So Labour leader Ed Miliband has ruled out a referendum on EU membership…or has he?
As ever, it is not the end of the matter.
Some conservative commentators have, predictably, described the move as an ‘unforced error’ and ‘priceless gift’ to David Cameron. Others, perhaps more accurately, say that it is a confusing fudge.
But in truth, it is sensible national politics. If Miliband were to match Cameron’s pledge a Labour government elected in 2015 would see its governing programme defined by a referendum it doesn’t support.
Businesses would be more reluctant to invest in a country that clearly had one foot out of the EU’s door. In fact, it was noteworthy that, following the speech, the British Chambers of Commerce stated that Miliband’s views “chime well with business thinking”.
As it is, Miliband has not ruled out an in/out referendum. He’s just kicked it into the long grass until there is a new EU treaty which transfers further powers to Brussels.
Former prime minister Harold McMillan famously described “events, dear boy, events” as the biggest risk facing a government. It’s never smart for politicians to follow the lead of other parties for the sake of expediency.
By committing himself to a renegotiation and deadline for a referendum in 2017, Cameron’s strategy remains very high risk. There are a number of ‘known unknowns’ that he will have little control over. Although a new EU treaty is likely before the end of the decade, there is currently little appetite among EU leaders to re-open the pandora’s box of treaty reform, and that is before you even get to whether they would be prepared to accommodate Britain’s demands.
Richard Corbett, who is bidding to return to the European Parliament in May after four years advising Herman van Rompuy, describes Cameron’s strategy it as a ‘double blackmail’ of the British public and the rest of Europe.
Labour is hoping that the public demand for an EU referendum fades away. Even now, no opinion poll put the EU among the top ten issues of most importance to voters. Instead, voters are, as usual, more exorcised about their jobs and economic prospects, welfare, schools and hospitals.
The first litmus test of Labour’s referendum policy will be May’s European elections. The referendum positions of the UK’s parties will probably be one of the few ‘EU-related’ parts of the campaign. But if Miliband’s referendum stance costs Labour much in the way of votes and seats, I’ll be amazed.
Next year’s European elections are threatening to shake up the political balance in Europe.
Far-right nationalist parties could quite conceivably take 100 seats next May. Marine Le Pen’s National Front could win up to 20 seats in France alone. With far-left populist parties like Greece’s Syriza also set to make gains, the scene is set for Europe’s voters to give the political establishment a kick in the balls.
The question is at whose expense their seats will come from?
Some will undoubtedly come from the centre-right EPP, who will probably take their heaviest losses in France, Italy and Spain.
As for the Socialists, well, 2009 was a dismal year for the centre-left parties, who took severe beatings in the five largest EU countries. Although the French and Italian parties in the Parliament’s Socialist and Democrat group are probably heading for another pasting, the group should expect to post limited gains of up to 20-30 seats to its 194-MEP group.
But for me, it is the Liberal group that has most to fear in May. The group’s two largest delegations – the UK Liberal Democrats and German Free Democrats (FDP) – are almost certain to suffer the curse of the junior coalition partner and take a kicking from voters. The FDP was wiped out of the Bundestag after getting fewer than 5 percent of the vote in September, while the Liberal Democrats could lose most of the 12 seats they won in 2009.
Not only that but the Liberals’ prospects are hardly likely to be improved if Finnish Economic affairs commissioner Olli Rehn is their candidate to be President of the Commission. Rehn threw his hat into ring to run for the European Parliament elections a few weeks ago and is likely to take on former Belgian prime minister Guy Verhofstadt for the post.
Criticism of Rehn is harsh but fair.
Aside from being less charismatic than the average doormat, Rehn is also the EU’s austerity hawk-in-chief and has spent the last few months trying to tell anyone who will listen about the eurozone’s formidable 0.2 percent growth rate in 2013. Rehn’s mantra throughout the eurozone’s economic depression has been that it is all part of a cunning plan to deliver “sustainable growth and job creation” – a claim that is borderline insulting to the intelligence in Brussels let alone Athens, Rome or Lisbon.
The prospect of Rehn trying to win friends and influence people anywhere south of Paris must be a terrifying one for any Mediterranean Liberal party.
For their part, Socialist group officials are rubbing their hands with glee at the prospect of Rehn’s candidacy.
