Confusion all around in Egypt today. Everywhere discussions rage on whether or not the military did a coup, if June 30 was a second revolution or a protraction of the 2011 revolution. What to do with the Muslim Brotherhood, let alone president Muhamed Morsi who is being kept hidden somewhere for over two weeks? My cab driver declared going to a pro-Morsi protest although he absolutely did not want the Muslim Brotherhood or Morsi to reassume power. Confusing.
However, the deep feelings of hatred that surface these days, are more cause for concern than the confusion. Many hate the Muslim Brotherhood and are willing to do anything to break the backbone of the organization. They’re convinced the MB are religious totalitarians. Others hate the military, the police and all things linked to the old regime as manifestation of all that went so very wrong in Egypt over the last decades. As for the MB, they hate everything that remotely smells like secularism. According to them, June 30 and all that preceded it, was one big conspiracy.
Actually, all are somewhat right in a certain way.
Who are the Muslim Brothers?
The MB was founded in 1928 by a young Egyptian teacher, Hassan Al Banna. It is no coincidence that Mustafa Kemal Attatürk had abolished the Caliphate just a few years earlier. Al Banna was convinced that Egyptians were westernizing too much and that they had to become real Muslims again. He wanted to achieve his goal by two means: resistance to the British occupation of Egypt, but above all through education of the Egyptians themselves. For all intents and purposes, Al Banna was a kind of a missionary. He travelled all over Egypt, persuading as many Egyptians a possible to join his underground resistance movement.
The MB combined religious education and social aid to the poorest. It made them immensely popular in no time. Egyptian and British authorities were less enthusiastic. They saw the MB as a subversive movement and quickly took action to suppress it. The Brothers were violent and murdered the Egyptian prime minister in the forties. A year later Hassan Al Banna himself was murdered.
The average Egyptian never really completely trusted the MB and this for three reasons. First, there is the ambiguity regarding their ultimate objective. Do they aim to restore the Caliphate? Do they aspire worldwide domination? Do they seek to transform Egypt into some sort of Saudi Arabia? The second reason is congruent with the first: it being a secret organization. As with free-masons, there’s no public list of members and nobody knows their exact numbers. And although they deny it, the MB is organized on an international level. The secrecy has a lot to do with persecution but also gives way to all kinds of conspiracy theories
The third reason for mistrust is the fact that the MB used a lot of violence. Their most infamous act was the assassination of president Anwar Sadat. Despite the fact they have since disavowed violence, many are convinced that the Brothers are behind terrorist organizations as Gamaa Al Islamiya or Al Qaida. Al Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden successor has a MB past. It is no coincidence that every Egyptian president was on a tense footing with the Brotherhood while simultaneously being forced to deal with them.
The 2011 revolution
When on January 25th the first mass protests filled Tahrir, MB executives declared that its members would not join. They choose evolution, not revolution. Nonetheless many young members joined the revolutionaries at Tahrir. On January 28th the MB realized that remaining on the side-lines was not an option and backed the revolution. That was important because if the organization is capable of one thing, it is raising huge crowds. That became apparent after Hosni Mubarak had fallen and the military leaders made some big errors. If Tahrir needed to be filled, the Brothers delivered. It have them an aura of good organizers that could speak for a large part of Egyptians.
After all, the MB had the aura of the revolution and of decades of resistance to the dictatorship. Muhamed Morsi was pretty used to be in jail and he and many other leader of the MB still were imprisoned on January 25. Besides, they enjoyed the image of being ‘good Muslims’ and therefore honest people, as opposed to the corrupt regime. A third advantage they held over other opposition forces: they had a plan, the so-called Ennahda.
The 2011 elections
Therefore, it was no surprise the MB won the November elections in a very convincing way, with nearly 50% of the votes. The other contenders were divided, badly organized and made quite some campaign mistakes. On the subway, someone explained very plainly why he voted MB. He said: “To marry I must buy an apartment. I can’t do that if I lose my job. The economy must reboot. The MB is our best guarantee for that.”
The enthusiasm in Egypt before, during and after the elections was enormous. People queued for hours to cast their true first vote. Politics and the meaning of the newly won liberty was discussed all over, the subway, the market, at the barber shop. After the elections huge numbers of Egyptians listened in on the sessions of parliament that were broadcasted live on radio. They did so in cabs, in the street, in tea houses. Every word was heard. That initiated the first downfall of the MB.
Every Egyptian heard how chaotic the parliamentary debates were. They heard elected MB and Salafis table the most insane propositions. There was the representative that proposed to make it legal to have sexual intercourse with a spouse up until six hours after she died. It infuriated the average Egyptian. They voted for the MB to improve the economy not to discuss Islam. Popular support for the MB sank rapidly.
The 2012 presidential elections
I was sitting down with a few young revolutionaries the day before the first round of presidential elections. One of them suddenly questioned: ‘What if the second round is between Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq?’ That off course would be every revolutionaries worst nightmare. But voting for Shafiq was out of the question. He was Mubarak’s last prime minister. If Shafiq were to become president, the revolution would have been in vain. To the astonishment of many Egyptians that nightmare choice became reality.
Although Morsi, and thus the MB, only got 25% in the first round, half the score of the parliamentary elections six months earlier, he got the most votes of any candidate. 75% didn’t vote MB, but that vote was divided. It was (and still is) the reality of the opposition: divided and lacking a common strategy. Yours truly suggested the revolutionary candidates endorsed Morsi in return for half the power and a veto right. It never came to an actual deal along those lines for lack of unity in the revolutionary camp.
Nonetheless Muhamed Morsi accepted the proposal, live in the most important TV show on air. He promised to be the guardian of the revolution, the president of all Egyptians and to share power with the liberal opposition. He further promised to appoint a Coptic vice-president and a woman. What were the options available for the revolutionary voter? Letting Shafiq win or reluctantly voting for Morsi, hoping the promises were not hollow words.
Morsi’s broken promises
I stood in the middle of Tahrir amidst a Muslim Brotherhood crowd when Muhamed Morsi was declared winner of the presidential elections and thus the first elected president in the history of Egypt. The relief among those present was indescribable. It felt as if 85 years of persecution fell of the Brothers shoulders. It was the week I published a piece stating Morsi had a choice between cooperating and disappearing. And that if MB failed to live up to their promises, Egyptians fear of them would quickly turn to hatred. That is exactly what happened the past year.
Still, Morsi was off to a good start. He deposed the hated military leader Tantawi and replaced him with the younger general Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi. Tantawi was the face of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) that held all power in the days between Mubarak and Morsi. It was the same SCAF that deprived the president of power during the presidential election weekend by virtue of a hastily drawn up constitutional declaration. Having taken back that power in August Morsi was cheered on by many Egyptians. He had an approval rating of 80%.
