world is warming, and the world is changing. I left Warsaw reading this week’s European edition of China daily, learning that the number of private cars increased from 59.39 million in 2010 to 93.09 million in 2012. In 1990, there were merely 0.82 million cars in China, and many more bicycles on the streets of Shanghai.
So whilst the talks circle, cars drive ahead.
Germany’s new Red-Green majority is set to change policies in Berlin and Brussels, regardless Merkel is likely to remain Chancellor
In Danish political history, there was an epic moment when triumph met defeat; on election night 12 December 1990, Svend Auken, the leader of the opposition Social Democrats entered “Borgen” – Parliament building in Copenhagen – climbing the grand steps to the second floor showered with flashlights; with 37.4% of the popular vote, the best result for his party in decades, Auken raised his hand in victory. Yet within days numbers spoke; Auken did not command a parliamentary majority, the Conservative government hung on to power, and less than a year later the Social Democrats ousted Auken as party leader.
Yesterday Ms. Merkel hailed a “super result”. In a rare electoral triumph for an incumbent leader in a crisis ridden Europe, her united Christian Democratic parties CDU/CSU secured 41.5% of the popular vote.
Yet Merkel’s win is a lonely one. Only this morning, Philipp Rösler, the Chancellor’s ally and leader of the defeated FDP liberal democrats announced his resignation. Suddenly top headlines in the German press feature the story of the dramatic down fall of the erased FDP rather than Merkel’s victory.
With the FDP’s exit from Parliament, a drama is about to begin in Berlin. As was the case in Borgen, it comes down to numbers, and Ms. Merkel might be well advised to play her cards humbly if she is to remain Chancellor in a Parliament where her Christian Democrats command 311 seats, and the Red-Red-Green opposition 319.
Whilst the prospect of a ‘grand coalition’ remains the most likely outcome of yesterday’s vote, policies are set to change. Indeed, Ms. Merkel cannot take the Social Democrats for granted, and an alliance with the Greens is highly unlikely given the affinities amongst ecologist partisans. The Social Democrats, whose 25.7 % represent a modest gain from a historically week position, have ruled out a Red-Red-Green coalition government involving the far left ‘Linke’ party. Yet the Green leader Jürgen Trittin is said to personally favour a so called R2G –twice red, once green – collaboration, which could materialise if Ms. Merkel fails to win over a coalition partner to replace the FDP, and take the form of a minority government between the Social Democrats and the Greens, supported by the Left Party.
Hence in order to avoid such a prospect of electoral victory turned parliamentary defeat, Ms. Merkel is likely to try to move to the left. In Germany, this might mean giving in on her party’s opposition to a minimum wage of 8.5 euro per hour, and in the EU, a Merkel III government might soften policies vis-à-vis crisis ridden countries in the Mediterranean, as suggested by senior Social Democrat leaders such as former foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Also, with new policies in Berlin, Germany is set to finally take a stand in the EU’s contentious climate debate; in this respect, prior to COP 20 next year in Paris, Berlin is likely to support Commission proposals on back loading of allowances, and a ‘fix’ of the EU’s ETS emission trading system.
So whilst the struggle for power has yet to fully begin in Berlin, the impacts of yesterday’s vote already materialise beyond Germany, where the prospect of enhanced German domestic consumption as a result of increasing wages, and a softer smile on Mutti’s face when looking abroad might mean more economic activity and exports to Germany. After all, a positive prospect for Europe, and for the next Merkel.
In Iowa, tongues mismatch on climate change
On the old prairie plains between the Missouri and the Mississippi rivers, the US state of Iowa now contains some of the world’s most fertile farm lands. Flying into Des Moines, the capital of the American Corn Belt, one sees squared fields all the way to the end of sight, forming a great agricultural chess board.
A similar sight of intensive production greeted Soviet leader Khrouchtchev during his visit to Iowa in 1959; years later during the 80s the than USSR foreign minister Shevardnadze visited too, and most recently, in 2012, the current Chinese President Xi Jinping stopped over in Des Moines whilst touring the US ahead of the recent leadership transition in Beijing. Indeed, is seems leaders from countries that matter come to Iowa, which is pivotal for US agricultural exports; hence what happens here impacts food markets all over the world.
So when at Iowa State University, which is an agricultural research hub, I am told by professors that climate change in Iowa is likely to impact production yields severely, it is not only the local farmers who are affected.
One of these farmers, John Hall, is a Vietnam veteran, and together with his sons he runs a farm seized more than 1000 acres, which primarily delivers soybeans for biofuels and feedstuff production to a plant on the Lincon Highway.
When I met John in his barn office and mentioned the gloomy climate predictions that the scientists hold, he invited me on a ride across his lands to take a closer look at the situation on the ground. Driving along yet-to-be planted fields, he said he recognizes the effects that climate change are set to have in Iowa, with increased weather volatility, heavy rains in spring, frost spikes in May and prolonged early summer draughts. In particular, the spring rains are troublesome. Although temperature increases have prolonged the growing season, these rains make it more difficult to saw, and without plants the naked fertile soils risk being washed into the Mississippi.
“Please go tell the world that this is real, and that we need to do something about it”, he said.
Yet amongst the upper echelons at the State Department of Agriculture in Des Moines, the mood is somewhat less concerned. This is a Republican administration, and alarmist science is political and opinionated, I understand, learning that the 1930s was also a very warm decade, which made the unusually warm summer of 2012 less of a worry. On the issue of the soils and the need to retain them during heavy rains, voluntary schemes designed to help enhance agricultural practices would be sufficient, I was told.
Seen from the state capital, moreover, the economic outlook for Iowa farmers is good; world demand is up because of population growth, and if draughts hit other parts of the US food prices rise. Were they to destroy future production in Iowa, the new yet-to-be adopted American crop insurance scheme, which is set to replace direct income support under the existing US agricultural policy, is likely to come farmers to the rescue, the top officials affirm.