“Having been in southern countries in crisis, that the more Mr Rehn speaks and the more he gives interviews, the more anti‑European feelings rise in these countries,” Socialist group leader Hannes Swoboda told MEPs before Christmas.
If nothing else, Rehn deserves credit for having the courage of his convictions. Despite all the evidence to the contrary, he genuinely believes that the austerity shock-treatment being meted out in Greece and elsewhere is working and is the right (and only) solution, and that people will eventually thank him for it. But unless the Liberals really do have a death wish, it’s hard to picture him as their star candidate.
If opinion polls are to be believed, UKIP has more than a fighting chance of winning next May’s European elections. And their prospects have certainly been done no harm by multi-millionaire Paul Sykes’ promise that he would “do whatever it takes” to give UKIP the most MEPs in Brussels.
With David Cameron becoming increasingly less popular with his own party members for not being eurosceptic enough, Nigel Farage’s party would anyway have expected to take a big chunk of Tory votes. The Liberal Democrats will probably suffer from same sort of coalition party squeeze that has just wiped out their German sister-party, the Free Democrats, from the Bundestag.
Meanwhile, although Labour currently tops the opinion polls, their support is soft. Labour voters also tend to be less likely to vote in local or European elections than their rivals.
In other words, this election was already there for the taking and it was no surprise to learn that bookmakers have made UKIP favourites ahead of Labour, with the Conservatives a distant third. For his part, Farage has been promising that next May’s elections will see a ‘political earthquake’.
Sykes bankrolled UKIP’s breakthrough campaign in 2004, where the party went from three to twelve seats, with £1.5 million and his riches will allow the party to compete with the big boys. In fact, with Labour still a few million in the red and the Conservatives keen to stash campaign funds for the following year’s general election, UKIP could end up being the biggest spender.
So, how much difference will the Yorkshireman’s money make?
Well, in terms of national profile, not very much. British political parties don’t spend very much on elections and so a relatively small sum goes a long way. The BBC is required by law to give the main parties equal coverage. Besides, UKIP now has the name recognition that it did not have pre-2004 and Nigel Farage is one of the country’s most recognisable and popular politicians.
But what it will pay for is the ‘ground game’ that has always separated the three major parties from UKIP. Although its membership has gone up dramatically in the past two years, UKIP still has around 30,000 members, far fewer than Labour and the Conservatives, although they are rapidly catching the Liberal Democrats. It is the network of local councillors and activists that develop the voter identification records and ‘pavement politics’ that helps win elections and UKIP has never had this resource.
The real challenge for UKIP will be to carry their performance in European elections into the next general election in 2015. The party has not come close to winning a Westminster seat, though it has finished second in several by-elections over the past eighteen months. Perhaps that will be the real challenge for Sykes – whether he can use his money to get Farage and others into the House of Commons. Now that would be a political earthquake.
At the end of it all, a deal was done. But it was always going to.
But seldom have so many working hours been wasted to achieve so little as the EU’s interminable budget negotiations. Spare a thought for the MEPs and their staff. not forgetting the numerous civil servants with the misfortunate of having to sit through weeks and months of futile trilogues.
Little wonder that politicians and reporters have been complaining of ‘budget fatigue’ for months.
The EU’s budgetary system verges on the farcical. National governments agree on the projects and provide the money to pay for them, while the commission administers them. Around 20 percent of the EU’s funds are raised through VAT and customs and excise duties, while most of the remaining 80 percent comes in the form of direct payments from national governments.
Largely as a result of this, the commission has complained of being ‘under-resourced’ for years. Last year, the commission ran out of money in October and was forced to ask governments for more money to cover bills for the Erasmus exchange programme and the European Social Fund. They also rolled over as many payments as possible into 2014. Governments then insisted on a 2013 budget without sufficient funds. So it was entirely predictable that the commission would run out of money in 2013, just as it had done in autumn 2012.
And that’s what happened. The commission has tabled nine separate amending budgets during the course of this year worth a combined total of €16 billion, meaning that the €150.9 billion settlement agreed this time last year ended up leaving a shortfall of more than 10 percent.
During the October plenary session in Strasbourg, a number of MEPs were making dark threats about the EU having its own version of the US ‘debt ceiling’ debate. But the main similarity was that the episode is thoroughly embarrassing for all concerned. Unlike in the US where a government shutdown means precisely that – with public sector workers being either shut out of their offices or working for free – the EU’s so-called ‘thirteenth month’ rule comes into play if an annual budget can not be agreed. In other words, spending levels from December of the preceding year are rolled over to the next, after being adjusted for inflation. There was never any prospect of an EU shutdown.