Other promises proved harder to realize. In his campaign Morsi had promised to solve Cairo’s traffic problems in a hundred days. And clean up the city. Off course, a hundred days having come and gone, there was not one traffic jam or pile of rubbish less in one of the world’s most chaotic cities. His promise of a woman and a Copt vice president weren’t fulfilled either. Instead he did appoint a widely appreciated judge.
The beginning of the end: the mini-coup
None of these shortcomings were the reason the atmosphere in Egypt shifted all of a sudden. To everyone’s surprise in November 2012, Morsi –by way of his spokesman- issued a new constitutional declaration stripping constitutional court judges of all power. He appointed a new general prosecutor. He further declared that the drafting of the constitutions was to be concluded within the week and to be followed by a referendum in two weeks on a text written almost exclusively by Islamists.
Revolutionary and liberal Egypt was infuriated. Instead of implicating them in the political process, they got pushed aside together with the entire judicial power. Again masses took to the street, protesting “the MB coup”. The MB resorted to armed mobs to disperse the protesters. Some people got dragged into the presidential palace where they were beaten and tortured. Revolutionaries of the first hour declared Morsi to be the new Mubarak. The vice president resigned in protest, as did all independent presidential advisors.
The day after the so-called mini-coup I asked someone close to Morsi what was going on. He told me a incredible story. Morsi and the MB leadership were convinced of a major conspiracy orchestrated by opposition figures as Mohamed El Baradei, the media, judges, businessmen and elements of the old regime. Morsi and his brothers got entrenched in a bunker mentality of ‘us against everyone else’ they haven’t managed to let go since. It induced Morsi to commit mistake upon mistake. Dialogue had become impossible.
The tyranny of the majority
There were several attempts to restore dialogue. The first one was made by the new army commander, general Sisi during the protests against the mini-coup. Morsi refused Sisi’s invitation. Instead he organized his own dialogue between his advisors, the resigning vice-president and the opposition. By that time, the opposition had lost all faith. And it has to be said, the opposition was also divided to the extent that any strategy beyond boycotting seemed impossible.
But despite the divisions the opposition organized itself in the National Salvation Front, headed by Baradei. Once the interlocutors had become clear, the European Union endeavored a kind of compromise in order to share power between the MB and the opposition. Morsi should replace his prime minister and allow the opposition access to five cabinet positions. The electoral law should be adapted according to the remarks made by the Supremer Constitutional Court. The hated general prosecutor should be replaced. European diplomacy chief, Catherine Ashton herself came to Cairo to give this proposal a final push. All seemed to agree. But Morsi did not respond. The political leadership of the MB was divided…
Instead of trying to close the gap, a campaign was launched against leading political and media figures. Journalists were detained. Liberal politicians were accused of spying, of heresy, of conspiring. Even the very popular satirist Bassem Youssef was prosecuted and questioned. Morsi’s approval ratings fell from 80 to 30 percent in less than seven months. More and more people saw him as the president of the Muslim Brothers rather than the president of all Egyptians. Those that had voted for him felt cheated. In the presidential elections they had overcome their deep doubts and anxieties in the name of the revolution. Now they felt betrayed by Morsi.
The youth rises against Morsi
Atop of all the political mistakes, Egypt was doing ever worse economically. There were daily power an water cuts? Petrol shortages became a general nightmare, causing enormous traffic jams at every filling station. Living got a lot more expensive as Egypt’s pound fell. If it hadn’t been for financial aid from Qatar and Libya, Egypt would probably have gone bankrupt in January.
In April some youth had the idea of starting a petition demanding precipitated presidential elections. A big demonstration was planned for June 30th, the first anniversary of Morsi’s oath of office. To their own surprise the response to the petition was overwhelming. Pretty soon they had gathered 2 million signatures. The military realized: June 30 was going to be huge and dangerous. The hatred ran deep. The Army decided on contacting the founders of the Rebel movement (Tamarod) and offered to provide security on the condition of a peaceful demonstration.
Meanwhile the petition amassed an increasing and spectacular number of signatures (it is said that by the end there were 22 million), making everyone realize this would end in an enormous clash between those that saw Morsi as a new dictator (betraying all ideals of the revolution) and the MB (that insisted on respect for election outcome). The days leading up to June 30th already saw some skirmishes and casualties.
The role of the Egyptian Army
The army is highly respected in Egypt. Particularly because as all other institutions seem to fail, the military often appeared the only one that could get things done. Even as it holds a large chunk of the country’s economy (figures vary from 20 to 40 percent), it is considered the only factor to put the country’s interests first. During the 2011 revolution the army chose not to intervene, which meant choosing the side of the protesters in Tahrir. In the end, it was the military that deposed Mubarak.
Of course Morsi too saw June 30 approaching. But instead of searching for a solution, he was looking for ways to divert the people’s attention and to try to gather them behind him. All of a sudden there was the problem of the Nile dam in Ethiopia and the threat of war. The sentencing of NGO employees drew anger in Europe and the US. And suddenly, in front of a packed soccer stadium Morsi changed his Syria strategy and called for a jihad against Assad. At the same time Morsi refused to take tough measures to tackle the anarchy and violence in Sinai where several soldier were kidnapped.
Thus, in June the army saw the convergence of two phenomena. On the one hand a big clash between Morsi opposers and supporters with the potential to grow into a kind of civil war. On the other hand the army saw a president willing to risk national security for political reasons. And this even leaves out the economic consequences of all of this for a country already on the brink. General Sisi made multiple attempts to persuade Morsi to engage in dialogue with the opposition. Morsi not only refused to listen to him, the political office of the MB decided secretly to replace Sisi and a number of other generals. A similar fate was bestowed upon a bunch of ‘conspiring’ judges and journalists.
The finale: June 30 until July 3
The tension on the eve of June 30 was enormous. Everybody believed a massive and violent clash would ensue. Friends told me they were even prepared to die – or at least they were convinced that in the end that would be their fate. But when I went from Tahrir tot the presidential palace and back on June 30, I realized it was al over for Morsi. Never before had so many people taken the streets. Numbers varied from 15 to 33 million Egyptians. Whatever the correct figure, it was clear to all that this was far bigger than the 2011 revolution itself. The protests were too big to fail.
The question then was: what will the military do? Will it wait to intervene until the situation escalates completely into violence or will it try act preventively? General Sisi chose the latter. He gave Egyptian politicians (read: Morsi) 48 hours to come to a solution. Morsi rejected the ultimatum and gave a speech repeating allegations of conspiracies and foreign interference. The only ‘concession’ he made was the promise to hold parliamentary elections within six months.
The army intervened, backed by the liberal opposition, de Coptic pope and the head of Al Azhar, the most renowned institute of Sunni Islam. They advanced a transition plan that was verbatim the one the Rebel-movement had proposed two weeks earlier. I was in Tahrir square when it was announced Morsi had been removed for office and replaced by the presiding judge of the constitutional court. The mood was ecstatic. Millions of Egyptians partied, danced and sang in the streets all night.
