Posts Tagged Barroso

Blink and you’ll have missed it because it has attracted little media coverage, but 2010 was the warmest year on record. According to the World Meteorological Organisation, the global average temperature in 2010 was 0.53 degrees Celsius above the 1961-1990 average, while the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has it at 0.62 degrees Celsius above the twentieth century average, making 2010 equal with 2005 as the warmest year on record.

Now just a note for those who will point out that for much of the northern hemisphere December 2010 was extremely cold and snowy: when talking of “global warming” and “climate change”, please remember the clue is in the names. Global warming means the global temperature, on average, is going up. It does not mean that there is uniform warming in all places simultaneously. Climate change means, surprisingly, that the climate is changing. This change can be experienced in many ways: warmer weather in some places, cooler weather in others, more rain and storms and extreme events (as seen in Australia and Russia in 2010). The NOAA also has 2010 as the wettest year on record, in terms of global average precipitation, by the way.

Given the continued global warming trend, it seems surprising that the top EU politicians hardly mention it any more. In particular, the EU2020 strategy seems to be becoming an excuse to put off action on climate change until later. Real action on “low-carbon growth” is now seen as something for 2030 or 2050, rather than now. In recent speeches, Jose Manuel Barroso has barely mentioned climate change. In the EU economic growth priorities for 2011, the notion of sustainable growth does not even feature. In his speech to the first 2011 session of the European Parliament, Barroso briefly welcomed the relative progress in international negotiations on climate change at Cancun (venue for the 16th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, at the end of last year), but then promptly put it in the same bracket as EU agreement on the Eurovignette truck road charging system. Climate change is becoming, it seems, a second division policy area.

And environment commissioner Janez Potocnik is not helping, deciding in the last couple of days to put off until 2013 a review of air pollution legislation that should have happened in 2004. Part of this review would be to set 2020 targets for reductions of some pollutants. Potocnik doesn’t want to put his head above the parapet, it would seem.

But, as climate action commissioner Connie Hedegaard said in a recent debate organised by the Lisbon Council, “we’re in for some very expensive solutions if we just continue business as usual”. She wants the EU to increase its 2020 emissions reduction target from 20 percent to 30 percent compared to 1990 levels, but this idea has been on the table for a year without any real development in the discussion. Hedegaard will push it ahead of the next UN climate summit, in Durban, South Africa, at the end of this year. Its acceptance, or not, will be a major test of the EU’s resolve to try and do something about climate change.

The Copenhagen debacle shows one thing very clearly: the European Union has minimal political clout to influence international climate negotiations. As I noted in a previous post, in the Copenhagen talks, China and the US were the only voices that really mattered. The Copenhagen result is a stand-off between them. There has been no commitment on the US side (ie. by rich countries) to a programme of emission reduction targets; and there has been no real commitment on the Chinese side to moderate the environmental impact of their march towards global economic dominance. The EU went to the Copenhagen summit with a list of aims and demands, but has been sidelined as the real global powers battled it out.

Let’s take a look at some of those EU aims and see which were achieved. Binding emission reduction targets for rich countries: failure. Quantified carbon intensity reduction targets for emerging economies: failure. Get rid of the Kyoto Protocol in favour of an all-encompassing treaty: failure. Mid-term targets: failure. Meaningful reform of the Clean Development Mechanism: failure. Integrated OECD cap-and-trade system: failure. Firm targets on reducing deforestation: failure. Measures to control aviation and shipping emissions: failure. Firm financing commitments by rich countries in exchange for sustainable development plans from China and the rest: OK, something small has been done here, with a short-term climate fund, and some vague commitments beyond that.

Overall, it’s been embarrassing. All the statements in advance of the summit about the EU leading the negotiations and setting the pace look very foolish now.

The consequences for EU domestic politics will be seen in the months ahead. Will there be any appetite among member states for further emission reduction commitments? I doubt it. Will industry welcome the chance to earn further windfall profits from the free carbon allowances they will receive through the emissions trading system, while at the same time demanding further concessions because there is no “level playing field”? You can be sure of it. And what does it all say about Barroso’s big idea for sustainable development through 2020, and even about the new Commission (is Connie Hedegaard still credible as climate commissioner?)? Not much.

Since the Copenhagen outcome has demonstrated the EU’s weakness on the global political stage, the logical next step would be to look at better use of its trade power. In another environmental field — the REACH chemicals legislation — the EU has shown that it can force behavioural changes on other economies if they want access to EU markets. Schemes factoring in the carbon cost of imports must surely come next.