The endless shenanigans do not portray any of the players in a good light. The Council for refusing to hand over the money that will allow projects to which they had already agreed to be paid for; the Commission for making a series of seemingly unlimited requests; the Parliament for always demanding more money and doing too little to trim its own bloated spending;
Total EU spending for 2014-2020 is a fraction under €960 billion – a tidy sum, but one which works out at under €140 billion per year – smack on 1 percent of GDP. In the wider context of government spending in Europe, it is not very much. For example, statistics revealed today showed that EU governments spend 29 percent of GDP on social protection.
The problem is that, with the seven-year spending plans finally agreed, and an election in six months time, the urgency for reforming the budgetary process will probably disappear. With the proposed financial transactions tax stuck in the legal long-grass and no other real ideas for alternative income The commission is almost certain to get out the begging bowl this time next year.
Even so, there must be a better way of doing this. Much more of this nonsense and the EU’s budgetary process will become another stick for eurosceptics to beat them with – and, in this case, entirely self-created.
For most of the past fifteen years, pro-European Conservatives have been on the endangered species list in British politics. In 2008 only three Conservative MPs out of a caucus of nearly 200 voted in favour of the Lisbon treaty. Thatcher government was dominated by europhile big-beasts – Douglas Hurd, Leon Brittan, Ken Clarke, Chris Patten and Thatcher’s nemesis, Michael Heseltine, just to name a few. Of these, only Clarke remains in David Cameron’s government, like the last europhile dinosaur waiting to be made extinct.
The decisive movement was the passing of the Maastricht treaty in 1993, which cost Prime Minister John Major his majority in Parliament, and caused a decisive split in the party which took a decade to heal. To the eurosceptic rebels, this was the moment that the EU ceased to be about trade and became a political union hell bent on destroying the nation state. To the rest of the country, it is symbolic of a time when the Conservative party decided to make itself unelectable.
Even now, the degree of anti-EU vitriol in the Conservative party has to be seen and heard to be believed, and one of the best places is the Conservative Home site. Last week Robert Buckland, elected as a Tory MP in 2010, penned a thoughtful and fairly innocuous article to the effect that Britain is starting to assert itself in the EU and that this was a good thing. Fairly uncontroversial stuff, and quite hard to disagree with considering that it is only a fortnight ago that David Cameron teamed up with Angela Merkel to win a 3 per cent cut to the EU budget.
In fact, the comments on Buckland’s article by fellow Conservatives illustrates why the party’s moderate wing has tended to keep quiet and why Tory europhilia was – to paraphrase Oscar Wilde – like a love that dared not speak its name. Anybody who doesn’t think the Brits should close up the Channel Tunnel and thumb their nose at the continent is in the pay of ‘Brussels’ and/or a “quisling”. Quite how supposedly intelligent people equate support for British EU membership with Nazi collaboration is beyond me.
But, dare I say it, the green shoots of a more moderate eurorealism in the Tory party are starting to show. Several weeks ago, Buckland was one of a group of backbench MPs that launched the European Mainstream group within the Conservative parliamentary party. European Mainstream becomes the second pro-European campaign group to be set up in 2013, following the equally clunky-named cross-party Campaign for British Influence through Europe.
Since then, the EU has announced plans to negotiate a series of bilateral trade deals with G20 countries, with the jewel in the crown being a trade deal with the US – more manna from heaven for free marketeers you might think.
Let’s not get ahead of ourselves. The Tory party has not suddenly morphed into a hotbed of federalists. For the time being, there are only 12 MPs declared as members – with the Financial Times reporting that there are another 10-15 who are still too nervous to declare themselves public.
Neither is the party’s eurosceptic rhetoric likely to be toned down. The Tories are scared that losing votes to UKIP could cost them a parliamentary majority in 2015 and lead to a humiliating defeat in next year’s European elections. Taking a hard line on eastern European migration and complaining about the iniquity of ‘regulations from Brussels’ will remain the party’s default setting.
But it is significant enough that they feel brave enough to put their heads above the parapet, and are seemingly prepared to face down critics from their local constituency party. This may turn out to be part of the slow drift of MPs taking sides in advance of an ‘in/out’ referendum. But it just might be a sign that the Conservative party’s silent majority is finally ready to challenge the eurosceptics.