Revolution or military coup?
Apart from MB themselves, few Egyptians consider the removal of Morsi a real military coup. Rather it is regarded as a second revolution with the military siding with the people, as was the case in the first revolution. Contrary to what it did in the first revolution in 2011, the army did not assume political control of the transition, but immediately presented a civil president and cabinet. However it is clear that the army continues to play an important role in Egypt, politically and economically, as it has for the past sixty years. Particularly in foreign policy it is and remains the military that sets out the boundaries.
The massacre committed by the military among protesting Muslim Brothers raises serious questions of accountability though. Can anyone hold the military accountable? Or does the army remain an untouchable state within the state? As was the case in Malaysia or Turkey, it will probably take considerable time for the Egyptian army to be reined in to its appropriate role.
The most important question however remains what will happen to the MB? Up until today, they refuse to accept Morsi’s removal as a fact and refuse to talk unless he is restored in his office. We will undoubtedly see more clashes in the weeks and months to come. Still overtures for talks – whether or not under the auspices of the EU – remain possible. In any case, for Egypt to make progress, it is necessary to find some sort of democratic modus vivendi. For this to happen, hate and mistrust will have to make way for something we learned to live with a long time ago in all democratic countries: compromise.
Everyone in Egypt woke up on Monday 8 July with the horrible news that the army had shot dead 51 Muslim Brothers near barracks in Cairo. Immediately, two different stories got propagated. Muslim Brothers claimed their people were unarmed, held a peaceful protest when suddenly the military opened fire. They even showed images purporting infant casualties. The armed forces –and its sympathizers- showed images of (what appeared to be) armed Muslim Brothers trying to attack the barracks. They claim the first casualty was a soldier. They also demonstrated that the images of dead children were old footage.
It is characteristic of the propaganda battle currently raging in Egypt. This battle over truth is extremely important. It sets the mood of the international community just as much as it does that of the Egyptians. A similar propaganda battle is fought over what actually happened on Wednesday July 3th: a military coup or a military intervention. This is no innocent word game but a crucial point that determines the future of Egypt and many Arab states.
To understand what is happening now, every detail of these last months is important. A brief overview. In August it was president Morsi that deposed the hated military leader Tantawi and replaced him by general Sissi. Morsi was convinced Sissi would never be unfaithful. People first took to the street in November, when Morsi grabbed all power while forcing a constitution on Egyptians. Back then it is army commander Sissi that called for dialogue. In the months that followed Sissi repeatly implored Morsi to transform his government to a coalition of national unity. Morsi refused.
When it became clear protests on June 30th would be massive, it was again the army by way of Sissi that asked Morsi to present a solution. When Morsi did exactly the opposite in a speech a couple of days prior to June 30th, even threatening the opposition, Sissi advised the president to resign in order to avoid spiralling violence. Morsi kept repeating he was legitimately elected and that nothing could ever change that. For Muslim Brothers the prevailing sentiment was that all would eventually pass.
The number of people that turned out on June 30th was surprisingly big. Google Earth counted 33 million. That more than a third of Egyptian population. Everybody in Egypt realised that very soon the situation would become untenable. Nonetheless, acting as an go-between, general Sissi sought a solution. He gave all Egyptian politicians 48 hours to come to an understanding. He himself was thinking of the organisation of a referendum.
He ran that idea by the powers that be: the Islamic university Al Azhar, the Coptic church, the opposition through the figure of Mohamed El Baradei and by the youth that was at the origin of the so-called ‘Rebel-campaign’, the actual organisers of the street protests. It was the youth that refused. They wanted Morsi resignation and nothing else. One of their leaders told Sissi: “I want to tell you sir, you might be the commander of the army, but for the moment the people are your commander. Now you must listen to the people and support us”. Apparently this was the decisive contribution that lead to the military intervention. The so-called transition plan advanced by the army was a copy-paste transcription of the plan the “Rebel-youth” had circulated earlier.
Coup or no coup, today Egypt has two presidents: one elected president supported by the Muslim Brothers and one appointed president supported by a large majority of the Egyptian people. No side wants to budge. This is the reason for the current violence in the streets. Up to and including the unacceptable violence of the military directed at pro-Morsi protesters.
What now? Either we enter a French Revolution scenario with one faction reckoning with and succeeding to another every year, finally ending in dictatorship. Or genuine talks recognising all political groups are initiated. Recent events clearly forfeit any scenario that includes Mohamed Morsi. What happened this week makes it increasingly obvious that a stable future is just as impossible with the military in the cockpit. The fact that almost none of the parties and factions of the new coalition agreed on the new constitutional declaration shows that the army can’t just do whatever they want.
The only valid script that can bring Egypt from chaos to order will have to be based on the very principles that got 33 million Egyptians in the streets. It’ll have to be an Egypt that allows everybody the freedom to be themselves. Whether they are Salafi, Muslim, Copt or even atheist. Every government or president that tries to curtail this freedom in one way or another will once again face a full Tahrir and a new revolution.
You can follow @koertdebeuf on Twitter
(with thanks to Kristof Debergh for the translation)
“We are not leaving before Morsi does.” Such was the reaction I heard just about anywhere in Cairo these last days. The determination was reinforced by the historic turn out on June 30th. The armed forces initially spoke of 13 million people, the ministry of information called it at 17 million. Some media stated that in the whole of Egypt no less than 30 million people had taken to the streets.
Whatever the correct number, millions of Egyptians were united in one single message: erhal the Arab word for ‘leave’.
Non-Egyptians wonder what Morsi must have done wrong to get that much people in the streets? Some point to the economy as the main reason. It is certainly true that Egypt is at the brink of the economic abyss. Every day there are multiple outages of power and running water. There is hardly any petrol left, creating very long queues at gas stations which in turn cause big traffic jams. Tourism, Egypt’s major source of income, has fallen drastically to a fraction of what it once was. The currency lost a quarter of its value, making everything more expensive. This is particularly hard on the large group of very poor Egyptians.
Yet, this is not the reason for the massive turn out at protests. It is clearly not a hunger revolution either. While having a cup of tea close to the presidential palace, I could observe the massive crowds passing by. The diversity was apparent: young and old, veiled and unveiled women, poor and rich, Muslim and Christian. Furthermore, it is important to stress that the atmosphere was and still is positive. Yesterday Tahrir and neighbouring streets looked like one big festival. Fireworks were lit. There was singing and dancing.
What brings all of these people together is a sense of betrayal. The Muslim Brotherhood was given a chance after the revolution. They were the best organised and had the most thought-through ideas. People imagined the brotherhood to be the best shot at fulfilling the ideals of the revolution: freedom, dignity, justice and bread. Exactly what was expected of Morsi. And Morsi was off to a good start. He replaced the hated military leader Tantawi and re-seized the power the armed forces had taken from the president.