Indeed, whilst climate change can be observed and predicted at global level, and be felt on occasion by individuals, it is much more difficult to establish sound forecasts at the local, regional and state levels where most of the political debate takes place in America, and across the world in most democracies.
In a recent report on “Climate Change and Adaptation in the United States”, the US Department of Agriculture recognizes this “mismatch between the typical spatial scales of climate science and agricultural science experimentation”.
So it is Pentecost on the prairie with no revelation just yet. Whilst plants grow – and indeed some seem to grow faster because of higher levels of CO2 in the atmosphere – tongues mismatch on most but one thing: What happens in Iowa, never stays in Iowa.
Every day, 2400 plants pose for a photo session at the Monsanto research greenhouse outside Raleigh, North Carolina. One by one, like bags arriving on an airport belt, they are taken from the sun to the studio and captured, for scientists from four corners of the world to subsequently examine their genetic potential.
Here, in the middle of what is known as the Research Triangle Park – one of America’s biggest scientific hubs – some of the world’s leading biotechnology companies have clustered to develop new seeds and plants for 21st century agriculture.
In 1977, Mary-Dell Chilton demonstrated that genes responsible for disease can be removed from a bacterium without affecting its ability to insert its DNA into plant cells, hence modifying a plant’s genome.
On this day of in spring, with blue skies covering Sugar Maples outside, Ms. Chilton, 73, sits in her laboratory at Syngenta Biotechnology. This Swiss company now employs more than 100 scientists relocated from Europe because of restrictions on GMO research, in a Research Park facility bearing Ms. Chilton’s name.
In the EU since the genome discovery, the legal framework – and to a lesser extent public opinion – turned vividly against GMOs. By 1992, British tabloids coined the term ‘Frankenfoods’, and rarely have so many been so afraid of so little.
Except today there is a real fear that Europe by going against GMO science might be losing more than valuable biotech jobs; a new generation of GMO research no longer only focuses on securing plant resistance to pesticides, but rather the coining of healthier foods – such as Golden Rice that can help alleviate Vitamin A Deficiency, which causes blindness amongst millions of children in poor countries, and more climate resilient crops that use less water.
In a clear sign of this technology’s potential, globally for the past five years GMO research has outspent traditional research on pesticides.
Meanwhile, every day 150.000 more people are born to this planet whilst in Asia the middle class population is set for an exponential increase in the coming decades – from some 500.000 million today to some 1.7 billion in 2020 and 3.3 billion seventeen years from now, in 2030.
So demand for food will increase enormously, whilst concerns for deforestation caused by agricultural expansion in vulnerable tropical lands rich on biodiversity and indispensable as carbon sinks are very real.
In the Research Triangle Park, I am asked if Europe might be about to change its stand on technological advances that hold potential to increase productivity on existing farmlands?
Of course, with time change will happen, and enhanced understanding of the effects of indirect land use changes – so called ILUC – might bring about a new valorisation of sustainable productivity in agriculture; but as is often the case when dealing with fears, it seems difficult to predict a change from irrationality.
Rather, a periodical tendency for selective science denial – be it on climate change in America or GMOs in Europe – might simply be a common part of the Western mind set.
EU mitigates, whilst the US adapts to climate change
1900 in Galveston, a hurricane swept the former capital of the Republic of Texas. Some six thousand people died in those winds, which even after Katrina and Sandy remain the deadliest in US history. Once the richest and most important city in the state, today this city remains a shadow of its former self; few seem to be willing to invest too much at hurricane central, and Galveston is full of poor and wind shagged homes.
In Texas, it is politically incorrect to believe in anthropogenic climate change, a theory yet to be proven, like Darwinism it seems. At one of Houston’s main hospitals, the head of staff was granted emergency powers to handle the influx of 27.000 refugees from New Orleans when Katrina struck in 2005. “We are in a war on climate” he explains, whilst denying that man is culprit.
Galveston has become both an argument and a counter argument in the debate here; an example of what might happen to other coastal cities along the Golf and the Atlantic shores, the city and its history also allow those who question science to point to an extreme weather event eleven decades ago. The increased frequency of these events is discarded, and the existing and solid scientific volume underpinning reports from the world’s leading scientists ridiculed – “tell me the impacts on girls from global warming!”, said one Texan I met.
In the US, risk is opportunity and risk is attractive, and it seems taking on a war on climate is more exciting than paying more for electricity and gasoline. European precautionary principles, including those that deal with environment and health are utterly unfashionable.
Yet whilst this close encounter with risk might still delay emerging political support for climate action, which from a low starting point is on the increase in the US – even in Texas – it might also be risk taking that ultimately enables America to overtake Europe when dealing with the effects of climate change.
Across the country, adaptation in the war on climate takes a myriad of different forms; from the urgent and particular and sometimes draconian response in crisis situations when barbed wire and guards deploy at hospitals to prevent them from being turned into shelters – 2005 in Houston – to foresighted and potentially game changing research into the genetics of plants, such as cotton, surgeon and camelina. These are draught resistant crops that can be genetically modified to potentially become a valuable – and in the case of camelina – even very healthy source of food for millions of people.
Whilst parts of America remain dogmatic climate change is not real, challenging science and denying the role of fossil fuels, thereby hampering US mitigation efforts to take off and the country to commit to international CO2 reduction targets, the reverse is true when it comes to adaptation in the war on climate; indeed, on GMOs it is Europe that seems to be challenging science.
So while the EU mitigates and debates climate targets for 2030, America adapts much more vividly than Europe to the new 21st century conditions. Might one possibly combine the two approaches and do away with dogmas on both sides of the Atlantic?