A common phrase was on the lips of pundits this morning – only in Italy.
With the centre-left scoring only the narrowest of victories, leaving them with control of the lower house – the Chamber of Deputies – but a good 40 seats short in the Senate, it is hard to imagine a set of results less amenable to the creation of a government.
The results will have sent shivers down the spines of breakfasting EU officials just as it has spooked the hell of the markets. The Italian stock market has already dropped by 5%. Interest rates on 10 year government bonds have jumped 0.4% to 4.8%.
Last month, the outgoing finance minister of Mario Monti’s technocrat government, Vittorio Grilli told MEPs on the European Parliament’s Economic committee that the country would run a balanced budget in 2014. Then, last Friday, the Commission’s economic Winter Forecast indicated that Italy’s finances were returning to good shape, with the budget deficit to fall below 3% in 2013. In the space of less than 24 hours, eighteen months of painstaking work to claw back credibility and market confidence risks being undone.
However, taking a step back from the economic panic caused by the stalemate, there are so many fascinating sub-plots in this election that it is difficult to know where to start.
What is the main story? Silvio Berlusconi’s refusal to give up on politics after three separate terms as Prime Minister and enough scandal to fill over 100 unprintably salacious novels. What about the inexplicable reluctance of the Italian electorate to finally kill off the 76 year old dinosaur? How it is possible for a convicted fraudster currently on trial for having sex with an underage prostitute, to claim 30% of the vote?
Then there is the failure of Pier Luigi Bersani’s Democratic party, who could only secure victory by the skin of their teeth, separated from Berlusconi’s Freedom party by fewer than 150,000 votes in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies and less than 1% in the Senate. Indeed, the centre-left was also dogged by allegations of scandal over its involvement in the Monte Paschi bank collapse.
What about the sudden emergence of Beppe Grillo, who has made a comedy career out of lampooning Italy’s political class, and now holds the balance of power?
Or, last but not least, the routing of Mario Monti? The favourite politician of Brussels (and Berlin), who could only finish a dismal and distant fourth place with 10% of the vote in his first election contest.
What next you might ask?
Well, short of a Bersani/Berlusconi grand coalition, it is difficult to see how a government of any colour could take office, let alone be able to survive for more than a matter of weeks. The centre-left and right blocs are both well short of the 158 members needed to form a majority in the Senate even with the support of the 18 members elected on Monti’s ticket. For his part, Grillo has so far insisted that he will play no part in a government with either of the mainstream parties. Italians are likely to be sent back to the polls sooner rather than later.
That said, however, the election produced such a fragmented result that it is far from likely that fresh elections would deliver a majority government. In any case, the instability caused by months of inaction could well take Italy back to the mercy of the financial markets.
A week ago, the EU and the watching world would have scoffed at the idea of a maverick comedian holding the balance of power in the eurozone’s third largest country. They’re not laughing any more.
EU leaders started their first summit of 2013 in fine fashion. First talks set to begin at a civilised 4pm were delayed until 8.30pm – a cruel interruption into carefully laid dinner plans. Then there was no formal proposal tabled by Herman van Rompuy until 6am. Several hours later on Friday morning it was back for the second round of punishment. The deal – when it came – concluded 24 hours of talks. An impressive display of sustained ‘jaw-jaw’ even by the EU’s high standards.
After the succession of crisis summits that have blighted many a Thursday night and early Friday morning over the past couple of years, I suppose we should be grateful that the politicos are merely dealing with how the EU’s farm subsidies and structural funds are going to be divvied up for the next few years rather than yet another bail-out.
But, ultimately, it’s hard to avoid a sense of frustration. €959 billion sounds like a lot of money but that’s not what is being haggled over. Politicians left the Justius Lipsus building in November with a proposal of €973.5bn in commitments from Herman van Rompuy. With Germany and the UK leading a group wanting further cuts, but the “Friends of Cohesion” and “Friends of the CAP” both anxious to protect their slice of the pie, the amount of room for manoeuvre was limited. In the end, it came down to splitting budgetary hairs. For example, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte held up agreement for hours until he got an extra €45 million to go home with.