All changed in November 2012. Morsi and his party were convinced of a major conspiracy in the making. Mursi’s response was a constitutional declaration seizing all power and shoving an Islamic constitution down Egyptians throats. As of that moment more and more Egyptians got convinced Morsi was just a Muslim Brotherhood president and not the president of the Egyptian people.
That is at the core of this week’s protests: people do not accept one group forcing its agenda upon an entire nation, regardless of whether that group has an electoral majority. This rising against “the tyranny of the majority” we see in Egypt today and we saw in Turkey these last months. In Turkey too, people do not accept the economic progress generated under Erdogan’s rule as an excuse to govern as he pleases.
This is Mursi’s and the Muslim Brotherhood’s big error of judgement. Convinced of their majority, they thought the opposition was small and divided and that people would eventually side by them. June 30th that certainly turned out differently. No one can withstand such masses. Not even the army. The military brass saw what happened and saw that it could result in a huge spiral of violence. This is probably why they issued an ultimatum, to avoid Egypt turning into one giant street fight.
In the meantime everybody is abandoning ship. Ministers resigned. The president’s press secretary quit, as did a number of governors. Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are increasingly isolated as the people seem determined to continue to protest. Some claim an elected president cannot simply be deposed. That would be special, but not unique. US president Nixon resigned to avoid impeachment. French president Charles De Gaulle resigned upon losing a referendum. A referendum that was organised in response to the many street protests seen by France in those days.
Whatever the outcome of this battle of titans, some conclusions are already clear. For one thing, a very religious country such as Egypt does not accept its religion to be politically abused in power plays. Islam, like Christianity, is a very diverse religion. Imposing one interpretation on the rest of the population is not tolerated. Secondly, citizens of a country in transition are very aware that democracy is not just holding elections. Whomever is elected will have to listen to the rest of the people. Majority-reasoning is refuted. Finally, it is clear people do not accept the hard won freedom to be restricted again by anyone. Those who try are removed immediately. Those are the signals in Egyptian streets today. And those are reason to be optimistic about the outcome of the Arab Spring.
Hayat TV to close down
Hayat TV, a progressive Turkish TV channel of the working people, the youth, women and the intellectuals is facing closure.
We believe this is a blow to people’s freedom of information.
The decision for the closure is made by the broadcasting regulator RTÜK, Radio & Television High Commission with the pretext that Hayat TV has no licence.
This is not true.
Hayat TV has been broadcasting since 21 March 2007 by ofcom license via TURKSAT satellite. But a recent change in broadcasting rules via TURKSAT requires broadcasters to obtain a RTÜK license to be able to broadcast via satellite.
Our application for a RTÜK license has been submitted and pending for a decision. We have taken all the necessary steps and RTÜK agreed that we could carry on broadcasting as it is until a RTÜK license is granted.
However, RTÜK is now making an arbitrary decision to close down our channel because of, we believe, our broadcast of recent protests in Istanbul and across Turkey.
RTÜK says they investigated “the complaints received for our coverage of the Gezi Park protests” and made a decision for the closure.
We believe this closure is part of the overall repression on the media in Turkey during the more than two-week-long Gezi Park protests. Four other TV channels have been given a fine by RTUK because of their coverage of the recent events.
RTUK sent a letter to TURKSAT to put an end to Hayat TV broadcast at 12:00 p.m. on Friday, 14th June 2013.
We believe this arbitrary and unlawful decision should be reversed.
We call on all democratically minded people to show solidarity with Hayat TV.
Hayat TV Broadcast Coordinator
(Red. Support freedom of press and spread this letter. For more info you can follow @koertdebeuf on Twitter)
One of these days Libyan Members of Parliament, Ministers and most probably even the President of the GNC (General National Congress) will have to resign, due to the Political Isolation Law. After this law was voted by the Libyan parliament I wrote on Twitter: “Mahmud Gebril is excluded from running in elections. The man who prevented the Benghazi massacre. Justice?” I was pretty surprised about the reactions I received. And not by the least informed. They all found my statement very much exaggerated. It was not because Gebril was on TV a lot that he also has done something substantial, they said. It made me realize that in fact the real story behind the no-fly-zone in Libya has not been told.
The most told version of what happened has been loudly spread by Bernard Henri-Lévy. On how he went to Libya, came back to Paris and convinced Sarkozy to plea for a no-fly-zone. It was also BHL who convinced Mahmud Gebril to come to Paris and it was he who pushed the president to recognize the National Transition Council. A very short version of the heroic story of Henri-Lévy is most probably true indeed. If Sarkozy was the first one to call for a no-fly-zone in Libya, just one week after the revolution started on February 17, 2011 I do not doubt BHL did play his role. In the rest of this history the starring role was not for BHL, but for Mahmud Gebril.
In the first week of March a Libyan opposition member in Brussels called Louis Michel to ask if he could see some members of the National Transition Council. Michel is the former Foreign Minister of Belgium and now Member of European Parliament. The first thing Michel does is calling Guy Verhofstadt, former Prime Minister of Belgium and now president of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in the European Parliament (ALDE). They both agree they should invite these Libyan to the ALDE Group in the European Parliament in Strasbourg.
Getting the Libyans to Strasbourg was not easy. The meeting of the ALDE group was on 8 March, but we could only start with the procedure for the visa on Saturday the 5th. I called the Chief of Staff of the Foreign Minister of Belgium. Apart from the fact that he was not very cooperative (who are these Libyan rebels?), he explained me that there exists an urgency visa procedure, but that this only counted for the country that issues it and not for the entire Schengen zone. So, we had to call the French government. My colleague got permission and a security clearance from the French Minister of Interior. As an former advisor of President Sarkozy, he of course warned the President that two members of the NTC would be in France: Dr. Mahmud Gebril and Dr. Ali A. S . Al-Issawi.
The only thing we knew about both gentlemen was that Al-Issawi was the Libyan ambassador in India and that he defected to the opposition in February as a reaction to the violent response of Muamar Gaddafi. Of Mahmud Gebril we knew near to nothing. The contact person we had to call for more practical arrangements was a lawyer, living in Geneva. His name was Ali Zeidan. I only realized a few weeks ago that this was actually the same person as the current Libyan Prime Minister.
At the meeting of the ALDE group (which was open to other parties as well) on 8 March, Mahmud Gebril surprised everyone. This unknown man was so short and precise in his description of the situation of the Libyan revolution and in his demands to the European Union that for the audience it was almost impossible not to be convinced. Gebril spoke with authority. Most of all, he made clear to everyone that there would be a serious alternative if Gaddafi would fall.
Gebril asked three things from international communitiy:
1. the recognition of the National Interim Council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people;
2. guarantee the supply of humanitarian assistance to the Libyan people particularly where there is shortage of food and medicine and a lack of secure telephone lines;
3. enforce a no-fly-zone (but no military intervention) to prevent further killing.
Guy Verhofstadt asked me to write these demands literally down in a press release together with the plea to the international community to support each one of this.
We also tried to convince EU High Representative Cathy Ashton to meet with Gebril. She hesitated. A few days earlier she had received a common letter from all European ambassadors in Tripoli in which they stated it would be best for the EU not to take sides in the conflict. After all, what would the EU do if Gaddafi would win? But a few hours later her spokesperson told me at the coffee bar that she would meet him, but that it would be a secret meeting. The meeting apparently went well as he called me to say it was ok for the press to know about it.
During the debate in the plenary of the European Parliament the next day Ashton refused to promise anything about the possible recognition of the NTC. Even though most speakers did ask for it. I even had to go to her with a compromise proposal in which she would promise to put it on the table of the European Council. But as Ashton never moves without having consulted with the other Ministers of Foreign Affairs, she even refused to say that.
President Sarkozy on the contrary did not hesitate. Originally, the plan of the Libyan delegation was to go to Geneva after the plenary debate in Strasbourg. Zeidan knew his way there and would organize some interesting meetings. But the plans changed as the Elysée called them: the President of France wanted to meet them. Sarkozy knew he didn’t make a very good impression by not supporting the revolution in Tunisia. Next to that, he was not doing well in the opinion polls for the presidential elections. As he knew from his Interior Minister that the Libyan opposition was in the country and probably saw the ALDE press release, he saw his chance. So, on 10 March that’s where they went.
I was driving in my car back home when I heard on the news that Sarkozy recognized the National Transition Council and of course supported the other two demands of Gebril, as he called for a no-fly-zone already before. Nobody in the French government was informed. Even not his Foreign Minister Alain Juppé. Juppé and his German colleague, Guido Westerwelle just closed their bilateral meeting and were walking towards the press point. A few meters before the press point one of the advisors of Juppé gave him a small paper. To his surprise he read the message that his president just recognized the NTC. Although not known for hesitating, Sarkozy must have been very convinced of what he heard and saw of Gebril.
Although winning the support of France was very important, it would not be enough to convince the UN Security Council to install a no-fly-zone over Libya. It of course helped a lot that the Arab League asked for a no-fly-zone on 12 March, in a unique moment of decisiveness and consensus. But to push it through it needed the support of the United States was needed. That was a problem. The US was very much surprised by the demand of the Arab League, but still had no appetite at all to go into another Arab war. Colum Lynch (Turtlebay, October 23, 2012) wrote that the US Ambassador to the UN snapped to her French colleague who asked for support: “You are not going to drag us into your shitty war”.
Two days before the vote on Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011 Susanne Rice changed position and started very actively to convince the other countries to endorse the resolution. On March 15 Rice said: “We are discussing very seriously and leading efforts in the Council around a range of actions that we believe could be effective in protecting civilians — those include discussion of a No-Fly Zone. But the U.S. view is that we need to be prepared to contemplate steps that include, but perhaps go beyond, a No-Fly Zone. At this point, as the situation on the ground has evolved, and as a No-Fly Zone has inherent limitations in terms of protection of civilians at immediate risk.” What happened?
Lynch writes that “the United States held a high-level teleconference with Obama’s top national security team, including Rice and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who had just met with Arab leaders, agreed to intervene.” On 15 March, Clinton went indeed to Cairo where she met with Egyptian Foreign Minister El-Arabi and with Amr Moussa, Secretary-General of the Arab League, who explained to her why the Arab states were convinced about an intervention in Libya. It’s no secret that Gaddafi was not especially liked by the other Arab leaders.
However, few people know about the meeting Clinton had the day before, on March 14, in Paris. She had to be there that day for the G8. It was most probably Sarkozy who convinced her to meet with Mahmud Gebril. After his meeting with the French President, Gebril, Al-Issawi and Zeidan took the train to Brussels. He quickly had to come back to Paris for probably the most important mission of his life: convincing the United States to support the UN resolution that would allow the installation of a no-fly-zone in Libya. Clinton and Gebril met for 45 minutes. After the meeting however no declaration was given and no information was leaked which is usually an indication that something important happened.
The rest of the story is well known. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, after intensive lobbying by France, the UK and the US. At the beginning of the meeting with those countries that agreed to participate to the no-fly-zone, France immediately send fighter jets to Benghazi. Not less then sixteen miles of military vehicles were at the gates of Benghazi. Some of the vehicles, full of soldiers and mercenaries loyal to Gaddafi already entered the city. The goal was very simple: erase Benghazi, rape as many women (and men) as possible, kill everyone and destroy every building. Executing the warning of Muamar Gaddafi: “We will find you, wherever you are”.
The new Political Isolation Law is now preventing Mahmud Gebril to become even Member of Parliament. But it’s not only about Gebril. It’s about all those courageous Libyans who defected as soon as they could. Together with so many Libyans who gave and risked their life for a better Libya, they are the ones who made the revolution succeed. Moreover, they are probably the best place people to rebuild the country Gaddafi left destroyed in the past. It seems that the Political Isolation Law might destroy the future of Libya as well.
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A few days ago, a Belgian mother called me to ask if I could contact the Syrian Jihadists of Jabhat Al Nusra. Her son left his family to join them a month and a half ago and since then she hasn’t heard anything of him anymore. I had to disappoint her, as I have no contact with the Jihadists. In fact, when in Syria, I always try to avoid them.
She was of course very worried, but also embarrassed. Her son is fighting in a battle she does not at all support and even not understand. I kind of recognize this embarrassment as it made me recall the story of a relative whom my family barely ever talks about. He was killed in the Second World War when he decided to fight with the Nazis against the Communists. He believed he had to choose between Rome and Moscow; between God and the Devil and that this choice needed sacrifice even if it meant his own life.
Each time I travelled to Syria during the last months, I saw Jihadists taking the same plane and the same bus as I did and following the same illegal way to enter northern Syria. What drew my attention and worried me each time is the self-confidence in their eyes, the acceptance that they will die in Syria. Above all, they are proud of it. They know they are going to be at the front line of the battle and that some people will admire them for that. And for them, this is exactly what they missed in their lives; admiration, guidance and heroic acts.
What disturbed me most however, wasn’t seeing these Jihadists entering Syria. I can’t stop them anyway. No, what is worse is that I didn’t see any others entering Syria. No relief teams, no doctors and no trucks loaded with aid for the other Syrians, for the vast majority of the rebels who have nothing to do with the Jihadists’ ideologies. While Al Qaida’s friends possess weapons and money to distribute to their fighters, people are dying of hunger in refugee camps supervised by the FSA.