It is also far from clear whether or not the painfully reached compromise will be chewed and spat out by MEPs. The European Parliament is preparing to play hard-ball because it says that having payments worth around €910bn based on commitments for €960bn is a recipe for debt and deficit. Last night, Martin Schultz told reporters that the Commission would be forced to table an emergency budget in the coming months to cover a €16bn hole in this year’s budget. Without guarantees that the EU will have the cash to pay for its bills, he wouldn’t sign.
All this after a senior EU official told me that basically what’s at stake is 0.002% of EU GDP. Hardly worth staying up all night for.
Conversely, a handful of bland paragraphs in the post-summit communique could be rather more significant. EU leaders gave a green light for talks on a free trade agreement with the US, a deal that could generate 2% of GDP on its own. While the budget talks were uppermost in most people’s minds, it is the prospect of trade accords with Japan and the US – as well as the soon-to-be-finalised trade deal with Canada – that has the Brussels diplomatic corps excited. EU officials think that an EU/US agreement could translate into €275bn per year and 2 million new jobs.
In fact, taken in this light the budget talks are a microcosm of what the EU used to be and what it could and should be. A seemingly never-ending inward-looking debate about subsidies and investments in Europe by Europe. Ironically, the sections of the budget spending outside the EU- development aid and cash for the countries negotiating accession deals to join the EU – were among the items targeted by the biggest cuts. Meanwhile, outside the Brussels-bubble, the world goes on.
David Cameron’s EU speech attracted vitriol from the usual suspects last week. Guy Verhofstadt accused him of “playing with fire”, the Socialist group’s Hannes Swoboda said it was “tragicomic” – and those were some of the kinder, printable comments.
And, yes, there is something particularly tiresome about the self-satisfied smugness of many British eurosceptics whenever they launch into yet another tirade on the innumerable evils and iniquities of “Brussels” and then, within minutes, reveal an impressive level of ignorance of the EU decision making process.
But, in truth, it’s hard to disagree with much of what Cameron actually said. The Working Time directive – which Britain (and other countries) have opposed for years – was the only piece of EU law singled out. Even then, the Prime Minister didn’t give an idea of what opt-outs or exemptions he wanted from renegotiation. With his remarks about the EU’s democratic deficit, the need for the institutions to be closer to Europeans, for national parliaments to take a greater role in EU law-making, and for the bloc to become more competitive and outward-looking,
Whether officials in the EU institutions like it or not, it is a plain fact that – and I say this as someone who spent several very happy years working in the Parliament – the institutions feel remote from most Bruxelloise, let alone the rest of Europe. And the same officials are kidding themselves by suggesting that this gap, or the democratic deficit, has not grown wider as a result of the eurozone crisis.
Pro and anti-Europeans can surely agree that the crisis has seen a huge transfer of economic powers from national governments to the Commission and the European Central Bank. Lest we forget, neither of these institutions is directly elected. Without rigorous checks and balances and clear lines of accountability this cannot be sustained, and the evidence from the first two years of the European Semester indicates that national parliaments are doing a far from effective job in scrutinising the EU’s revamped economic governance rules. Closing this accountability gap should be a top priority for the EU as well as national institutions.
As far as the wider implications for Britain are concerned, my sense is that Cameron played a bad hand about as well as he could have done last week and managed – albeit only briefly – to unite his party. But he has still started the clock ticking on a time-bomb that will detonate at some unspecified and unknown point in the next five years. There are far too many “known unknowns” that could derail his plans to renegotiate. There may well not be an inter-governmental conference in the next five years if the eurozone crisis abates and, in any case, there’s no guarantee that Conservative eurosceptics will be prepared to wait that long. The Tories might also lose the next election.
But regardless of whether Britain’s terms of membership within the EU change or not, those who want the EU to survive and prosper should listen to the latest leader of la perfide albion. Just because he’s a British eurosceptic doesn’t mean he’s always wrong.
Last Wednesday I was bracing myself for yet another failed EU crisis summit followed immediately by the usual flight of capital courtesy of panicky financial traders. It was a relief to find that Italy scored a surprise diplomatic win over Germany just hours after their football team did the same in Poland.
But after marathon talks, during which Messrs Monti and Rajoy refused to budge until they had obtained measures to reduce their borrowing costs, Angela Markel finally backed down and we have the first significant breakthrough in response to the crisis for over a year. The EU’s permanent bail-out fund, the European Stability Mechanism, will be able to directly recapitalize banks and buy government bonds without tough conditions. The ECB has been appointed as supervisor of the eurozone’s banks and may well have the powers to wind up broken banks.