We in the West are so mesmerized by a small group of radicals that we lost the ability to see the reality. By fearing the ghost of Afghanistan, we decided to do nothing. Because if we do nothing, we can’t do anything wrong. And this is precisely the huge mistake we are committing today. Because by doing nothing we only make Assad and the Jihadists stronger. While we are leaving those who share our values on their own.
The main excuse I hear for not intervening is: we don’t know what the Free Syrian Army is and we don’t know what they want. It’s a silly excuse. Because if you don’t know, it’s simply because you haven’t done the effort. It’s not that difficult. Two weeks ago, I had a dinner in Turkey with the Chief of Staff of the FSA, Salim Idriss and four of the five Front Commanders. Anyone who does the effort to go to Antakya will be able to meet any officer of the FSA. You will hear that they want freedom and democracy, that they try everything in order to respect human rights, protect the minorities and help the refugees. But you will also hear that they don’t have the means to achieve these goals properly.
Anyone who makes an effort can reach the refugee camps in Syria very easily and will be able to see how disastrous and inhuman the situation is there, how children spend sometimes days without food or even weeks without milk, how they die because of injuries, caused by a shrapnel, due to lack of medical care. You will see how our aid to Syria is mainly distributed through Assad, which is the reason why almost no aid is reaching the liberated areas. Whoever makes an effort will see that it are the soldiers of Assad and no one else that are attacking and bombarding civilians.
But, apparently all this requires too much effort. We prefer to do nothing “as we don’t know what will happen after Assad falls”. Just imagine that the Americans and the British wouldn’t have entered in WWII because of fear of communists, and because, they too, didn’t know “what would happen after Hitler falls.
Should we be surprised then that those who fight for a better Syria are getting more and more angry and frustrated with the West? They have to witness how the only thing that comes from the West are Jihadist fighters – whatever small and insignificant their number is – while the secular forces and the Syrian people are being left on their own.
It is of course justified to feel uncomfortable and even fearful for “our boys” who go to this far away and unknown Syria to fight for the sake of forming an Islamic State. However, we will not solve this problem by trying to stop them. We will only solve them if we start to engage in Syria itself. It’s less difficult than we might think. We just need to do an effort.
(with thanks to Maha Alasil for helping with the translation from the Arabic version)
The day Mohamed Morsi was elected as the first civilian president of Egypt in June last year most reform minded people were hopeful. With many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood Morsi spent many years in prison. No doubt they would do everything to change this ‘society of paranoia’, wouldn’t they? In his first speech as elected president Morsi also promised to form an inclusive government and to appoint a female and a Coptic vice-president. The main question back in June was how Morsi would deal with the army. In a ‘mini-coup’ the army curtailed the president’s position and absolved the People’s Assembly.
And yes, Morsi’s first decisions were bold. He tried to reinstall the People’s assembly. He turned back the ‘mini-coup’ of the army and took the power back. On top of this he fired Field-Marshall Tantawi (and his number two Sami Anan), to replace him with general Sisi. Morsi also appointed as his presidential advisors people from all over the political and religious spectrum. All these steps were of major importance. Not only for Egypt that seemed to be on the way to a rapid reform from a autocratic to a democratic state. The entire world was watching closely.
Moreover, it is hard to underestimate the leading role of Egypt in the Arab world. Egypt is by far the most populated country and claims the historical leadership of the Arab society. Not less important is the fact that the largest political organisation in the Arab world has its origins and its leadership in Egypt: the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is like the communist party in Russia in times of the Soviet-Union. All sister parties in the region are following very closely what they are saying and doing.
Generous in victory, gracious in defeat.
Contrary to their promises the Muslim Brotherhood was not very generous in victory. No female or Coptic vice-president was appointed. The government appeared to be not inclusive. The presidential advisors from outside the Brotherhood were not listened to, while the ones of the Brotherhood had nothing to say. Very soon the old underground culture of following orders instead of discussing them found back its place at the presidential palace. What came back as well was suspicion: every one is against us. The consequence was a bunker mentality: outside the bunker there is a huge conspiracy against the Muslim Brotherhood. The only option is to fight back.
So, that’s what the Muslim Brotherhood did, fighting back. First they replaced the editors in chief of most of the main newspapers. Then they tried to sideline liberal and Coptic voices in the Constitutional Committee. Then Morsi took all power by presidential decree. He sidelined the Constitutional Court and installed his own public prosecutor. He finished the Constitution and put it to a referendum two weeks later.
As the reaction of the people was much bigger than they thought, the Muslim Brothers saw their conspiracy theory confirmed. The only way was fighting back even harder. On the streets and by court. The new public prosecutor started accusing opposition politicians, activists and random people in the street.
However, it must be said that the opposition wasn’t gracious in defeat either. After they organized themselves in the National Salvation Front (NSF) they boycotted as good as everything. By doing so the NSF didn’t miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. They refused to talk to president Morsi, to vice-president Mekki and to the Muslim Brotherhood. They boycotted the Constitutional Committee, the referendum and the elections. If 38 percent of the Egyptians went to vote against the referendum, it was despite and not thanks to the opposition.
The collapse is becoming very close
If all political turmoil would happen in an economic prosperous environment, then the citizens would react with increasing apathy. Unfortunately, the exact contrary is happening. Morsi launched his presidential decree and the constitution during the negotiations with the IMF. Although the IMF is politically neutral, turmoil and fights in the street does make them doubt about the political stability and thus the ability to reform.
Today the IMF doubts proved to be right. No deal has been made. This means that Egypt misses a loan of in total 14,5 billion dollar as the loans of institutions as the EU, the EBRD and the African Union are connected to the one of the IMF. At the same time the Egyptian Pound is faltering, power cuts become a daily issue, rows of cars and trucks waiting for diesel are growing. Tourism – the main source of income – is a disaster. Investors are waiting, while large foreign companies are one after the other leaving the country.
For the average Egyptian the cost of living is becoming a nightmare. The anger is clearly growing. And instead of seeing politicians working hard to improve this situation, they see them fighting and taking decisions about blocking porn on the internet or allowing police officers to grow a beard. Instead of creating an investment friendly environment, the Muslim Brothers are targeting activists, journalists and comedians for insulting the president or insulting religion.
The question is not if but when it will explode
It is hard to overestimate the anger and the fear of the Egyptian people. You could compare it with a room full of gas. It only needs one spark in order to make it explode. That spark could well be the subsidies for bread and energy that need to be reformed. The last time Egypt tried to cut subsidies was in 1977, under Sadat; it immediately lead to the only uncontrollable riots ever. If we see the anarchy today in cities as Port Said, Suez or Malhalla, it is clear that no party will be able to control the streets if the situation explodes.
In the meantime, president Morsi and his government are making the one mistake after the other. It’s as if the Muslim Brotherhood is on a suicide mission. Not only for Egypt but also for the entire Arab world. The same day Morsi issued his decree in November 2012, the protest for political reform in Jordan halted as they feared only the Jordanian Muslim Brothers would profit from it. A few days ago the Syrian Muslim Brothers even complained that their Egyptian counterparts were ruining their reputation.
We know from history that the situation of Egypt is not exceptional. France for example did eighty years from revolution to a stable democracy. And the transition in Central-Europe took almost two decades. History teaches us that the biggest danger in times of collapse and anarchy is the rise of a new populist or a new strong man. That could be someone like the Salafist Abu Ismael or again someone of the army. That would bring the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the opposition back to square one.
But that doesn’t mean chaos is the only way. Although it is already very late, it isn’t too late to move this country forward. Egypt has everything: natural resources, a young ambitious population and the most attractive touristic combination in the world. The only thing that is needed is parties and politicians forgetting their ego and their honour and start a real dialogue about solving problems together. The last window of opportunity is closing rapidly. Dear politicians, for the sake of the people of Egypt, don’t miss this last chance. Otherwise, there will be no winners left.
Egypt is in total chaos. In a few days people will have to vote on the new constitution of the country. This is a moment of utmost importance. If Egypt votes in favour it will set the lines for all politics in the next ten years. Such an important decision should be made with at least some knowledge and in a calm atmosphere. Egypt’s situation today is the complete opposite.
Chaos started with the Constitutional Declaration of President Morsi on November 22. In this decree, he took all power in order to prevent the Supreme Constitutional Court to abort the constitutional process. This would be a logical step for the Court as it declared the People’s Assembly unconstitutional before. And it was this Assembly that selected the Constitutional Assembly. Morsi believed that rather than a legal point of view, the court was taking a political one, with a goal: obstructing the Islamist majority. True or not, Morsi went much too far than necessary for his purpose.
When the Islamist majority (the others had left) voted the constitution in a rush, everything pointed in the direction of an Islamist takeover of the country. Most worrying indeed, but the question is, is it illegitimate? I think everyone agrees that the power grab of Morsi was not legitimate. I am sure he thinks so himself. More importantly however is the question if the constitution is illegitimate? Frankly, I don’t see why it would be. The people elected the People’s Assembly. The one third of the candidates that should have been independent from any party, weren’t independent. However, not only the FJP failed to do that; all parties were complicit. So, it might be unconstitutional but is not undemocratic or illegitimate. (By the way, I never understood why nobody ever said before the elections to all parties that party people would be barred from running for these seats.) In any case, this free and fair elected assembly selected a Constitutional Assembly of 100 people. One can discuss whether this selection is fair, but it is certainly not undemocratic or illegitimate.
Why did so many representatives run out of the Constitutional Assembly? Writing a constitution is not the same as making a budget. The latter can easily be voted majority against opposition. That’s politics. But a constitution is different. Constitutions are essentially the protection of minorities, of weaker groups and people, of individual freedom as well. Constitutions are the protection of the minorities against whatever majority. The fact that several ‘minorities’ felt insufficiently heard, gives this constitution a flavour of fundamental unfairness. But that doesn’t make it illegitimate.
In short, President Morsi took power in an illegitimate way in order to protect a legitimate draft constitution. But that doesn’t mean that the constitution is a fair and fully democratic piece. Also from a legal point of view one might have some questions. How on earth, for example, can a constitution say that it is forbidden to insult a human being? Is saying to my neighbour that I don’t like his shirt unconstitutional?
But back to the chaos. The soap of the last days is of almost mythical proportions. From the opposition side as today it is totally unclear what its position is. They said yesterday that they are against all presidential decrees. But at the same time some parties are campaigning for a no in the referendum. It is still unclear if the opposition (or a part of it?) will boycott the referendum or not. Some say Morsi has to go, others that he has to change his decrees and change the constitution. The chaos from the president’s side however is much more confusing. The day after he gives his (much delayed) speech in which he says nothing is going to change, the Vice-President said something might change. Even more, VP Mekki said the President might delay the referendum, while Al-Awa said after the negotiations that a delay is impossible. The President said the constitution is not going to change, but at a bit later he says (through his spokesman) that if the opposition agrees on the articles it doesn’t like, he will put them in a law and bring it to the next parliament. One week before the referendum the President issues a law that increases taxes on a lot of things, but he cancels the law the same night at 2.30 am. The government wasn’t informed. And there is also the question of the organisation of the referendum. Some judges decided to boycott, others said they will overview. What is the army going to do? Who is going to count the votes? Who is going to supervise the counting of the votes?
This is the atmosphere in which the people of Egypt have to decide on the most important document of the next ten years, at least. One can disagree if the constitution or the process is democratic or not. But everyone cannot but agree that a referendum in the current chaos would be very undemocratic. Democracy is essentially a system to disagree in a civilized way. It also means giving people a chance to disagree. Organizing a referendum in one week time is denying the people the chance to discuss about the constitution and yes, also disagree.
So there are essentially two sides. Morsi and his Islamist forces exude confidence that this constitution is fair and representative of Egypt’s values. And they are confident of victory. Fine. Then they should have no problem with a delay. The other side feels the constitution is flawed and does not represent Egypt’s values. Fine again. Then they too should support only one constitutional decree that gives a thirty-day delay to properly make their case to the Egyptian voters. So, it becomes simple: hold the referendum in mid-January 2013. And let’s have a proper debate.
What was Morsi thinking on the evening of November 22? Everyone expected him to take some measures to appease the clashes that commemorated the many killed revolutionaries one year ago in Mohamed Mahmud Street. Instead he made a Constitutional Declaration of seven articles, giving himself unlimited powers. Article 2 says: “All constitutional declarations, laws and decrees made since Morsi assumed power on 30 June 2012 cannot be appealed or canceled by any individual, or political or governmental body until a new constitution has been ratified and a new parliament has been elected. All lawsuits against them are declared void.” Article 6 says that “The president is authorized to take any measures he sees fit in order to preserve the revolution, to preserve national unity or to safeguard national security.”
Not only the world was stunned, Mohamed Morsi himself was also surprised, by the overall negative reaction. Didn’t he take these powers to give blinded revolutionaries pensions, to reopen the trials that let those responsible for the killings unpunished, to give the liberals more time to finish the constitution? And above all, didn’t he fire one of the most hated remnants of the old regime, the public prosecutor, who refused to investigate so many cases filed by revolutionaries? So, what was Morsi thinking when he issued his declaration? Was it amateurism or bad will? A lot of people on Tahrir said: “Told you so. The Muslim Brotherhood is a Masonic-like organization who wants to take power in order to turn Egypt into a second Iran.” I believe the problem lies somewhere else.
I asked sources, close to the president and the government, in private what was going on. What they told me struck the historian in me. They unfolded to me that the government had proof that the judges, the administration and the media were conspiring against the president and the government. Not to overthrow them but to block whatever they wanted to do to make progress. The media, they said, did not bring the good news. They only criticize. No wonder, because they were paid by foreign funds. There was even proof that some liberals were in the same kind of conspiracy.