At last, we have got some realism about how to stave off the crisis.
As ever, the devil will be in the detail, particularly about the new powers for the European Central Bank as the eurozone’s bank supervisor. The current ECB statute and the treaties do have a reference to the bank acting as a ‘prudential supervisory’ role, but I doubt that the draftsmen had the idea of the ECB being a super-regulator in chief of the continent’s banks when they drew up its mandate.
It also remains to be seen how the ESM will directly prop up the banks. There are still no plans to give the EU bail-out fund a banking licence or to increase its size, but I imagine that EU leaders will choose to cross those bridges when the time comes. Once the precedent of buying bonds and propping up banks is established, it will be difficult to put a stop to it.
However, while we undeniably have the tools to stave off bond market pressure onItaly and Spain, and should protect them from needing a full rescue package, the long term future of the euro is still uncertain. For all Merkel’s protestations, it is difficult to believe that some form of debt mutualisation will not be needed. The German Redemption Fund proposal is probably the most likely solution – pooling the excess debt beyond the 60% threshold laid out in the Stability and Growth Pact into a fund that must then be paid off each year. The Redemption Fund uses the same logic as the economic governance’six pack’, with countries required to reduce their excess debt by at least 5% each year.
Crucially, it might well be possible to set up a Redemption Fund without a treaty change, although I wouldn’t recommend saying this to a German politician.
In any case, with any serious talk of debt mutualisation still off limits for Germany, leaders did the smart thing by parking the issue with European Council President Herman Van Rompuy. Van Rompuy, who, as usual, played a quietly important role in brokering the summit compromise, will now draw up a detailed proposal to be discussed in the autumn.
Last week’s summit is just the first step, but for the time being, we should now enjoy a long overdue period of relative calm. Here’s hoping…..
Now that the dust has settled on the second Greek general election in as many months it is striking to realise that the two elections have not achieved a lot. A coalition of Pasok and New Democracy is going to be replaced by – you’ve guessed it – a coalition between the same two parties, although with New Democracy as the largest party. Of course, the seismic shift has been the sudden emergence of the radical left Syriza party, which has completely broken the mould of Greek politics by routing the socialist Pasok party which won over 40% of the vote and a parliamentary majority at the last elections held in 2009. However, while Syriza has so far refused any overtures to join a grand coalition, preferring to go into opposition rather than government, Greece will still have a government with a working majority.
That, though, is the easy part. The real challenge will be whether Greece will be able to stick to the tough conditions of its bail-out agreement and start to slow and painful process of dragging itself out of recession and reducing its debt burden. I think we have seen enough in the past two years to accept that the bail-out package on its own will probably not be enough. Greece is in its fifth consecutive year of recession. GDP has fallen by a quarter since 2007
A few weeks ago a friend of mine was at a conference in Greece with delegates from a number of European countries. He pointed out that Germany’s economic recovery of the 1950s and 60s would not have taken place without the Marshall Plan. Although I hesitate to make the analogy, it is becoming increasingly clear that Greece needs its own Marshall Plan if it is to recover.
After over a decade of overspending and two statistical frauds you might ask why Greece deserves special treatment. But the reality is that a country marked by the high levels of social unrest and desperation as we have seen in Athens has knock-effects on its neighbours.
Indeed, Greece’s difficulties have huge effects on the rest of Europe that are social as well as economic. For example, massive public spending cuts to border patrols has meant that Greece is really struggling to control its borders. Thousands of illegal immigrants from Turkey and other parts of Asia and North Africa are entering Greece each month on their way to the Promised Land of wealth, milk and honey in northern Europe.
There are tools that can immediately be used. The European Investment Bank should be encouraged to bankroll more infrastructure projects to boost employment and help re-build the country. The European Commission should allocate extra structural funds and project bonds. It is not even about solidarity so much as common sense. Our neighbour’s destitution inevitably hampers our own quality of life.
Even with a targeted EU stimulus package and a €130 billion bail-out Greece’s recovery is going to be slow and bumpy. But regardless of whether its politicians deserve help, the Greece people certainly do. Even if they didn’t a Marshall Plan for Greece would still be a good idea. If EU leaders have any sense they will stop the moralising and accept that the sooner the cradle of democracy becomes a more stable and hopeful country, the better for us all.