Sure there is some truth to it. The media hasn’t been very kind. The Constitutional Court had dissolved the People’s Assembly and was poised to dissolve the Constitutional Assembly as well. The public prosecutor has indeed not been very cooperative. The judges seemed to have used legal grounds to motivate political rulings. The bureaucracy is dragging decisions into the administrative mud. And the liberals walked out of the Constitutional Assembly. But labeling al this as a conspiracy is more then one bridge too far. I have worked in opposition and government in Belgium. Every politician gets that feeling at least once in his career. The ‘they-are-all-against-us-motif’ is an all time classic. It happens in all countries in the entire world. The question is how do you react to it?
The biggest danger is going into the bunker-mentality, closing your self up in retreat, waiting for the right moment for a counter-attack. In a fully fledged democracy this counter-attack is always pretty harmless, because the bunker-mentality makes you misread the situation and loose the next election. Nicolas Sarkozy is a good example. In a post-revolutionary situation, the counter-attack is mostly very dangerous. Because whatever you decide, your bunker-mentality will make you only more suspicious and will encourage you to go down the path of dictatorship, step by step.
Egypt has seen this evolution before. When Nasser took power in 1952 he didn’t shut down democracy immediately. I even think his initial intentions were good. He wanted to liberate Egypt from its foreign occupiers and their puppets. But then he was drawn into the bunker-mentality. He didn’t trust his former friends anymore and surely not the political parties that wanted to block his plans. Gradually, Nasser turned into a brutal dictator himself, sacking president Naguib, abolishing political parties and imprisoning all ‘anti-revolutionary forces’.
This is the psychology of post-revolutionary dictatorship: fighting the enemy of the revolution from an ever smaller becoming bunker. Many revolutionary leaders went down the same path. After the French revolution some leaders wanted to fight against the counterrevolutionary forces. They weren’t butchers by nature. On the contrary, they were mainly intellectuals who were suddenly overwhelmed by the fear that the revolution might fail. Lenin made the same mistake. Initially, he wanted to install a government out of representatives of the Soviets. The Soviets were the councils set up by soldiers, farmers and workers against the reign of the Tsar. But when the councils – without which no revolution would have been possible – criticized the plans of Lenin, he labelled them as enemies of the people and sent them to Siberia.
I am not saying that Morsi is a dictator or that the Muslim Brothers are the same ruthless people as the Bolsheviks. But they should realize that there is no such thing as a big conspiracy against them. There simply is no human brain big enough to master media, judges, politicians and the street. That only exists in films of James Bond. Most people just fight for their ideas or for their own position. Of course, there are many opponents who would like to see them fail, but that is the case in every democracy. The Central-European countries needed two decades to become well-functioning democracies after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Transition is not easy and it takes an awful amount of time.
The problem is that once you go down the path to dictatorship, there is hardly a way back. So Morsi has the choice: either he sticks with his declaration and has to start a crackdown in order to maintain it. Or he leaves his bunker, cancels his declaration and faces the difficulties every post-revolutionary transition has to deal with. There is always a way out. The president and the opposition should start a dialogue instead of setting ultimatums. Deleting articles 2 and 6 and agreeing on a way to move forward with the Constituent Assembly might be the only solution to avoid a major political deadlock. It is not easy and often very frustrating. But thinking that a short period of dictatorship will set everything right is wrong. History proves that the path to democracy never leads through dictatorship.
«I didn’t realize that you hate us», said European Commissioner Stefan Fühle after a two hour discussion with Egyptian NGO’s. It was the last meeting of the EU-Egypt Taskforce. This Taskforce assembled four hundred politicians and entrepreneurs for two days in Cairo in order to see how we could better cooperate. The meeting was very high level. From the Egyptian side the prime minister was there, the foreign minister and many other ministers and members of the Shura Council. From the European side Lady Ashton was there, as well as EU Commissioners Tajani and Fühle, many foreign ministers and members of European Parliament.
The most important news from the Taskforce was the announcement by the European Commission to support Egypt with no less than 5 billion euro. Not without conditions. Egypt should comply with the conditions of the IMF. A thing Egyptians don’t really like to hear. They have a collective historical aversion of foreign loans. It was King Mohamed Ali who took loans from Britain and France to build the newly independent Egypt into a European-style power in the first half of the 19th century. When he was unable to pay the loans back, Britain took half of the Egyptian ministries. It was only until the Suez crisis in 1956, more then a century later, that Egypt succeeded in kicking the foreign powers out and regained its independency. This historical fear, together with the feeling of humiliation – why can’t we govern our own business in a proper way – makes Egyptians happy and unhappy at the same time with foreign support and certainly if it is conditioned.
Conditions, that is what it is all about. When I visited with some liberal Members of European Parliament the Prime Minister just after the revolution (it was still Shafiq…), he told us that we supported Mubarak before and that we were not well placed to tell the Egyptians what to do. A few months later we met with PM Sharaf and he told us the same thing. Guess what, this week PM Qandil and president Morsi gave the Europeans exactly the same message. And the Europeans feeling guilty about the Mubarak era back off. At least publicly. Not realizing that by being silent they make the same mistake as they did with Mubarak. The most obvious example during this week was the incident with the civil society.
The Egyptian government invited the civil society (NGO’s, human rights and development organisations) to participate to the EU-Egypt Taskforce. A few days before the actual meeting the government withdrew the invitation. The European Commission was not pleased and thought about what they could do. Or they could blow up the whole thing, but in their eyes that seemed a bit exaggerated. Or they could insist on meeting the civil society separate from the official program. That’s what they did.
So this is the core of the perfect mutual misunderstanding. The EU honestly thinks that as long as they listen to the civil society and take their remarks serious, everything is fine. Even more, a high-level European representative asked the civil society to be grateful as the EU did organise a dinner with them. The Egyptian civil society was utterly shocked that they were erased from the official delegation and sidelined to a dinner. Why? This is not only about pride. This is about the revolution itself. Not the organisers of the Taskforce risked their life on Tahrir square. On the contrary, they are exactly the same people of twenty (some even forty) years ago. It were these guys who sidelined the civil society every single time under Mubarak and it were the same guys who repeated the same scenario. As if the revolution never happened.
When European Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Fühle comes to explain during a dinner for the sidelined civil society that there are also human rights and democratic conditions in the EU package, he should not be surprised that the attendees react sceptically and even angry. Because if he is serious about these conditions, why did he then allow the Egyptian government to screw the first moment where his words could be applied? And this in the very week, one year after the clashes in Mohamed Mahmud street, where more than forty youngsters had been killed by police snipers. Nevertheless, Mister Fühle, the Egyptians don’t hate the EU. But they are vey frustrated and disillusioned. They had hoped for more. Much more. And frankly, they are right.